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Abstract
A growing body of literature on comparative international entrepreneurship has focussed
on exploring the factors that explain differences in entrepreneurial activity across
countries. In particular, the institutional environment is regarded as a crucial influence
on this activity, yet there is less agreement about which institutions matter, and more
importantly, in what ways do they matter. Much of the research focussed on explaining
the influence of institutions on entrepreneurship has taken a specific and narrow
approach to institutional theory. This views institutions as ‘converging’ creations which
posit a theoretical ‘one-best-way’, largely seen as liberal and non-interventionist. This
approach to institutional theory overlooks the nuanced diversity of the institutional
environment which defines the architecture of capitalist economies.
In order to develop a broader understanding of this phenomenon, this thesis utilises
perspectives from comparative institutionalism. The intent of this research is to
empirically understand institutional diversity across countries, and its potential impact
on comparative international entrepreneurship.
This study utilises a quantitative approach with two sequential steps. The first
step comprises of a principal components analysis with the attempt to develop robust
quantitative variables which proxy for a countries institutional context. A cluster
vii
analysis of these variables is further employed to provide an objective contextual taxon-
omy of institutions and ‘diversities of institutional systems’. This objective contextual
taxonomy helps give legitimacy to such diversity approach. The variables here are
then transformed for the second step, which utilises multivariate panel modelling. The
overall aim of this step is to estimate various model specifications outlining potential
statistical relationships and directions between institutional diversities and aggregate
level of entrepreneurship.
The results of this analysis present three key contributions. Firstly, that there exists
rich institutional diversity between political economies, identified by nine taxonomies
of countries across an optimum clustering of four ‘modes of capitalism’, defined by
complementary variants across institutional sub-spheres. Secondly, the relationship
between the degree of institutional coordination within the institutional complemen-
tarity format and the level of entrepreneurial activity is non-linear. Specifically, the
relationship is quadratic and ‘U’ shaped. Where the institutional structure of the
political economy allows for higher levels of market coordination or higher levels of
strategic coordination, estimated entrepreneurship rates are higher than they are when
there is more variation in the types of institutional complementarity present in the
political economy. Thirdly, aggregate performance of entrepreneurship is moderated
by the institutional configuration of the political economy. Institutional coherence
identified by this perspective appear to offer general efficiencies. Therefore, these
results suggest that institutional explanations of entrepreneurship can be explained by
‘equifinality’, in that a ‘perfect’ institutional setting does not exist.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background to the Research
The rate of entrepreneurial activity differs considerably across nations (Verheul et al,
2002) and a growing volume of literature in comparative international entrepreneurship
has focussed on exploring the factors that explain these differences. The entrepreneur-
ship literature started to explore these issues in the early 1990s, stating that the manner
in which a society’s institutional structure economic payoffs influences the nature of
entrepreneurial efforts and activities (Baumol, 1990; Sobel, 2008; Acs et al, 2018). Over
the years, a consensus in debate has emerged that formal and informal institutions
incentivise individuals behaviour (North, 1991), thereby influencing the extent and
structure of an economy’s entrepreneurial activity (Acs et al, 2008; Urbano & Alvarez,
2014). Given entrepreneurs are embedded within an institutional context, Zahra &
Wright (2011) argue that ‘the characteristics of the external environment in which new
ventures are established and compete’ can help explain ‘the birth-rate, magnitude and
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types of opportunity and how entrepreneurs exploit them for profit’ (Zahra & Wright,
2011, p. 76). The study of the varied institutional context can therefore help explain
the variation of international entrepreneurial levels between countries (Syliowicz &
Galvin, 2010).
During the last decades, the role of entrepreneurship has been the object of increasing
attention from researchers and policy-makers. Entrepreneurship has been acknowledged
as the key driving force for the incredible growth miracle of capitalism (Wennekers &
Thurik, 1999) against the backdrop of the rising share of employment in SMEs (Loveman
& Sengenberger, 1991). According to Reynolds et al (1999) and Zacharakis et al (2000),
about one-third to one-half of the differences in national growth rates can be explained
by variations in entrepreneurship rates. The change in the relative importance of SMEs
has been ascribed to a new era of industrial structure brought about by changes in
technology, where the role of entrepreneurship has been re-evaluated as central to
economic development and growth (Audretsch & Thurik, 2001; Wennekers & Thurik,
1999). In particular, entrepreneurship stimulates innovation, job creation and economic
growth (Acs et al, 2012; van Praag & Versloot 2007; van Stel et al, 2005). As such, an
important reason to study entrepreneurship is given its prime role in the process of
growth and development (Carlsson et al, 2013).
Ascribed in part to a lack of technological growth and dynamism, the fall of
command based economic systems has further illuminated the role of the entrepreneur.
For Schumpeter (1942), entrepreneurship is vital in creating dynamism that command
based economies lacked. The creation and prominence of market based economics
has opened up opportunities for individual entrepreneurs to act, and furthermore,
entrepreneurs are now seen as an essential agent of change and structural adjustment.
The entry of new firms was crucial for removing distortions in the supply of goods and
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services, increasing competition, and encouraging innovation. Due to these economic
changes, research on entrepreneurship has grown and policy makers have become
increasingly interested in discovering how to create a supportive environment for
entrepreneurship (Dilli, Elert & Herrmann, 2018). This is largely given entrepreneurship
can be expected to vary both over time and across countries.
It was from this regard that scholars seek to identify the key drivers and antecedents
with regards to promoting and supporting entrepreneurship, at both the regional and
national level. From this perspective, researchers identify that ‘entrepreneurs do not
operate in a vacuum’, but rather they are constrained and enabled by their institutional
environment (Estrin et al, 2013; North, 1990; Aldrich, 2011). Institutions affect and
incentivise individual behaviour, thereby the extent and productive character of an
economy’s entrepreneurship and, consequently its economic development (Baumol, 1990;
Acs et al 2008, Urbano & Alvarez, 2014). According to Wennekers et al (2002), culture
and institutional variations seem to be very important for explaining cross-country
variations in entrepreneurship.
While it has been acknowledged that the institutional environment is a crucial factor
affecting entrepreneurship (e.g. Baumol, 1990; Busenitz et al, 2000; Wennekers et al,
2002), there is less agreement about which institutions matter, and more importantly,
in what ways do they matter. As it goes, "institutional theory remains characterised
by an electic set of approaches" (Jackson & Deeg, 2008, p. 540). Given the plurality of
institutional approaches, how entrepreneurship scholars employ institutional theory
has important implications for which and how institutions matter for entrepreneurship.
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1.2 Statement of the Problem
Much of the research focussed on explaining the influence of institutions on entrepreneur-
ship has taken a specific and narrow approach to institutional theory. Entrepreneurship
research has, for example, emphasised the rule of private property rights, rule of law,
and economic freedom (e.g. Acemoglu & Johnson, 2008; Estrin et al, 2013). Deemed
as formal institutions, these studies have tended to emphasise the New Institutional
Economics (NIE) theory of institutions. This views institutions as ‘converging’ cre-
ations which posit a theoretical ‘one-best-way’, which is largely seen as liberal and
non-interventionist (Allen & Aldred, 2012; Rodrik et al, 2004). This is also referred to
‘unifinality’, in which across the variety of possible institutional arrangements there
exists an optimal configuration of institutions for economic performance (Fiss, 2007).
This approach to institutional theory overlooks the nuanced diversity of the institu-
tional environment which defines the architecture of capitalist political economies.
For example, Sweden and the UK have similar rule of private property rights, yet
are fundamentally different in terms of their institutional configuration; they demon-
strate ‘varieties of capitalism’. How one defines institutions therefore has important
implications for how institutions matter for entrepreneurship.
Overlooking approaches positing institutional diversity has led entrepreneurship
studies to adopt a ‘narrow’ definition of institutions. This definition of institutions
is favoured over a broader definition that incorporates a greater range of institutions
as defined by their relative diversity, functional equivalence and complementarity.
This broader definition of institutions can be taken by blending theory from the
‘comparative institutionalism’ institutional camp, rather than solely focussing on
New Institutional Economics (NIE) and New Organisational Institutionalism (NOI)
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approaches. Comparative institutionalism strives to identify, classify and evaluate
the distinctive configurations of institutions that characterise political economies.
Comparative institutionalism therefore sees institutions as divergent creations.
The difference between the two institutional approaches (comparative institution-
alism versus NIE/NOI) is theoretically important for comparative international en-
trepreneurship given several reasons. Firstly, the inclusion of a wider set of institutions
within entrepreneurial analysis, together with a theoretical framework that specifies how
the institutional environment provide genuine efficiencies to economic agents, arguably
allows comparative institutionalism led approaches to provide a richer explanation of
how, where and why entrepreneurs act. Secondly, one of the main theoretical tenets of
the comparative institutionalism literature is the nature of institutional diversity which
defines the architecture of political economies. It assesses the conditions under which
political economies are likely to continue to have divergent sets of institutions. Allowing
the study of how institutional diversity across many domains of the economy has an
impact upon the types, levels and nature of entrepreneurial activity. The capabilities
and actions of entrepreneurs are strongly shaped by the configuration of institutions
within which they operate, and the configuration is unique to every country (Amable,
2003; Ebner, 2010; Yeung, 2002). Thirdly, the comparative institutionalism literature
differentiates in the sense it highlights the nature of institutional complementarities.
Institutional complementarity is where the presence of one institution increases the
efficiency of another. Individual institutions may interact with one another to reinforce
a specific institutional logic, which then alters the actions of agents. There is not
a consideration of institutions as single stand-alone entities, but as complementary
configurations that shape a dominant pattern of economic coordination.
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In sum, comparative institutionalism literature is defined by institutional diversity,
illuminating a wider set of institutions which potentially combine to provide unique
forms of economic action. It promotes a parsimonious, configurational view of insti-
tutions and the institutional environment. It can address the relative insufficiencies
of using narrow, convergent approaches to institutions, which, for example, could
unnecessarily suggest unifinality of institutions and their entrepreneurial outcomes.
Consequently, entrepreneurial activities within economies are embedded in a dis-
tinct socioeconomic order, as so is the articulation of entrepreneurship shaped by
institutional complementarities that specify the corresponding variety of capitalist and
their complementary sub-system (Ebner, 2010). The dominance of New Institutional
Economics approaches, which focuses on institutions as narrow and converging creations
does not allow for the configurational enquiry of the overall institutional environment.
Comparative institutionalism allows an integrated multidisciplinary configurational
approach to theorising about institutions, offering more explanatory power than the
examinations of individual and singular effects.
Therefore, the intent of this study is to empirically understand institutional diversity
across countries and its potential impact on entrepreneurship. The main justification
for conducting this research stemmed from several important gaps identified in the
comparative international entrepreneurship literature. These concerned: (a) the
relative neglect of a ‘comparative institutionalism approach’ and, more specifically, the
lack of theoretical emphasis of national institutional system thinking via Governance
approaches; and (b) overlooking the conception of key comparative institutionalism
themes such as (i) institutional diversity, (ii) institutional complementarities and its
configurational approach, and (iii) institutional coherence. At its crux, there is a
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need to move away from convergent views of institutions, to applications which sees
institutions as divergent creations.
In this study, it is argued that comparative institutionalism perspectives provide
a better form of entrepreneurial analysis for several reasons. Firstly, the study can
analyse institutional diversity, drawing on the potential for functional equivalence
and equifinality. Secondly, the study can account for institutional complementarities,
and the diversities they may take. Thirdly, given the divergent nature of institutions,
regression analysis should be tested with non-linear estimates. This way one can
analyse whether there is a ‘perfect’ ‘one best way’ of institutions (linear), or rather
levels of entrepreneurship will be similar yet within diverse institutional configurations,
hereby functional equivalents (non-linear). After all, perspectives from comparative
institutionalism have hardly been applied in entrepreneurial research (Herrmann, 2019).
Taking an ‘institutional configuration’ approach, this study poses the question of
‘do the different institutional configurations in different capitalist political economies
influence the volume of entrepreneurship?’ Therefore, the aim of this study is to explore
the influence of national institutional environments on the levels of entrepreneurship.
The proposed study seeks to explore this issue from a cross-disciplinary stance, drawing
upon research from the disciplines of political economy, comparative institutionalism
and international entrepreneurship. The proposed methodological approach involves
a sequential methodology design, comprising: (1) the exploration of factor analysis
defining institutional diversity among groups of countries; then (2) A panel model
analysis to explore statistical relationships across i and t of institutional factors and
aggregate entrepreneurial performance among these different groupings. This way,
the study allows the provision of a greater contextual understanding of institutional
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influences on entrepreneurial activity, reflecting the complexities and mechanisms of
social processes with broader yet parsimonious methodological perspectives.
1.3 Research Aims & Objectives
The intent of this study is to empirically understand institutional diversity across
countries and its potential impact on entrepreneurship. This approach, subsequently,
provides a justification for the main research aim to be elaborated and divided into
more specific research objectives. For reasons of establishing methodological rigour,
enhancing the credibility of the finds and providing a stronger basis for theoretical
development, and also in responding to the call for cross-country comparative research in
the context of international entrepreneurship literature (Welter, 2011), the decision was
made to focus on a large selection of OECD countries through the lens of quantitative
assessment.
The aim of this study is to explore the influence of national institutional environ-
ments on the levels of entrepreneurship. This is achieved by pursuing the following
objectives:
Research Objective 1:
To ascertain whether capitalist institutional diversity exists, and if so, how can
diversities be characterised between political economies.
Research Objective 2:
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To ascertain the effects of institutional diversity on aggregate entrepreneurship.
Research Objective 3:
To ascertain whether perspectives from comparative institutionalism can explain the
divergent nature of entrepreneurial activity across nations.
In order to meet these three objectives, a two step/stage quantitative study was used,
incorporating principal components analysis (factor analysis) followed by a subsequent
panel analysis through two estimation strategies. Given the limited knowledge of
the potential influence of national institutional environments and their subsequent
functionalities, the comprehensive approach adopted here is appropriate, particularly
due to greater alignment with the pursuit of objective reality, given the subsequent
methodology employed, embedded in a positivist research paradigm, as compared to
more restrictive single method studies.
This methodological approach has been selected to answer the following research
questions:
Research Question 1:
Does capitalist institutional diversity exist and if so, how can diversities be
characterised between political economies?
Research Question 2:
What are the effects of institutional diversity on aggregate entrepreneurship?
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Research Question 3:
Can perspectives from comparative institutionalism explain the divergent nature of
entrepreneurial activity between nations?
This research adopts a quantitative, deductive approach to explore the composi-
tion and influence of institutions on aggregate entrepreneurship performance in 29
OECD countries. It is therefore concerned with testing hypotheses by examining the
relationship among variables. This study takes forward the claim that understanding
aggregate entrepreneurship, embedded within specific institutional contexts, can best
be explained by advancing the relationships among variables posed using questions
and hypotheses (Davidsson, 2008).
This study utilises a quantitative approach with two sequential sections. The
results of the first quantitative section are used to underpin the second quantitative
section. Specifically, the variables created in the first section are those which specify
the econometric models of the second section.
The first quantitative section comprises of a principal components analysis and then
a discriminant variable analysis in the form of a hierarchical ascending cluster analysis.
The purpose of this factor analysis technique is to develop robust quantitative variables
which proxy for the institutional environment within countries. The data used within
the principal components analysis comprises of 42 manifest variables collected from
numerous online secondary data sources. This data is enriched with databases that
contain certain information on labour market structure, financial system depth and
education spending on a relatively large set of countries. Consequently, to maintain
consistency, validity and scope from such a multiple source approach, the analysis is
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performed on 30 countries which are all members of the OECD as collected from 2010
to 2015. Cluster analysis is then performed on these developed variables. This outlines
the optimal similarities and dissimilarities between countries, which clusters countries
into groups. This classifies the institutional diversity between countries and contributes
to the comparative institutionalism literature.
The second subsequent section used a multivariate panel analysis. Using the
institutional factors created in the first section, this section tests several econometric
model specifications outlining the statistical relationship between institutions and
the levels of international entrepreneurship within 29 countries1. Departing from the
narrow definition of institutions, the factor and cluster analysis underlines the diversity
of political economies which are built upon unique configurations of institutions. In the
second section, these factors are used to create coordination indices for each institutional
sub-sphere, which highlights the degree of non-market coordination present within
institutional sub-spheres. To account for institutional complementarities, this section
creates an interaction term which measures the institutional form of each country. These
measures then form the data specification of the panel models. Amongst a backdrop
of control variables, this study aims to test the relationship between institutional
complementarities and aggregate entrepreneurship performance. Specifically, this
section uses time varied dependant and control variables between 2010 and 2015.
The number of observations is therefore 1452. This section then employs a range of
robustness analysis to test the reliability of the empirical findings.
The rationale for this approach is that the quantitative data and their subsequent
analysis provide a general understanding of the research problems. Given this study has
1New Zealand had to be dropped given the removal of its GEM TEA data
2Given the inclusion of a distributed lag model for purposes of endogeneity, the specification loses
one year.
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identified literature gaps in the underutilisation of certain institutional approaches, this
study will use a quantitative approach and the subsequent results opens the domain to
a potential multitude of methods. Quantitative approaches are largely exploratory in
this regard. The research agenda takes a different institutional approach to the current
entrepreneurship literature, and quantitative methods allows the study to test fresh
theoretical arguments within a set of established rules.
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis comprises seven chapters.
Chapters two and three present a view of the relevant academic literature in two
parts. Chapter two reviews the streams of literature most relevant to considering the
(a) concept of institutions, (b) context of institutions and (c) plurality of institutional
theory. The width and plurality of institutional approaches to entrepreneurship however
represents the main guiding literature to this thesis, particularly in relation to the
narrow blend of institutional theories in comparative international entrepreneurship
studies lends the main literature void.
Chapter four discusses the research approach and methodology employed to carry
out the empirical research for this study. The chapter outlines the choice of research
methods and provides details of the two methodological steps. In detail, it documents
the data specification, hypotheses and model specifications.
Chapter five, which is the first of two results chapters, presents and analyses
the results of the principal components analysis (PCA) and the subsequent cluster
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 13
analysis relevant to Objective 1. The first objective is to ascertain whether capitalist
institutional diversity exists, and if so, how can diversities be characterised between
political economies. To address this objective, the chapter conducts several principal
components analysis within the institutional sub-spheres as outlined by the ’governance
approach’ to comparative institutionalism (Amable, 2003).
Chapter six, which is the second results chapter, presents the estimation technique
and estimation results of the panel model in relations to Objective 2 and 3.
Chapter seven extends and discusses the key findings of the quantitative analyses
presented in chapters five and six. It discusses, through the use of headline findings,
the depth of the analysis and the wider contributions. Specifically, this chapter divides
the contributions into theoretical and public policy implications.
Chapter eight develops conclusions and summarises the remit of the thesis and its
key contributions. It provides a thesis summary, where it restates the key gaps and
explains addressing the three specific research objectives led to achieving the main aim
of the study.
Chapter 2




This chapter provides the first part of the literature review with a focus on institutions
and institutional theory. Relating to the boundaries of institutional thought, it draws
both upon the conception of institutions and the plurality of institutional theory to
address the main research agenda. Specifically, whilst institutional theory has become
an attentive agenda in entrepreneurship literature, it largely overlooks the simple
differences in institutional environments. Indeed, narrow conceptions of institutions
are taken. This chapter provides a discussion of the wider literature on institutions,
highlighting the varied ‘approaches’ to institutional theory, and importantly, how this
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can define the theorized impact of institutions on economic outcomes. It is argued that
particular institutional approaches provide a unique theoretical lens for understanding
the institutional environment and their analysis for potential influence. The aim of this
chapter is to provide an understanding of ‘institutions’, theorizing its impact within
the context of economic agency, whilst outlining the plethora of potential institutional
approaches. This will frame the ‘understanding of institutions’ and their constituent
approaches within the context of this research study.
2.2 Understanding ‘Institutions’
It is impossible for people to interact with one another in the absence of shared
understanding about how others will respond and the efficacy of sanctions aimed at
mitigating the negative externalities of potential opportunist behaviour (North, 1987;
1991; Hodgson, 2007). Economic agents will only transact if they have trust and
confidence that their expectations will be met. Exchange between agents, which is
often repetitive and numerous, is required to be predictable, frictionless and secure.
Indeed, exchange requires ‘transactional trust’. As such, human interactions, both
economic and non-economic, depend on forms of confidence underpinned by rules
and regulations securing against unpredictable and opportunist behaviour. Born from
institutional theory, these rules and regulations are referred to as ‘institutions’.
Institutional theory has become a prominent field of interest within social sciences,
proving a fresh analytical perspectives for various scholars of economics, sociology and
political science. Whilst institutional thought has been applied in varied manners,
institutional theory provides its main foci in relation to its explanation and examinations
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of the wider economic, social, cultural environment and their impact on behavioural
and economic outcomes (Scott, 2008; Kenworthy, 2006; Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Hodgson,
1998; 2001). In this manner, institutional theory has offered a new perspective to
many maturing social sciences, challenging ingrained arguments which have become the
‘manufactured’ norm in mainstream disciplines such as (neoclassical) economics (North,
1990; Hodgson, 2001). The economy is a complex, evolving system and the neoclassical
economics notion of equilibrium remaining a durable state provides institutional theory
with natural points of distinction (Chang, 2007; Rodrik 2008).
Depending on its use, the term ‘institutions’ does not always attach the same
meaning for researchers. Though central in its theorised claims, definitions and inter-
pretations of the term remain varied and diffuse, largely dependent on its disciplinary
context. Institutions as a concept are broad, diverse in its meaning and therefore
mostly troublesome (Jackson & Deeg, 2019; Redding, 2005). Unfortunately, there is no
agreed way of defining ‘institutions’. Therefore, in providing a clearer understanding of
the term ‘institutions’, a brief examination of the central themes, concepts and insights
are given from the three major scholarly areas of its use, that is economics, sociology
and political science. It is from these three disciplines that provide the core momentum
behind the ‘neo-institutionalist’ approach to institutional theory. This contrasts the
much critiqued and challenged wave of ‘old institutional theory’, developed upon the
work of Veblen (1898).
It is within economics that institutions have provided a considerable contribution.
Developed from the evolving perspective of ‘New Institutional Economics’ (NIE), rooted
in the works of Coase (1937), North (1990) and Williamson (1975), highlights the func-
tion and role of institutions in the economic system. In economics, it is acknowledged
that institutional factors play a key role at all levels in the economy, from the structure
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and functions of the firm, through to the operation of markets and onto the varied
forms of state intervention (Hodgson, 1988). From this perspective, institutions are “hu-
manly devised constraints, informal constraints, and their enforcement characteristics”
(North, 1994 pg. 360). Institutions comprise of written and unwritten rules, norms and
constraints that humans devise to reduce uncertainty and control a given environment,
thus defining the ‘incentive structure’ of economies and societies. Such structure is
underpinned by (i) written rules and agreements governing contractual relations and
corporate governance, (ii) laws, constitutions and rules that govern society and the
functions within it; government, politics and finance, (iii) unwritten codes of conduct,
beliefs and norms of behaviour. Here, institutions are the “rules of the game” (North,
1990), formal and informal, which are often taken with a pro-market rhetoric (Rodrik,
2006).
Sociologists takes a varied perspective to institutions, as established by their
‘new organisational institutionalism’ approach. A field developed from the core of
organisational theory and sociology, this perspective focuses on organisational forms
and practices rather than the national level ‘rules of the game’. By reinterpreting
economic action as social action, sociology similarly emphasises the persuasiveness and
importance of social institutions in economic life. Here, institutions are established ways
of acting and transacting stemming from shared ‘regulative, cognitive and normative
frames’ (Morgan & Kristensen, 2006). The sharing across organisations of common
rules, traditions and norms provide the institutionalisation of organisation forms,
ultimately because it provides a reward. Conformity or ‘institutional isomorphism’
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) increases organisational legitimacy, rents from resources
and transactions that ultimately extends the survival of the organisation (Meyer &
Rowan, 1977). These institutionalised behaviours are guided by normative pressure and
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cognitive thought systems (Scott, 1995; 2008) rather than through NIEs perspective of
formal institutions.
Political scientists take an alternative institutional approach with two sub-disciplines.
One, ‘comparative governance’ and two, ‘political economy’ provide two disparate
views on the political scientist’s approach to institutions. For the comparative gover-
nance approach, institutions are “legal frameworks and administrative arrangements
characterising particular governance structures” (Scott, 1995, p. 6). In this view,
institutions are seen in the context of ‘governance’, which take varied forms in terms of
their constitutions, bureaucracies, parliamentary norms and legal methods. It is these
components which constitute the governance structures which impact political, social
and business behaviours.
In contrast, ‘political economy’ based political science approaches vary where the
domain of ‘comparative institutionalism’ (also referred to as comparative capitalism)
focuses on the institutional effectiveness of the constituent institutional sub-spheres
which form the economic environment. That is, comparative institutionalism approaches
seek to explain and describe diversity in the socioeconomic institutional architecture of
countries. Formally, political economy approaches seek to identify the large intrinsic
diversity amongst capitalist countries, and thus institutions are seen as ‘distinct
national configurations that generate a particular systemic logic of economic action’
(Hall & Soskice, 2001; Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Hotho, 2014). Capitalism takes varied
institutional forms and configurations. It is the national differences in institutional
organisation that influence political, social and economic actions (March & Olsen,
1996). From this perspective, institutions matter because societal institutions provide
unique resources, competencies and practice norms to agents operating within such
arena. It is, however, the diversity of these ‘institutional configurations’ that encourage
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unique yet divergent economic and technological specialisation patterns (Hall & Soskice,
2001; Allen 2013).
Whilst varied definitions of institutions exist, conformity is evident in the sense of
the overarching impact of such structures. They fundamentally ‘enable and constrain’
activities of agents, whether that be firms, individuals or nation-states. Institutions
provide general incentive structures which facilitate economic, social and political
interactions, despite being classified in diverse ways and at varied levels. In doing
so, they create incentives for certain courses of action, and by so act as vehicles of
both structure and change (Boettke & Coyne, 2009; Noseleit, 2013). It is, however,
the plethora of varied institutional definitions and meaning that provide researchers
with the potential plurality of institutional analytical approaches. The chapter will
now move forward with these definitions to understand the functional importance of
institutions in social systems. This will help illuminate why the theme of institutions
is fundamental where attempting to understand context.
2.3 Understanding Long-Run Economic Develop-
ment: A Role of Institutions
“The historical study of economic growth is, in fact, a study of institutional
innovations that permit increasingly complex exchanges to be realised by reducing the
transaction (and production) costs of such exchanges”
(Douglas North, 2008, p. 23)
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Economic growth is a complex phenomenon. Economics, sociology and geography
have long attempted to map and understand the asymmetry in the global experiences
of growth and development. Challenging this complex causality has however left little
consensus in favour of understanding the variances in global growth and development
(North, 2005; Rodrik, 2008; Chang, 2007). Competing perspectives all yield varied
explanations into the discrepancies of growth, and indeed, whether positive-sum global
development can be achieved at all (Singer, 1950).
Perspectives on growth and development are now beginning to acknowledge the role
of institutions, that is, ‘institutions matter’ (Rodrik, 2008; Rodrik et al, 2004; Tylecote,
2016; Hall & Jones, 1999; Reinert, 2007; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2001; Chang, 2007;
Flachaire et al, 2014). The mainstream of the 20th-century neoclassical economics
which has carried forth perspectives on economic growth has largely assumed that
institutions are indeed exogenous variables with agents perfectly adjusting for them.
At worst, they have been disregarded altogether. In candid perspective, North (1994,
p. 257) argues that “. . . the neoclassical paradigm is devoid of institutions. . . The
currently fashionable growth models of economists do not confront the issue of the
underlying incentive structure that is assumed in their models”. This deficit is wholly
inappropriate, given that market transactions are far from frictionless and costless.
Institutions reduce the costs of coordinating human actions and therefore are of central
importance in understanding human interaction (North, 1990); the divorce of such
factor from explanations of growth is clearly unfitting. It is institutions that enable,
constrain and retract economic development in spatially different ways, therefore
illumining the ‘geographically uneven development’ through the lens of institutional
variance (Martin, 2003; Chang, 2007). Whilst scholars may identify that institutions
do matter in the context of economic growth, there is little understanding of how they
matter. This indeed is a deficit in itself, warranting an amplified understanding and
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discussion into why they matter. To appreciate the primacy of institutions, this section
will provide a framework for understanding the mechanisms for economic growth, thus
theoretically underpinning (1) the growing need for the use of institutional thought
and (2), overall context to the thesis.
2.3.1 Operationalising Production Factors
The mobilisation of capital (K) is a central factor of long-term growth under a duality
of savings and net investment (Solow, 1956). An increase in capital per worker will
generally lead to an increase in economic output, with capital enabling a sustained
rise in the potential for productive efficiency, hence potential output (Solow, 1994).
Capital stock is contingent on investment, which is a function of the available factors
of production. As such, there is a required interplay of economic variables. Firstly,
there should be an established postponement of consumption of income into savings;
the opportunity cost of investment inaugurating the ‘savings sacrifice’. Secondly, such
borrowing of these savings should be channelled into the installation of productive
capital, namely machinery, business expansions and other neighbouring physical capital
intended to spur capital formation and upgrading.
Indeed, capital (K) is a central component to growth, yet treating such in isolation
again gives a narrow perspective on the growth process. Incremental increases in
capital lead to a declining marginal productivity of capital (Solow, 1956; Caselli &
Feyrer, 2007), similar to the recent experiences of the ‘Chinese miracle’ and its ‘vehicle’
of state capitalism (Hsieh & Klenow, 2009). In such respect, this matches the thoughts
of Karl Marx where the central emphasis of private capital, and eventual investors
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decline of profitable uses of capital will lead to a decline of the return on capital, and
consequently the downfall of capitalism (Marx, 1867).
However, capital mobilisation is important, yet an unsatisfactory explanation of the
process of economic growth, hence the introduction of ‘national production functions’,
a relationship in which capital (K), labour (L) and technology (A); examples of inputs,
are related to predictable amounts of output (Cobb & Douglas, 1928). As such, there
can remain a distinction of how much economic growth can be attributed to changes in
factor allocation, and thus contribution to advancing technology (A). Such neoclassical
approaches had the clear advantage of signifying that the growth process, as argued by
Marx (1867), need not be unstable or inevitably leading to declining rates of return.
As the theory goes, advancements in technology lift the production function, which
in turn, will drive economic growth (Romer, 1994). Such a nexus represents that
technological progress, assuming matched with allocative and productive efficiencies,
facilitates the conversion of inputs (K and L) into superior output. The subsequent
changes in factor prices will also induce factor substitution; capital surpluses lead to
the reduction of capital interests rates, and as such, cheaper capital can be utilised
to a superior proportion to that on costly labour inputs (Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1994).
This substitution effect will only be underpinned where technology has been recognised
in explicit terms, given that the substitution interplay requires, and is a result of,
changing technologies. As a result of this, much attention has been placed on technical
innovation in explaining and facilitating economic growth (Reati, 2014; Toma et al,
2014; Wong et al, 2005; Romer, 1994).
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2.3.2 The Mobilisation of Society for and in Development
The growing focal interest of technological innovation and progress lead many scholars
and public policy to be directed towards the less tangible components of accelerated
advancements, placing strain on what Becker (1962) coined as ‘human capital’; the
predominance of knowledge, education and the acquisition of skills (SK). Stressing the
role of capital accumulation thus requires attention to rising productivity levels, and as
such, developing the human capital of society is needed to ensure that growing capital
stocks would lead to the intended increase in output (which is levered by technology)
(Adams, 1990; Schultz, 1961). The improvements in people and organisation through
facilitating technical, skill and knowledge would ensure superior efficiency in the key
components of growth; labour and capital.
Whilst natural resources (NR) has always remained a key factor for explaining
potential growth, despite the often coined ‘resource curse’ (Ross, 1999; Mehlum et al,
2006) and ‘Dutch disease’ (Fardmanesh, 1991); the contribution of imminent scarcity
and exhaustion of some resources (Meadows et al, 1972) has been argued to have
facilitated the basis of knowledge accumulation. Taking the view of ‘resources for
growth’ argument differently, the paucity and rising prices would lead to a mobilisation
and reallocation of capital and effort resulting in the procurement of knowledge for
new geological methods of extraction, or methods of economisation of viable present
or new resources (Neumayer, 2000; Solow, 1997; Hartwick, 1990). This facilitates
the acquisition of skills and knowledge, potentially creating fresh avenues for and of
economic growth (Beckerman, 1974).
Thus, human capital of skills, knowledge and know-how (SK) is the dominant
leitmotif for underpinning and leveraging the required factor of technology (TEC),
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which allows the efficient uses of labour, capital and natural resources (L, K and NR).
However, how these factors are arranged within ‘an’ economic system of production
(Coase and Wang, 2011; Coase, 1937) is essential for understanding the ‘still asymme-
tries’ of the developed-developing dichotomy, focusing on the structural composition
(STR) of economic activity. Clearly here, the institutional architecture promoting the
arrangement of activities remains integral, forwarding the voices of many prominent
scholars (North, 1995; Acemoglu et al, 2005; Bardhan, 2005; Easterly & Levine, 2003).
Even more, the central components of macroeconomic growth, as identified before-
hand, organically involve microeconomic structures, which change systematically with
increasing income levels. In short, the micro-structure of the economy changes with
both the ‘right’ institutional and macroeconomic conditions (dSTR) (Chang, 1994;
Baumol, 1990; Karlsson & Karlsson, 2002). In particular for macroeconomic conditions,
dominating norms of activity composition, such as ‘manufacturing’, is maintained as
the crucial structure of arrangement over certain levels of national income (Rostow,
1992; Kaldor, 1961; Foellmi & Zweimuller, 2008). As economic growth accelerates and
national income rise, services grow disproportionally fast (Felipe et al, 2012); thus,
labour-intensive sources of arrangement attain the desired edge when incomes are low
(institutions permitting), with capital and knowledge intensive sources of activity when
incomes rise. Institutions matter here, with rigid structures potentially obstructing
the level of structural change (dSTR) (Rodrik, 2007a; Kasper et al, 2012; Reati, 2014;
Boettke & Coyne, 2009). This remains a relevant factor when explaining the current
‘Eurozone crisis’, and equipping the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with the
architecture and conditions of sustainable growth (Hall, 2014; Hancke, 2007; Amable,
2009).
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2.3.3 The Entrepreneur, Knowledge, Innovation & Institu-
tions
The pre-eminence of knowledge in the process of growth coupled with the microeco-
nomics of change (dSTR) ignites a clear avenue of novel thought. How does society
produce useful knowledge? How is it created, tested, and most importantly, applied?
The agent of this process remains the crucial lever of progress, that is, the entrepreneur.
Entrepreneurship plays a significant role in initialising structural change, where the
transition from traditional to the modern section is facilitated by the innovative capacity
of individuals (Gries & Naude, 2010; Naude, 2009; Noseleit, 2013). Yet what moti-
vates the entrepreneur to operationalize the beforehand production factors, attempt
structural composition changes, risk potential uses of knowledge, and overcome market
transaction costs? Drawing on the growing economic popularity of the ‘Austrian School
of Thought’, who established the prevalence of market competition as a determinant
and process for human knowledge (Hayek, 1937, 1978; Kirzner, 1973, 1997), innovation
economics has attempted to theorise the importance of the entrepreneur. Indeed, they
present consensus that the required significance of technological progress, knowledge
and change is driven by the human agency of risk-taking and explorative thinking, but
only where material incentive and the dynamics of market competition are present
(Hayek, 1937; Kirzner, 1973; Wennekers & Thurik, 1999; Holcombe, 1998; McCelland,
1961).
Parallel to these claims, economic history provides a further sufficient observation
of the need for supporting structures. North (1992) and Acemoglu & Robinson (2008)
take note of the technical and organisational advancements of knowledge within the
industrial revolution. The structural developments, namely dSTR, were not sudden
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endogenous sources of growth but had been encouraged by the incremental evolution
of institutions favourable to both the exchange in markets (property rights; limited
government) and capital accumulation (K, L and T). Scully (1991) demonstrated that
in the absence of ‘transactional trust’, capitalist entrepreneurs had been unable to
produce continual structural change and thus economic growth. Crucially, such agents
relied on civil, political and economic liberties, such as those proposed by Adam Smith
(1776), alongside the complimentary institutional architecture supporting mutual and
transactional trust.
With comparable observation, Jones (1994) challenges why the remarkable progress
of the Chinese technological base, namely the period of the Sung dynasty, failed
to lead to an industrial revolution. In such hegemonic and closed economies, there
was little rent seeking behaviour as the present political elite were not compelled
to compete to entice and maintain the agents of enterprise and knowledge in their
corresponding jurisdictions. Cultivation of attractive institutions for the entrepreneur
and mobile capital was therefore unseeingly necessary. Put differently, insufficiencies in
the institutional development of Asian economies neglected the leverage of technological
progress and output gains of present structural changes (Jones, 1994), which should be
facilitated by the innovative capacities of entrepreneurs.
All together, this demonstrates that growth is defined by the actions of entrepreneurs
which are a product of their institutional environment. Entrepreneurship is regarding as
a vital source of endogenous change in the economy (Terjesen & Wang, 2013; Noseleit,
2013), with institutions improving the pay-off structure of such activity (Boettke &
Coyne, 2009). As summarised by Boettke (2005), “economic performance through
time is a function of the incentive structures that economic actors face & the quality
of the information these actors receive & can process, so as to respond effectively to
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these incentive structures”. This in mind, persistent asymmetry in global economic
growth rates cannot be explained with the continued academic ‘institutional deficits’.
Human coordination in economies depends greatly on regular patterns of action on
which people may rely. Such interaction of agents requires adaptive rules of interaction
and coordination, which to define, are institutions. It is only with the aid of such
rules and regulations can human coordination be augmented, with improvements in
economic efficiency and living standards following.
Growth is driven by the focal point of knowledge, in which the entrepreneur remains
the process catalyst. The absence of the entrepreneur undermines the effectiveness of
the macroeconomic factors of growth (K, L, SK, TEC), given that knowledge remains
the key condition for changing economic determinants. Reallocating resources to an
institutional environment that supports entrepreneurship should, therefore, be a public
policy imperative (Dewick & Hernandez, 2014). Entrepreneurial activities are only
possible with the appropriate ‘rules of the game’, institutions constraining possible
arbitrary and opportunistic behaviours in market human interactions. Global discrep-
ancies in development depend on how the entrepreneurial propensity of individuals is
channelled, which is dependent on the composition and quality of the existing insti-
tutional environment. Institutions matter for entrepreneurship, as enterprise matters
for growth. Overall, scholars cannot ignore the institutional context. The interplay of
these constituent sections has been conceptualised and can be demonstrated in Figure
2.1.
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2.4 Plurality of Institutional Approaches
“. . . institutional theory remains characterised by an eclectic set of approaches”
(Jackson & Deeg, 2008, p. 540)
The foregoing discussions have highlighted the need to analyse institutions with
the use of institutional theory. Yet treating institutional theory as a one-size narrow
perspective gives a largely misguided understanding of the breadth and plurality of
literature. From a theoretical point of view, it is possible to identify three broad
categories of approaches to the study of institutional issues. These are as follows – new
institutional economics approach, new organisational institutionalism approach and
the comparative institutionalism approach. These can be visualised by Figure 2.2.
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2.4.1 New Institutional Economics (NIE)
Abandoning the standard neoclassical assumption that individuals have perfect informa-
tion, unbounded rationality and the propensity for instantaneous market transactions,
‘institutional economics’ has introduced a rewarding contrast to the mainstream way
of analysing economic systems. Here, institutional economics provides an alternative
view; individuals have incomplete information and limited mental capacity as con-
tingent on the ‘bounded’ information they possess. As a result, market individuals
face uncertainty about unforeseeable outcomes and therefore incur ‘transaction costs’
to acquire information. To reduce the risks and costs associated with transactions,
humans create institutions, regulations, laws, contracts – formal institutions – and
belief patterns, habits of thought and cultural norms – or informal institutions. With
the attempt to embed the analysis of institutions in economic thought, scholars gave
birth to new methodological approaches within economics, to what we now coin as
‘New Institutional Economics’ (NIE).
Primarily developed notably by Thorstein Veblen (1898), Mitchell (1910) and Ayres
(1944), these American based economists are considered the founding ‘fathers’ of what
we now know as ‘old institutional economics’. It was these eminent economists that
considered the framework of laws and thought trends inherent to individuals interaction
within which determine economic behaviour. That is, institutions shape economic
performance.
This central theme was introduced by the seminal work of Douglas North (1987;
1990; 1991), Oliver Williamson (1981) and Ronald Coase (1937; 1960) to become the
key theoretical tenant of ‘New Institutional Economics’. As a way to provide a more
integrated approach to the mainstream economics approach, NIE promoted the theme
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of transaction costs. It is these costs that provide frictions to economic exchange,
therefore play a fundamental role in shaping both production and transaction, and
consequently economic outcomes (Coase, 1937; 1960; North 1990). More specifically,
the reorientation towards analysing the frictions involved with economic exchange
provided a view on the extent to which the assets involved are specific to a transaction.
It is these ‘specificities of assets’ (asset specificities) that give birth to non-market
transactions, specifically in the form of hierarchical exchange (e.g. firms). This gave
microeconomics a more nuanced approach to understanding why firms are established
and grow, the so-called ‘theory of the firm’. In return, NIE has emerged as a prominent
heterodox approach by the way in which is challenges the core assumptions of the
neoclassical theory. Here, markets are frictionless, the sole and only way to coordinate
behaviour on a basis they provide perfect information to which all agents can transact
with rationally.
Whilst NIE is primarily associated with the scholarly movement of Williamson
(1981), North (1990) and Coase (1937), institutional economics has contributed sig-
nificantly to neighbouring disciplines such as developmental and business studies. By
emphasising the role of institutions and their theorised notion of shaping behaviour,
NIE promotes a powerful and micro-analytical framework for the study of institutional
influences within the realm of social science. Where standard approaches to economics
are ‘static’, NIE supports a dynamic perspective to the study of economic life (Menard
& Shirley, 2005), thereby significantly mobilising both economics and institutional
theory for a more ‘operational’ use in separate disciplines (Hodgson, 2007; Dequech,
2002).
Formally, NIE studies institutions and how institutions interact with organisational
arrangements. Here, institutions are the written and unwritten norms, rules and
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constraints that humans devise to reduce uncertainty and control their environment
(Menard & Shirley, 2005). They provide the “rules of the game in a society” (North,
1990, pg. 3), and therefore determine human agency in such a way as to coordinate
the actions of society. At its analytical level, NIE suggests that the nature of exchange
processes and a number of market ‘frictions’ are dependent on the institutional context
in which they take place. For institutional economists, the institutional context (also
referred to as the ‘institutional framework’, ‘institutional regime’ or ‘institutional
environment’) refers to ‘one-best-way’ sub-institutions which regulate the economic
behaviours of individuals and strategic ‘fit’ of organisations. Here, it is the systems of
informal conventions and routines, coupled with the formal structures of regulation
which constrain and control socioeconomic behaviour. Specifically, the extent to which
the institutional environment guarantees private property rights and facilitates the
efficacy of contracts affects the level of transaction costs (Williamson, 1975; Coase,
1937). It is the institutional context that “dictates the margins at which organisations
operate” (North, 1990, p. 110), and therefore can be a useful point of observation
when seeking to understand the actions of economic agents. From this perspective,
the institutional environment can be seen as the set of overarching structures that
establishes the basis for economic exchange and production (North, 1990).
To new institutional economics, institutions can be both formal and informal
(North, 1990). Formal institutions include the role of constitutions, rules, regulations
and contracts. Informal institutions comprise of norms, values, customs as influenced by
more ‘stable’ patterns of culture and religion. While NIE acknowledges the existence of
both formal and informal institutions, the application of NIE based principles has tended
to focus on more formal conceptions. Specifically, there has been a large gravitation
towards understanding how those rules and regulations affect the choice of governance
arrangements through which economic activities are organised (Hotho & Pedersen,
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2012). A key point of distinction here between ‘old institutional economics’ and ‘new
institutional economics’ is that the Veblen (1898) view argues that institutions act as
conditioners of individuality, rather than mere configurations for adaptive constraining.
Individuals are assumed to shape their institutional creations independent of cultural
preference (Mayhew, 2008) therefore treating informal institutions as constants. From
the perspective of NIE, the institutional regime affects which governance arrangement
provides the lowest form of exchange friction (hence most ‘efficient’), and therefore it
can be argued that NIE provides a converging and ‘narrow’ view on institutions (Allen
& Aldred, 2012). Because transaction costs are linear, naturally the institutions which
provide the most efficiency will be seen as the ‘best’ institutions. This leads to the
view that there is ‘one best set’ of institutions, which tend to be the more ‘market’
and ‘liberal’ orientations of formal institutions (Rodrik, 2008; Chang, 2007).
It is these ‘market’ orientated institutions that provide NIE with its main conceptual
hook; these institutions influence economic performance and shape economic activities
(Williamson, 1993). This is why NIE has often been synonymous with ‘liberalisation’
in public policies, given the ‘best’ institutions are the ones that provide minimal
distortions to economic exchange, and thus maximising the productive efficiency of
the economy. At a broader level, institutions set the context to which all individuals
are confined. Specifically, the cost nature of transactions is the basic unit of analysis,
with the economisation of ‘transaction costs’ through the assignment of transactions
to governance structures in a discriminatory way (Williamson, 1985). Institutions of a
country determine the viability of engaging in certain forms of economic activity, such
as foreign direct investment, by influencing the costs of transactions and production
(Coase, 1998). ‘Effective’ institutional regimes provide the sole method of transaction
cost reduction through removing the need for ex-ante expenses (required in light of
low ‘transactional trust’). As such, high transaction costs have an overall negative
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impact on economic productivity, and thereby have an overall negative impact on
economic growth (North, 1990). Thus, transaction cost analysis advances that it is
these institutions that have the prime role and purpose of economising on transaction
costs. Differently, transaction costs provide a natural analytical point for understanding
how institutions affect the actions and agency of economic agents, where transaction
costs are the “cost of running the economic system” (Williamson, 1985), hereby taking
a liberal ‘best way’ stance (Rodrik, 2008).
2.4.2 New Organisational Institutionalism
Firmly rooted in sociology and organisational theory, ‘organisational institutionalism’
sees institutions as intra-organisational forms, practices and activities that are enforced
through coercive, mimetic and normative mechanisms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott,
1995). Focusing on organisational practices and forms, organisational institutionalism
lends itself to a more nuanced organisation-level approach beyond the national level
led perspective of new institutional economics. Its traditional conceptualization of
institutions as organisational structures has introduced more ‘relevance’ to analysing
the disseminations of organisational patterns and explaining various similarities and
differences in organisational practices. This has led to the birth of literature based upon
internal and external legitimises of firms (i.e. Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Kostova, 1999;
Kostova & Roth, 2002), igniting a fruitful strand of organisational institutionalism
based application. Whilst less pronounced, organisational institutionalism can be best
understood when comparing ‘old’ organisational institutionalism to the differences of
the emergent ‘new’ organisational institutionalism (Lowndes & Roberts, 2013).
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A group of old organisational institutionalists, most notably Selznick (1949; 1996)
and Clark (1960; 1972) are largely considered to be the founding fathers of ‘organ-
isational institutionalism’, for what is now, in contrast, the ‘new’ organisational
institutionalism approaches led by DiMaggio & Powell (1991) and Scott (1987). For
Selznick (2011) and Clark (1960, 1972), organisations develop distinct patterns of
characteristics in the forms of both practices and competencies. Practices are ‘in-
stitutionalised’ given the interplay between the internal and external environment
thereby leading the distinct and varied ‘character’ of individual organisations (Hotho
& Pedersen, 2012). Distinct organisational forms become deeply ‘stable’ creations
given the nature of path dependent institutionalisation and therefore are isolated
against external pressures of conformity (Selznick, 2011). As such, old organisational
institutionalism views the process of institutionalisation as an adaptive mechanism
of organisations (Selznick, 1996), and it is by creating orderly and socially integrated
patterns that ensure both internal legitimacy and stability.
This point of institutionalisation provides the primary point of contrast between the
old and new organisational institutionalism perspectives. That is whether institution-
alisation occurs within a particular field or within specific and individual organisations.
For old organisational scholars, institutions are viewed as intra-organisational patterns
that promote a specific activity format and thus the organisation becomes the primary
analytical foci (Ranson et al, 1980). For new organisational institutionalists, institu-
tionalised forms of the organisation are part of a wider set of shared belief systems
(Scott, 1987). As a result, new organisational institutionalism uses its perspective to
explain the homogeneity of forms and practices found within organisations. This is in
direct contrast to ‘older’ forms of institutionalism which seeks to highlight differences
between organisations through the lens of institutionalisation.
2.4 Plurality of Institutional Approaches 37
From the perspective of explaining organisational homogeneity, new organisational
institutionalism sees institutions as “taken for granted ways of acting, which derive
from shared regulative, cognitive and normative frames” (Morgan & Kristensen, 2006,
p. 1470). Both rules and norms form a set of shared belief systems which are common
across all organisations, with the institutionalisation of forms and conventions being
led by the organisational ‘field’ rather than by individual organisation (Powell &
DiMaggio, 1991). As held by Meyer and Rowan (1977), given organisational conformity
leads to ‘reward’ by the increase in organisational legitimacy, organisations will strive
towards institutionalised convergence in search of a pecuniary reward. Organisational
conformity, through the channel of internal legitimacy, allows organisations access to
resources which ultimately leads to organisational survival (Kostova & Roth, 2002;
Meyer & Rowan, 1977). These pressures are often referred to ‘institutional isomorphism’;
the explanation of convergence in organisational structures and forms. Where new
institutional economics suggests that economic actions are restricted through formal
based institutions, new organisational institutionalist scholars further argue that social
behaviour is further guided by both normative and cultural ‘scripts’ (Scott, 1995; 2008).
This naturally provides a contrast in institutional focus and institutional application
contingent on the discipline at hand.
Given these isomorphic pressures lead to a specific character of organisational forms,
which are shaped by the nature of their institutional environment, like institutional
economics, has led to a birth of criticism in relation to their determinist perspectives
(Tolbert & Zucker, 1999). In the search for a more dynamic organisation institutional-
ism perspective, Holm (1995) and Seo & Creed (2002) forward the counter-intuitive
perspective of how actors influence and change their environment in which they are
deeply embedded. They argue that contradictory institutional logics provide actors with
choice, which leads to pressures towards reversing the processes of institutionalisation
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(Firedland & Alford, 1991; Oliver, 1992). Instead of conforming to the institutional
environment, the determinist view, actors may instead seek to ‘manipulate’ or ‘defy’
them (Dacin et al, 2010). Therefore, where the institutional environment creates
unstable institutional logics, actors may act as ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ in the
attempt to influence the legitimacy of organisational forms and practices (Garud et al,
2007; DiMaggio, 1988).
At a more applied level, new organisational institutionalism has been predominately
developed by the work of Zaheer, Roth and Kostova (1997, 1999; Kostova and Zaheer,
1999). This work suggests that the widening institutional ‘duality’ between varied
institutional environments increases organisational pressure to maintain both inter-
nal and external legitimacy, therefore diminishing the effectiveness of organisations
operating in numerous country contexts. Here, new organisational institutionalism
suggests the growing variance between home and host institutional environments places
pressures on organisations to maintain organisational legitimacy (Kostova & Zaheer,
1999). The larger the institutional ‘duality’ experienced by local subsidiaries leads to
greater complexity faced by organisations, diminishing the effective transfer of organ-
isational practices to foreign affiliates (Kostova & Roth, 2002) and lack of effective
cognitive, normative and regulative frames. The pressures to maintain internal and
external legitimacy have provided an explanation of entry mode decisions (Vora &
Kostova, 2007; Davis et al, 2000; Meyer, 2001) and location strategies of multinational
enterprises (Xu & Shenkar, 2002; Meyer et al, 2009). This institutional approach has
also been used to explain the international variation of organisation practices such as
corporate social responsibility (CSR) measures and human resource (HR) procedures
(Gaur et al, 2007).
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2.4.3 Comparative Political Economy & Comparative Insti-
tutionalism
“Research linking institutional differences to specific economic outcomes has remained
surprisingly underdeveloped”
(Witt & Jackson, 2016, p. 780)
Unlike other strands of institutional theory, the main concept behind the compara-
tive institutionalism perspectives is that different socioeconomic models are neither
near-identical versions of the same ‘market capitalist economy’ nor the random assembly
of economic institutions. This perspective disputes the notion that there is one ‘right’
growth model for maximising economic performance (as present Governments are trying
to achieve) and rejects the assertion that structural reform should be driven by the goal
of homogenised liberalisation and deregulation. Capitalism is seen as institutionally
varied production regimes, taking diverse institutional configurations and forms. There-
fore, the formation of identical institutional areas (namely institutional sub-spheres or
domains), in varied political economies would not lead to identical growth trajectories,
namely in light of path dependencies and institutional complementarities (Amable,
et al, 2011). A key theoretical tenant of comparative institutionalism is that societal
institutions affect the organisation of economic activities and, thereby, a range of
organisational and country-level outcomes (Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Hall & Soskice,
2001; Hotho, 2014). Here, institutions are identified by their ‘divergence’, unlike the
‘convergence’ perspective of both new institutional economics and new organisational
institutionalism (Allen & Aldred, 2012).
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From this, the comparative institutionalism literature characterises national political
economies by the particular ‘logic’ of economic agency developed by the distinct
capitalist typologies of institutional configuration. This poses an institutional theory
whereby the character and interests of actors are conditioned by a given arrangement,
leading to the development of actor’s resources, strategies and capabilities. Put
differently, comparative institutionalism suggests that institutions develop the ‘supply-
side’ of a given economy, shaping the collectivism of capitalist inputs (land, labour,
capital, products) accessible to the actors within it (Baccaro & Pontusson, 2016; Hancke,
2009). Given the foregoing discussions have demonstrated that the entrepreneur remains
at the fulcrum of capitalist societies, (re-)combining from given labour, capital, land,
goods and services product markets, the nature of a given institutional configuration
holds a considerable agenda to the behaviour of this market agent.
Comparative institutionalism approach to institutional theory develops four key
theoretical tenets. Firstly, unlike other institutional approaches, comparative institu-
tionalism emphasises that institutional sub-spheres are complementary and fundamen-
tally interdependent. A complementarity exists when the presence and efficiency of one
institution increases the returns from another institutional domain (Aoki, 1994; Amable,
2016), tending to underpin the OECD emphasis of the liberal market/coordinated
market economy (LME/CME) dichotomy (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Hall & Gingerich,
2009). Given that complementarities generate mutual returns, economies with a given
degree of institutional coordination in one sub-spheres, cultivate an interdependent
institutional practice in neighbouring sub-spheres. Thus capitalist variety can be ob-
served as a path-dependent phenomenon. Such core of the literature distinguishes both
from idiosyncratic studies of institutional singularity (like new institutional economics),
and parallel streams of comparative economic analysis. This is because the ‘building
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blocks’ of capitalism are functionally inter-reliant on one another, founded on the basis
of mutual reinforcement of an interacting and dynamic process.
Secondly, given the nature of institutional complementarities and interdependence,
whereby functional interrelations between institutional domains gives rise to further
‘non-random’ configurations of capitalism (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). Thus, institu-
tional change remains incremental and path-dependent (Amable & Palombarini, 2009).
Despite the present arguments of institutional convergence under globalisation, the com-
parative institutionalism perspective suggests that competitive external pressures are
absorbed through both the view of ‘institutional combination’ and the interdependent
nature of such combination. As such, institutional change remains more difficult, costly
and timely given the leading shock effect to other institutional sub-spheres (Williamson,
2000). Therefore, institutional change will develop with a gradual ‘national flavour’ of
path dependency, underpinning the potential redundancy of the ‘convergence argument’
(i.e. liberal convergence, Europeanisation). This supports the idea of ‘equifinality’, that
there is no one perfect and optimal model of capitalism, underpinning the hypothesis of
institutional coherence. From this, the sociologically based arguments of ’institutional
isomorphism’ remain largely unfounded and unjustified.
Thirdly, the comparative institutionalism literature naturally evolves the argument
of institutional diversity, for which highlights distinct advantages or disadvantages for
various sorts of economic activity. The integrated nature of institutional sub-spheres
with studies of political and institutional proxies emphasises a variety of distinct possible
economic outcomes and behaviours, suggesting that potential capitalist divergence
supports a given ‘comparative (institutional) advantage’. Diverging societal institutions
offer countries comparative advantages in some but not all activities, and that those
institutions encourage divergent patterns of economic activities and entrepreneurial
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specialisations (Hotho, 2014). While this proposition in intuitively appealing, empirical
studies of the links between economic outcomes and institutions are often inconclusive
(Kenworthy, 2006; Hotho, 2014). Connecting streams of literature have yet to fully
utilise such feature of the comparative institutionalism literature, namely for analysis
of institutional advantages and entrepreneurship. Whilst under-emphasized, several
studies have attempted to survey the overall macroeconomic performance of varied
capitalist types, taking account of growth, employment (Hall & Gingerich, 2009), fiscal
stance (Amable & Azizi, 2011) and instability (Hall, 2014). However, little consensus
remains. Hall and Gingerich (2009) support the claims of Hall & Soskice (2001) in
that the level of institutional coherence, the degree to which economies exhibit LME
or CME traits, is positively correlated with economic performance. With similar
logic, Kenworthy (2006) finds no significant relationship between internal institutional
consistency and macroeconomic performance, indicating that both the validity and
literature consensus on the effect of institutional diversity remains limited, and clearly
an area for further research.
Lastly, given its eclectic background of inter-disciplinary analysis, the comparative
institutionalism literature takes forward the view of Weber (1978) and Granovetter
(1985), in that economic activity remains embedded in a deep social context for
which requires governance, coordination and legitimate authority through an array of
institutional sub-spheres. Given that an institutional setting is required in the arena
of socio-economic context, the ‘new institutional economics’ literature of ‘markets and
hierarchies’ (Riordan & Williamson, 1985) existing as the prime governance mechanism
remains truly displaced. Comparative capitalism takes a broader agenda in the light of
economic sociology, in which there remains a co-existence of informal institutions of
social networks and societal cohesion, analogous to that of the pure economic analysis
of idiosyncratic formal institutions and state intervention. As such, comparative
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capitalism allows the analysis of the socio-politico-economic phenomenon, vis-à-vis
that of the prevailing economic focus of ‘new institutional economics’. The crucial
themes of these institutional approaches are captured within Table 2.1.
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2.5 Comparative Institutionalism: Intra-Diversity
of Approaches
Despite the commonalities within the comparative institutionalism literature, a vast
field of variety still remains within it, characterising the distinct way of methodological
use, domains of analysis, and the geographic dispersion of capitalist arrangements.
The diversity of literature is representative of the lack of agreements in the distinct
types of capitalism, or indeed the approach to analytical strategies of comparative
study (Jessop, 2014). This is inherent of the diverse array of institutional sub-spheres
utilised to illustrate capitalism frameworks, methodological ordering principles, or
indeed the nature of ‘crucial dimensions’. Whilst these remain explicit features, and one
that is emphasised by the varied comparative discourses, implicit features yet remain.
Multiplicity lies again with the ‘softer’ conception of the nature of institutions and the
way in which they ‘enable’ and ‘constrain’. Surprisingly, there remains little definition
of ‘capitalism’ itself. So while common principles rest, they fail to remain analytically
equal, contributing to the divergent topography of the comparative institutionalism
literature. This is useful to discuss as it unearths the potential for institutional theory
to support novel analysis of institutional impact.
Combined together, the varied plurality of literature approaches blends a potential
for comparative analysis itself, suggesting varied expectations of economic action and
thus distinct routes of economic dynamism through the various views of institutional
configuration and the nature of institutional change (Chang, 2007; Streeck and Thelen,
2005; Hall and Thelen, 2009). The varied comparative institutionalism strands are
defined by common elements that distinguish the ‘uniqueness’ of each approach – namely
(i) the comparison of institutional configurations which derive from varied conceptions
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of institutional sub-spheres, (ii) theory of comparative institutional advantages for
different types of economic activity, (iii) dominant dimensions of diversity and (iv) the
‘stickiness’ of institutions which give birth to multiple institutional equilibria. There
are three synthetic frameworks within the comparative institutionalism literature,
namely the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach, ‘national business systems’ approach and
‘governance-led’ approaches. These form the discussion below and are conceptualised
within Table 2.2.
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2.5.1 Varieties of Capitalism (VoC)
Given the dissimilarity of intellectual and scholarly activity with respect to explaining
institutional diversity, has led to the birth of three parallel approaches to querying the
nature of capitalist variety. Firstly, aligned closely between the intersects of neoclassical
economics and political science, rests the "Varieties of Capitalism” (VoC) approach
centring on the work of Hall & Soskice (2001), yet drawing much attention from Albert
(1993). The ‘dualistic’ approach of VoC has become the dominant and somewhat
emblematic citation of comparative capitalism, with neighbouring approaches often
described as the ‘alternatives’ (Bruff et al 2015; Crouch, 2005a). Hall & Soskice (2001)
categorises the firm as a relational point within the network of an institutionally
embedded environment. Whilst there remains a populated topography of relevant
actors within a capitalist arena, such as the state, individuals, pressure groups, or
indeed, the entrepreneur, the VoC approach largely takes forward the firm as the central
economic actor. Given the institutionally embedded nature of the firm, operating
with a matrix of incentives and sanctions, the relational nature of the analytical foci
presents the response of predictive economic behaviour. This directly evolves from the
varieties of capitalism perspective that firm’s agency is a product of their institutional
environment. Such approach conveys well the nature of comparative institutional
advantage, which has lent itself to more policy active literature (e.g. Schneider, 2010;
Johnston et al, 2014; Hall, 2014). VoC has successfully revived the interest towards
institutionalist view of comparative political economy. However, it has done so by
providing an opaque and superficial view of how comparative institutionalism can
provide deeper and theoretical insight into a broader agenda of capitalist development,
dynamics, and institutionalisation (Clift, 2014).
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With a focus on micro-agents, VoC starts with the firm at the centre of analysis
seeking to understand how they organise activities in varied production regimes. The
firm operates in a ‘relational’ network and is therefore institutionally embedded within
a matrix of varied institutional sub-spheres. It is the configuration of institutional
sub-spheres that in turn develop the institutional framework and production regime
to which political science scholars refer to as ‘capitalism(s)’. Variance within these
frameworks is mutually attuned in systemic ways, leading to unique sets of institutional
complementarities which produce specific patterns of competitive advantage. This
approach, axiomatically, offers an institutional explanation for cross-country differences
in micro-behaviour as developed by the varied equilibria points of capitalism (Jackson
& Deeg, 2008). At the centre of the varieties of capitalism approach is its articulation
of diverse forms of institutional frameworks. What emerged from the Hall & Soskice
(2001) assessment, in polar ideal types, were two specific forms of institutional equilibria
– liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs). The
former is coordinated by market activities such as contractual relations and the latter
relies on strategic forms of coordination (Hall & Soskice, 2001).
Starting with the ‘resource based’ perspectives of the firm (Barney, 1991) in that
firms seek to develop core competencies and dynamic capabilities, the varieties of
capitalism approach explores capitalism from its central actor – firms. From this
point, VoC provides a micro-analytical view on the underlying ‘coordination’ problems
that firms face in transacting within non-market forms. According to Hall & Soskice
(2001), extending from new institutional economics, economic exchange is plagued by
informational asymmetries, principal-agent issues, opportunist behaviours and therefore
transaction costs. Smoothing coordination problems deriving from transaction costs,
VoC argues that mitigation occurs by the historically given institutional framework.
Formally, varieties of capitalism emphasise the presence of institutions providing
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capabilities for increasing the exchange of information, the monitoring of behaviour
and sanctioning of opportunist behaviour. These coordination issues are resolved by
the institutions of the political economy which given the multiplicity of institutional
sub-spheres, take specific forms, specifically liberal and coordinated market typologies
(Hall & Soskice, 2001). In the VoC example, firms find themselves permanently exposed
to markets. Labour markets where workers and management interact, capital markets
which provide capital to firms and product markets which structure relations between
customers and firms – these sub-spheres take very different and divergent shapes in
different capitalist political economies. According to the qualitative assessment of Hall
& Soskice (2001), labour markets in North-Western European economies are idealised
as having corporatist provisions, with strong unionisation and collective bargaining
arrangements. Labour markets in the Anglo-Saxon sphere, however, are characterised by
flexible labour relations and decentralised wage bargaining systems. Financial markets
in these countries offer market led short-term capital and dispersed shareholder systems,
representative of the financialization trend in core advanced economies. These markets
interact in non-coincidental and complementary ways which offer unique and distinct
economic outcomes. As such, firms do not operate in homogeneous institutional
frameworks and thus diverge in their forms of micro-behaviour.
The varieties of capitalism approach links this insight into perhaps its core and
fundamental insight – the presence of several ‘tightly calibrated’ institutional sub-
spheres determines the overall efficacy of the institutional framework/capitalist model.
The formal concept, “institutional complementarities” (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Aoki,
1994) infers that for the overall efficacy of institutional logics to have positive trends
in comparative advantage, institutional sub-systems must reinforce each other. The
varieties of capitalism literature highlight four institutional sub-systems which provide
their natural point of cross-national diversity namely – the ‘industrial relations system’,
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‘education & training system’, ‘inter-company system’ and the ‘financial & corporate
governance system’. The nature of the links between these institutional sub-spheres
defines the culture of institutional complementarity, and thus the degree to which it
converges to one of the two positions of institutional equilibria. For Hall & Soskice
(2001), these institutional equilibria are representative of whether the political economy
is either a coordinated market economy (CME) or liberal market economy (LME).
Coordinated market economies, as portrayed within the political economies of Germany
and Sweden, are characterised by the dominant form of non-market relations, harmony,
collaboration and commitment between firms. Firms here depend heavily on non-market
relationships, ‘collaborative over competition’ with equilibria established not through
market forces but strategic interactions between firms and other actors. In contrast to
this, liberal market economies such as those Anglo-Saxon countries are defined by their
arms-length, competitive relations and supply-and-demand price signalling (Hall &
Soskice, 2001). Contingent on market principles, price signals adjusts the willingness
of economic agents through the standard neoclassical economics theory of marginal
calculation. Thus in LMEs, market institutions provide a highly effective form of
coordinating actors and reducing transaction costs.
It is the very nature of these institutional complementarities and institutional equi-
libria that lead to different yet specific forms of firm behaviour, innovation patterns and
economic outcomes. In liberal market economies, flexible labour markets complement
the short-termism nature of the financial systems allows more dynamism in meeting
new demands, encouraging more ‘radical innovation’ in sectors of high value added
activity. In CMEs, long-term capital provision combined with protected labour markets
and high education skill specificity underpin a more ‘incremental innovation’ trend
in sectors dominated by capital goods (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Hall & Gingerich, 2009;
Schneider et al, 2010). The liberal market configuration reinforces the investment
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in fluid switchable assets, namely weak asset specificity. Contrary, the CME logic
underpins a more rigid investment focus on specific assets whose value depends on the
active operation of others (Hall & Soskice, 2001).
The persistence of the varied institutional equilibria is further reinforced by the
varied incentives created by each ‘variety of capitalism’. It is the different incentives
created by the institutional framework that generates a specific and supporting ‘politics
of economic adjustment’ (Molina & Rhodes, 2007), causing both a course of economic
reform and isolation from globalisation convergence pressures. As VoC argues, those
with fluid and non-specific assets, in the face of shocks undermining the profits on
current activities, will be tempted to stop current activities to seek higher returns in
‘new’ profitable areas. It is the nature of the political economy of institutions that
allows such transferable activities in LMEs and therefore acts as a catalyst to structural
reform. Similarly, those with specific assets will exercise a voice in defence of existing
activities (Hall & Gingerich, 2009). As such, coordinated market economies will often
oppose greater market pressures in the attempt to maintain the returns on their assets.
Meanwhile, liberal market economies will seek to reverse the trends in regulation
to further provide marketization and flexibility. For the VoC approach, equilibria
will become stable through the mechanism of adjustment incentives as created by
the varied institutional logics of political economies. In contrast to the convergence
arguments of NIE, the process of globalisation provides the vehicle for which reinforces
the logic of divergent adjustment rather than undermining it (Hall & Soskice, 2001).
Further, because capital flows towards the institutional framework which provides
complementary assets, both liberalisation and globalisation will often fetch specific
comparative institutional advantages. As such, the varieties of capitalism approach
claims that each political economy will be identified at a specific level of the value
chain. Given deep set flexibilities, LMEs will tend to encourage production based on
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low skill price orientated activities. Coordinated market economies meanwhile provide
the core activities of high value added, skill dependent and high productive formats of
production. This, however, has been contended by the recent works of Taylor (2004) &
Akkermans et al (2009) and indirectly by Hancke & Herrmann (2007).
From the work of Hall and Gingerich (2009, p. 27), rates of economic growth
should be higher in nations where levels of institutional coherence are high but lower in
nations where institutional coherence is low. Simply, converging on the liberal model,
as neoclassical economics would suggest, is not the ‘best way’ to order a countries
production regime. Political economies, in search for institutional efficiencies, should
either diverge on the liberal or coordinated market trajectory (Hall & Gingerich, 2009).
There is not one best model of capitalism, but two equally efficient growth regimes.
2.5.2 National Business System (NBS)
The growing scholarly activity with regards to understanding the topography of political
economies has, as this section argues, led to different yet parallel approaches. Whilst
the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach is often regarded as the intellectual heir of the
comparative institutionalism literature (Crouch, 2009), neighbouring approaches offer
a broader and complementary perspective to understanding cross-national institutional
diversity. Where the Hall & Soskice (2001) approach closely links political science
with both neoclassical and heterodox economics, ‘other’ approaches have intellectual
roots in alternative social sciences, emphasising the role of broader institutional
structures, path-dependant legacies and importantly, alternative perspectives on the
topography of capitalist diversity. Whilst all comparative institutionalism approaches
are primarily concerned with empirically proving the nature of cross-national differences
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within institutional frameworks, and that ultimately institutions are ‘sticky’, yet they
fundamentally differ in respect to their channels of characterising key institutional
sub-spheres. They measure capitalist political economies in different ways and consider
their methodological approaches to be superior to the varieties of capitalism approach.
Applications of comparative institutionalism literature can, therefore, be numerous,
holding varied analytical perspectives and domains of analysis (Hancke, 2009; Crouch,
2009).
Amongst the “post-VoC” movement (Ebenau et al, 2015, p. 34), rests the systematic
approach of Whitley’s (1999; 2007; 2010) ‘National Business Systems’ (NBS) capitalist
perspective. The core point of the national business systems approach is that business
systems, defined as the ‘dominant patterns of economic organisation and control’
(Whitley, 1999), can be compared analytically along three key dimensions: the type
of non-ownership coordination, the type of employment relations and the dominant
type of ownership coordination. Organising capitalist diversity along these spectrums
would then reflect, at an aggregate level, the dominance of certain types of firms that
have particular strategies and relations with other economic actors (Whitley, 1999;
2000). Consequently, Whitley (1999) identifies six types of business systems, broadly
ranging from the standard dichotomy of market-orientated to state organised spectrum
of political economies.
A central tenant of the national business systems approach is their view on the
internal consistencies of the dominant modes of economic organisation. Like Hall &
Soskice (2001), Whitley’s (1999) approach recognises the nature of complementarity and
interdependence between the institutional sub-spheres. Business systems dominated
by market led ownership relations are more inclined to support short-term capital and
risk-sharing between employers and employees, contrasting economies characterised
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by high levels market protection. Those with high market control and ownership are
defined by their way of limiting cooperation between firms. Like the core assumptions
of VoC, the viable number of functional combinations of institutional sub-spheres would
suggest that there is a unique set of equitable business systems (Whitley, 1999). These
established patterns of economic control and coordination are deeply coherent, and
therefore are likely to persist as equilibria points over time.
Another key notion of the national business system perspective is that the distinct
and dominant ways in which economic activities are coordinated and controlled are
contingent on the nature and format of societal institutions. Given economic coor-
dination problems similar to those identified by Hall & Soskice (2001), institutions
generate and produce established resource allocation patterns which deter against
coordination asymmetries. In this regard, institutions are important because they
encourage particular types of ownership coordination, how actors interact and as a
consequence, what they produce. The key institutional sub-spheres underpinning how
business systems coordinate and control are: the role of the state, the format of the
financial system, the skill-development system and the norms & values within work
relations (Whitley, 1999).
As argued, it is not just the individuality of these institutions that matters, but
rather their form of interdependence and complementarity. Symbiotic relations between
institutions creates the very stable patterns of economic configuration to which condition
the actions of individuals and firms in theorised predictable ways. Relying on a wide
variety of different configurations of institutional sub-systems, Whitley (1999) proposes
a conceptual typology of six types of business systems. These are born from unique
and diverse institutional “constellations” (Hancke, 2009, p. 12) and particular types of
dominant firms. First, a fragmented business system, characterised by small firms that
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cooperate little with other firms, whilst failing to develop long-term links with customers
nor employees. Symbolised by high direct control and low alliance coordination, these
business systems are often located in countries where trust is weak and financial capital
is limited. Markets, therefore, tend to be highly competitive, and the small firms tend
to be adaptive in seeking market opportunities (Whitley, 1999). Second, coordinated
industrial district business systems, similarly consisting of small firms, yet with greater
alliance coordination. Both labour and capital inputs are coordinated with firms more
readily adapt to meeting consumer demand. The state undertakes a more active role,
protecting market structures alongside the provision of high asset-specific training.
Compartmentalised business systems are the third type identified by Whitley
(1999). These are characterised by high ownership coordination and low non-ownership
coordination which are led by large firms often with the autarchic provision of capital
and labour. Strong formal institutions enable extensive market-based transaction to
take place, which encourages competition amongst firms. While large firms play a
similar role within the fourth type, state-organised business systems, they are jointly
led by the state. The state actively provides firms with abundant and cheap capital,
undertaking a ‘dirigiste’ led role in organising economic development (Kim & Kim,
1997). This encourages direct ownership with tight relationships amongst business and
political elites. Fifth, collaborative business systems display strong interconnections and
risk-sharing amongst economic actors. This allows scope for collective organisation and
cooperation at the industry level, combining with a labour market governed through
dense training systems and centralised wage bargaining systems. In contrast, highly
coordinated business systems extend its collaboration across all industries which often
takes the ‘Japanese’ form (Gerlach, 1992) of ‘alliance’ based business networks. The
state takes a more active guiding role than within collaborative business systems, yet
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often delegating considerable social and economic decision autonomy to intermediary
associations.
The typology based perspectives of the national business systems approach offer
considerable benefits as a conceptual framework when seeking to understand spatial
discrepancies in economic development. The formulation of typologies provides insight
into the specific logics of distinct patterns of economic action, control and coordination
whilst providing analysis into the general relations between institutions and economic
activities (Hotho, 2014). As such, Whitley’s (1999) institutionalist approach has
forwarded the scope of comparative institutionalist literature to provide scholars with
empirically grounded classification tools. Alongside the varieties of capitalism approach,
the national business system work as reduced the complexity of political economies
to clear forms exhibiting coherent patterns of economic action, offering an analytical
dimension to which individual capitalist institutional models can be studied and
compared.
Despite this collective function, national business systems perspective contrasts
VoC by taking a more empirically driven approach, largely based on facts that claim
to capture the architecture of economic relations within a given ‘capitalism’. The
national business system approach uses similar categories of institutional sub-systems
to that of Hall & Soskice (2001), with some arguing that Whitley’s (1999) typologies
are subsets of the binary LME/CME dichotomy (Hancke, 2009). The basis of typology
variety is also part of the analytical difference between the two approaches. Varieties
of capitalism gain traction from its simplistic elegance and has often been the base of
further comparative institutionalist literature (Hall & Gingerich, 2009; Schneider &
Paunescu, 2010; Amable & Azizi, 2014).
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2.5.3 Governance Approaches
Thirdly, aligned closely with the empirical basis of NBS, yet with a growing foundation
of statistical induction, lies the ‘governance approach’ associated with the combined
work of Hollingsworth & Boyer (1997) and Crouch & Streeck (1997). Beyond the
traditional distinction between hierarchies and markets, this approach addresses a more
holistic view of ‘governance’ mechanisms ignored largely by institutional economics,
stressing the domains of the state, networks, and communitarian norms. Different
from the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach, regulation theory focuses on the temporal
dimension of the institutional organization of production regimes and the periodic
shifts in this organization (Hopner, 2005a). Authors of this approach map the diversity
of coordination mechanisms used in the governance of economic activity. Beyond
the traditional distinction between markets and hierarchies, the framework includes
communities, the state, networks, and associations. These six basic governance mecha-
nisms differ along two underlying dimensions: the degree of self-interest or obligations
for actors, and the degree to which power is distributed horizontally or exercised
vertically. Each governance mechanism has its own organizational structure, rules of
exchange and enforcement, and typical strengths or failures (Hollingsworth & Boyer,
1997). Where Hall & Soskice (2001) emphasise rational strategic behaviour within a
set of fixed institutions, the governance ‘framework’ lends more attention to logics of
appropriateness in shaping economic agency and choices.
Authors Hollingsworth & Boyer (1997) use industrial sectors as their unit of
comparative analysis. In their sample of eight countries, the authors find substantial
and significant differences in governance mechanisms across sectors within individual
economies. Differences in governance within sectors are often recognisable as national
differences in that they follow a similar logic across subsequent sectors (Hollingsworth &
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Boyer, 1997). They explain this by arguing that social institutions supporting different
mechanisms of economic governance are, for the most part, nationally distinct in the
use of relational trading in networks, willingness to form associations and the degree of
state intervention. Different sets of institutions are either more or less supportive of
particular modes of governance and thus either enable or constrain different sorts of
company strategies.
However, vast innovations and expansions of such ‘governance’ discourse have
developed the ‘social systems of innovation and production’ (SSIP) approach furthered
by Amable (2003). Instead of the dualistic analytical distinction of the VoC literature,
or on the stylised fashion of NBS representations, the post-dualistic prose of SSIP are
built on statistical inductive measures of increasing institutional (relevant) domains,
with quantitative data more systematically gathered vis-à-vis the NBS methodologies.
Amable’s (2003) analysis centres around five institutional sub-spheres, to which estab-
lishing close links between correlation analysis and principal-agent analysis, evolves an
underlying institutional unity for which characterises varied institutional mixes into five
distinct models of capitalism. Grouping capitalist economies based on their similarities
(using cluster analysis) in these institutional sub-spheres generates models of capitalism:
a market-based model, a social-democratic model, a continental European model, a
Mediterranean model, and an Asian model. One of the key additions Amable makes to
the SSIP and VoC approaches is the further development of the political dimension to
models of capitalism. This turns out to be very important toward understanding change
and the evolution of a capitalist system. In particular, Amable argues that institutional
configurations reflect the preferences of the dominant social bloc. Institutional change
and adaptation are a reflection of political coalitions that emerge and provide a critical
mass of actioned change.
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Education & Skill Formation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employment Relations/Labour Markets Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial System Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product Markets Yes
Interfirm Networks Yes Yes Yes
Internal Dynamics of the Firm Yes Yes Yes
Ownership & Corporate Governance Yes Yes Yes
Social Capital Yes Yes
Social Protection Yes
State Role Yes Yes
Table 2.3 illustrates the institutional dimensions applied by the leading models
of comparative institutional analysis. As it can be seen, the field of comparative
institutionalism analysis is defined by the width of institutional approaches, and
therefore the definition of the institutional environment. However it can be seen that
there is a general consensus that the education system, labour market and financial
system define well the architecture of the institutional environment.
2.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter reviewed key approaches to institutional theory. It began by defining and
outlining the ontology of the term ‘institutions’, in a bid to then understand the role of
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institutions on the economic development process. From this perspective, the section
has defined and illustrated why ‘understanding institutions’ is imperative. From here,
the chapter then provided an overview of the topography of institutional approaches, for
what defines a ‘menu’ of institutional theory. The chapter then concluded by narrowing
its focus towards the intra-plurality of ‘comparative institutionalism’, illustrating the
varieties of capitalism, national business system and governance approaches. Combined
together, the varied plurality of literature approaches unearths potential for comparative
analysis itself, suggesting varied expectations of economic action through the various
views of institutional configuration. How one approaches institutions defines how
‘institutions matter’. This facilitates a contextual approach to entrepreneurship in that
economic action does not happen in isolation but indeed within the institutional setup.
Chapter 3




This chapter forms the second part of the literature review, which focuses on the
institutional theory applications to comparative international entrepreneurship studies.
It builds upon the first literature chapter to review how entrepreneurship studies
utilise institutional approaches from the foregoing discussion. This chapter has two
general themes to it. Firstly, it builds upon prior discussion to theoretically motivate
the conceptualisation of entrepreneurship, and to demonstrate how the comparative
international entrepreneurship literature has applied and utilised the varied institutional
theories. Secondly, in an attempt to conceptualise a framework for this study, the
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chapter moves on to discussing gaps and weaknesses in the present application of the
comparative international entrepreneurship literature. Building upon this, the latter
part of this chapter conceptualises key literature themes to build a theoretical and
empirical framework.
3.2 Entrepreneurship & Economic Growth
The traditional theory of long-term economic growth rests on the assumption that
physical capital and labour remain the driving factors behind economic development
(Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956). The components of investment and efficiency counteract the
diminishing point of increasing capital stock, upgrading the steady-state of national
income. This had been the underlining principle of the ‘Solow model’ in the traditional
views of growth. However, the evolution of growth theory has emphasised the emergent
importance of knowledge, with the prominence of human capital becoming the central
component of the growth process (Romer, 1986). The prominence of endogenous
factors inherent within economic development, of which some remain social individuals,
came to stress the role of institutional environments, for which enable and constrain
specific modes of economic activity (Acemoglu et al, 2014; Acemoglu and Robinson
2008; Rodrik 2003; Rodrik et al, 2004).
Drawing on this understanding, the roles of institutions (Chang 2007; Lin 2012;
Rodrik 2008) and entrepreneurship (Acs, 2006; Acs et al, 2008; Noseleit 2013; Wong
et al, 2005) have become key perspectives in developmental based analysis of growth.
Blending both fields of literature develops a more nuanced and holistic approach
to the understanding of growth phenomenon, and as such, highlighting the role of
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entrepreneurship. As argued by Carlsson et al (2013), an important reason to study
entrepreneurship is given its prime role in the process of growth and development.
Antecedent factors that promote entrepreneurship are therefore essential for advancing
entrepreneurship scholarship.
Scholars such as Minniti and Levesque (2010) and Michelacci (2003) have used the
original assumptions of Schumpeter (1934), that is that the entrepreneur remains the
key agents within capitalism, to include entrepreneurship in growth models. These
authors demonstrate how entrepreneurship leads to long-term equilibrium gains, and
therefore extended growth accumulation. Other studies such as Carree et al (2007)
input an ‘entrepreneur’ function within the Solow model to find its (positive) coefficient
strength in the growth process. Further studies provide empirical evidence regarding
the impact of entrepreneurship on growth (Audretsch & Keilbach, 2005, 2007; Van
Stel, 2006; Wennerkers & Thurik, 1999).
However, what remains absent from these studies are the dynamics through which
entrepreneurship is supported by institutions; it remains imperative to develop an
understanding on the dynamics of entrepreneurship within the growth process. The
disparate nature of this literature highlights varied perspectives to a dynamic approach
to the ‘entrepreneur envy’ growth scholars. Authors such as Van Stel & Storey (2004)
stress the role of job creation within new venture creations, while others stress the
role of new competition in a neo-classical based perspective of industrial economics
(Koster et al, 2012; Kritikos 2014). For some, entrepreneurs contribute to growth via
the development of product variety to match the emergent interests of the middle-class
(Van Stel 2006; Foellmi and Zweimuller 2008), while Hausmann & Rodrik (2003) argue
that the provision of non-pecuniary externalities provides fresh information of profitable
opportunities, which then leads to new resource mobilisation and the possibility of
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complementary product markets (Holcombe, 2003). According to Gries & Naude (2009,
2010), Naude (2008) & Noseleit (2013), entrepreneurial activity promotes a reallocation
of resources, and thus acts to promote allocative and productive efficiency, hereby
maximising the underlying dynamism of market based economies.
The binding of this literature highlights two prominent channels of entrepreneurial
effect. Firstly, is that entrepreneurship allows individuals to escape from both relative
poverty and informality by the form of hierarchic formal ordering of agents. Secondly,
entrepreneurship leverage growth by promoting structural change, thereby opening
up further opportunities for more productive wage employment, labour mobility and
specialisation. Whilst the neo-classical view considers sectoral composition as a by-
product of growth (Echevarria, 1997), prominent scholars such as Baumol et al (1989)
& Kuznets (1971) regard the changing nature of sectoral structures as the underlying
dynamic of growth. The central argument of this causal relation relates to the absence
of optimal resource distribution due to an insufficient adjustment to changes in the
structural nature of the economy. Increased allocative efficiency is closely related to
the innovation in products and services innate to sectoral change (Wong et al, 2005;
Aparicio et al, 2015). As such, new business formations that fulfil the functions of
innovation remain an important component to growth leverage (Neffke et al, 2011,
2014; Wennekers et al. 2005).
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3.3 Conceptualising National Level Entrepreneur-
ship
It has made clear the idea that both institutions and entrepreneurship can be explana-
tory to the empirical variations in both economic growth and development. Indeed,
there has been a long standing literature linking entrepreneurship and growth (Acs et
al, 2018), and over the past 20 years, a growing body of literature linking institutions
and growth. However, there is less emphasis on the links between entrepreneurship and
institutions, which leads to a missing link in the wider understanding to cross-country
growth differences and to the entrepreneurial ‘ecosystem’ (Stam, 2015, Acs et al, 2014).
To formalize these ideas empirically, studies would need to measure entrepreneurship
and institutional arrangements independently, as proposed by Acs et al (2018).
The common study of entrepreneurship has often focused with a ‘homo-economicus’
view of the entrepreneur, that is that they remain free from the conditioning of their
environments, with continuous research emphasis on entrepreneurial behaviourism,
such as the nature of the individual, traits and personality characteristics. As it goes,
entrepreneurship is promoted by creative innovators, perceived as an individualistic
act driven only by a few individuals (Herrmann, 2010). These views provide little
understanding of entrepreneurship at the national level.
As such, to theoretically conceptualise these ideas, one would need to consider
what they mean by entrepreneurship at the country national level. To many authors,
entrepreneurship encompasses varied action. To some, it is firm-level behaviour (Hen-
rekson & Sanandaji, 2014), to other it is self-employment (Reynolds et al, 2005), and
for Shane (2012), it is an individual cognitive behaviour; a process rather than an event
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embodiment as a type of person. When considering national level entrepreneurship,
Acs et al (2014, pg. 476) believes "the measurement challenge becomes even more
complex when discussing entrepreneurship in countries. If we have difficulty defining
entrepreneurship as an individual or firm-level phenomenon, what hope do we have of
deciding what ‘entrepreneurship’ means as a county-level phenomenon?"
Studies at the country national level use measures such as self-employment, new
firm start-ups and the rate of churn for example. However, this thesis proposes that
country-level entrepreneurship should be treated as a systemic output, the same way the
literature on National Systems of Innovation (NSI) considers country-level innovation
as a by-product of institutions and policies. As such, this thesis conceptualises
entrepreneurship at the national level as a measurement of each countries Total
Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA), in line with prominent studies such as Carree &
Thurik (2003) and Erken et al (2016). In turn, this thesis conceptualises by theoretically
motivating Nelson’s (1993) idea that aggregate innovation production of nations is
determined by country structure rather than individual process. Measurement should
attempt to achieve the same, emphasising the product of the entrepreneurship context
as suggested by Stam (2015).
In view of the numerous different theoretical approaches to the understanding of
entrepreneurship and their related concepts, this thesis considers entrepreneurship
to be an aggregate activity of nations, measuring the attempt at a new business or
new venture creation, such as self-employment, a new business organisation, or the
expansion of an existing business at the national scale of resolution.
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3.4 Perspectives in the Role of Institutions on En-
trepreneurship
As suggested, entrepreneurial research has often devoted itself to the study of microe-
conomic explanations of entrepreneurial behaviour with minimal regard for a broader
context (Welter, 2011; Lim et al, 2010). Given this, there has been less interest in
understanding the macro environmental conditions that provide relative incentive struc-
tures and formalized guiding principles of economic activities. Besides, any individual
characteristic will cooperate and interact with contextual factors that facilitate or
inhibit the activities of entrepreneurs. Hereby institutional analysis contributes with a
fresh theoretical lens to the study of entrepreneurship. This requires a cross-disciplinary
nexus of entrepreneurship study with the emerging prominence of institutional theory
(Terjesen et al, 2013). As put by Turner (1997), “institutional analysis is an important
and often neglected way to understand societies and organization”. This remains true
within the present neoclassical synthesis of mainstream economics, and echoes calls
to bring ‘institutions back in’ to the study of economics (Groenewegen et al, 2010;
Lawson, 2006; Rodrik, 2007b).
Institutional analysis necessarily involves the investigation and examination of
contextual institutional regimes with emphasis on specific institutional sub-spheres.
The institutional environment refers to the provision of the endowment structures of
societies as developed from economic, political, legal and social constructs (North 1991;
Williamson, 1985). They provide the foundational basis for economic exchange, and
blend capitalist markets with a degree of path dependency and interdependency to
support the conditioning of embedded agents and economic activities (Whitley, 1999;
Yeung, 2002; Aoki, 1994). An institutional economics perspective would further suggest
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that institutional constructs would counteract market imperfections & transaction costs
(Williamson 2000). With reference to resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978) and Barney’s (1991) seminal resource based perspective, institutions undertake a
pivotal role in the process in which both individuals and organizations must manage
dependencies in order to attain critical resources (Hessels & Terjesen, 2010). Therefore
for organizations to succeed, they need to build a competitive advantage in line with
the competitive advantage of their institutional environment (Herrmann, 2010). This
gives birth to a strong national identity of economic output and conditioned modes of
national competitiveness.
To understand the embedded nature of the entrepreneur within an institutional
context, analysis should be chiefly concerned with how institutions & institutional
configurations affect the behaviour of individuals, such as the decisions to induce
new venture creations or to provide new and novel resource combinations. This
is the principal aim of the entrepreneurial ‘eco-systems’ (EE) literature. Authors
writing in this vain investigate the link between external environments, including
institutions, and entrepreneurship. The entrepreneurial ecosystem concept emphasizes
that entrepreneurship takes place in a community of interdependent actors of systemic
context (Spigel & Harrison, 2018; Delgado et al, 2010). More particularly, the literature
on entrepreneurial ecosystems focuses on the role of the (social) context in allowing
or restricting entrepreneurship, and in that sense is closely connected to other recent
“systems of entrepreneurship” approaches (Spigel, 2017; Sternberg, 2007; Acs et al,
2014; Levie et al, 2014), which aim to bridge the innovation system approach and
entrepreneurship studies (Stam, 2015).
Indeed, the studies of Aidis et al (2008) and Bowen & Clercq (2008) argue that
national economic and social institutions promote a specific business climate, whilst also
3.4 Perspectives in the Role of Institutions on Entrepreneurship 70
providing the catalytic fuel to the internal dynamic of contemporary capitalism, which is
the evolution of the potential for venture creation. Taking a bounded agency perspective,
or the “choice-within-constraint” view of individual-institution interactions, Ingram
& Clay (2000) and Hodgson (2007) illuminate how institutions provide enforcement
mechanisms which bound agents towards specific patterns, attitudes and values. Here,
the modern focus of entrepreneurship research with traits and ‘the great man’ analogy
(Yeung, 2002) remains rather questionable, suggesting that all citizens are born with
the capacity to be entrepreneurial. This is in direct contrast to an institutionalist
perspective of entrepreneurship which suggests that entrepreneurship can be a product
of ones institutional environment. Furthermore, if we are to speak of the importance
of entrepreneurship within growth (Acs, 2006; Wennerkers & Thurik 1999), the absent
acknowledgement that ‘institutions matter’ clearly provides a narrow perspective of
economic phenomena (Naude, 2010; Chang, 2007).
Taking the institutional perspective, Baumol (1990) is the first suggests that the
structure of rewards condition the nature of entrepreneurial activity. The relative
‘payoff’ structure of society can be seen to allocate entrepreneurial activities to either a
productive, unproductive or destructive mean, with these different activities having
divergent impact upon economic growth. This argument is based upon providing
greater allocative efficiency of the factors of production. In a similar vein, Lim et al
(2010) find that institutions directly determine entrepreneurial cognitions. Taking the
cognition work of Mitchell et al (2000), Lim et al (2010) find that institutional spheres
have both an impact on the arrangement and willingness cognitive scripts involved
with the venture creation decision, and hereby provide a process orientated approach to
entrepreneurship. They argue that institutions promote a specific knowledge structure
that people use to make assessments, judgements and decision involving the ‘risk versus
opportunity’ of venture creation decisions.
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In sum, institutions work by structuring appropriate and devised paths of action
through incentives and sanctions. Taking a view of social rationality, economic actors
will act within the confines and limits of their institutional environment, and if we are
to understand the nature of entrepreneurial activity, institutional based perspectives
remain integral. As argued by North (1991), “that institutions affect the performance
of economies is hardly controversial”, yet there is a shortage of analytical frameworks
that appreciate how the broad array of institutions impact entrepreneurial activities.
3.5 Institutional Approaches in Entrepreneurship
Studies
Institutional approaches for understanding entrepreneurship are becoming more appre-
ciated. Alongside this, the foregoing discussions have illuminated the wide plethora
of institutional theory, which is born from varied disciplines ranging economics, so-
ciological and political notions. In turn, these theoretical diversities leave room for
multiple areas of application where introducing institutional approaches to comparative
international entrepreneurship (Herrmann, 2019; Szyliowicz & Galvin, 2010).
Despite this, empirical assessments of the relations between institutions and en-
trepreneurial patterns often draw on an insightful but relatively narrow concept of
institutions and siloed applications of institutional theory. Subtle differences defining
varied institutional frameworks remain under appreciated, and the extent to which
different institutional frameworks can promote similar outcomes have become under
explored. This suggests that a more nuanced comparative institutional approach might
be needed to capture the impact of institutions on entrepreneurship (Dilli et al, 2018;
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Herrmann, 2019). The following discussion will outline the current literatures appli-
cation of institutional theory in comparative international entrepreneurship studies.
Given Chapter 2 has identified a ‘menu’ of institutional approaches, the discussion is
structured within the bounds of a given institutional approach. This further draws
attention to the hegemonic influence of certain schools of institutional theory within
comparative international entrepreneurship, whilst promoting a conceptual discussion
on how literature gaps can be leveraged in pursuit of applying a more encompassing
parsimonious approach to institutional analysis.
3.5.1 New Institutional Economics & Entrepreneurship
As discussed in Chapter 2, new institutional economics (NIE) is primarily associated
with the foundational work of North (1990), Ronald Coase (1937) and Williamson
(1981). An emerging consensus acknowledges that the extent to which the institutional
environment can guarantee private property and enforce contracts will reduce the
‘transaction costs’ associated with using market transactions (Coase, 1937; Williamson,
1975). To new institutional economists, institutions are the national level ‘rules of the
game’ for society, which are human creations devised to shape societies interactions
(North, 1991). The founding fathers of NIE, Douglas North, Oliver Williamson
and Ronald Coase recognize the existence of two strands of institutions, formal and
informal. The application of NIE in entrepreneurship studies have however tended
to concentrate on formal institutions, rules and regulations that affect the choice
of governance arrangements through which economic activity is organized. In this
literature, institutions and institutional change have generally been analysed as way in
which market imperfections and transaction costs, such as informational asymmetries,
uncertainty and bounded rationality are reduced by formal ‘man-made’ institutions
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(North, 1990). These typically take the form of private property rights and the rule of
law in entrepreneurship literature.
Emphasising the role of institutions in the process of social action, NIE has proved
a powerful analytical framework for the study of institutional influence. The dichotomy
between formal based and informal based institutions has contributed a neat con-
textual setting, providing a coherent backdrop. As such, comparative international
entrepreneurship scholars accounting for the institutional environment have typically
used the new institutional economics theory as the framework of analysis. It is typically
argued that entrepreneurs need to recognise and act per institutions to obtain ‘legiti-
macy’ (Bruton & Ahlstrom, 2003; North, 1991). From the context of NIE, legitimacy
can be defined as “a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity
are desirable” (Suchman, 1995). Here, legitimacy is a key determinant, particularly
for new ventures, as it signals the value of a venture to important stakeholder (Rao et
al, 2008). It is from this perspective that NIE provides its main contribution to com-
parative international entrepreneurship studies, and forms the theoretical framework
within which NIE based frameworks are developed.
For example, McMullen et al (2008) used NIE to study the effects of government
restrictions on entrepreneurial freedom, with Ireland et al (2008) assessing the influence
of several formal and informal institutions on entrepreneurial activities. Extending the
scope to Russia, Aidis et al (2008) explore the ways in which institutions and networks
influence entrepreneurial development. Using the work of Douglas North (1990), they
develop probit regression models to examine the importance of both formal and informal
institutions. Their results suggest that Russia’s institutional environment is imperative
to explaining its relatively low levels of entrepreneurial development. However, most
interestingly, they find Russia’s business environment and its consequences for the role
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of business networks contribute to the relative advantage of entrepreneurial ‘insiders’
over ‘outsiders’, as measured by new business start-ups.
Adopting a similar New Institutional Economics ‘macro-level’ lens, yet with more of
an emphasis of private property rights and formal structures of Governmental organisa-
tion, Estrin et al (2013) extend the work of Aidis et al (2008) to explore whether social
networks compensate for weaknesses in formal institutions. Their framework generates
hypotheses at the national level on the negative impact of weak private property
rights, greater government activity and higher levels of corruption on entrepreneurial
aspirations to increase employment. Applying a multilevel estimation framework, they
find that the relationship between growth aspiring entrepreneurs and institutions is
"complex". According to their results, entrepreneurs benefit simultaneously from smaller
governments and higher private property enforcements. Similarly to the results of
Aidis et al (2008) and Autio & Acs (2010), Estrin et al (2013) find that social networks
mediate some but not all deficiencies in the institutional environment.
However, it has been the case with these two studies that the country sample
includes a consistent set of countries based an approximate equal levels of economic
development. Given calls to increase the sample to include a broader basket of countries
for cross-country comparison (Terjesen et al, 2016), Casero et al (2013) were one of
the first to include a large country sample where they control for groups of countries
classified according to their economic development. In particularly, they set out to
explain the link between entrepreneurship and economic growth with institutions acting
as a mediating variable. The results suggest evidence that some institutional variables
that influence business creation depend on the countries developmental stage. In
developing nations, formal institutions such as education and health services act as
more critical institutional factors. In transition economies, the integrity of the legal
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system and the strength of contracts remain more influential institutions, whereas
in develop economies the size of the government and availability of credit have more
influence on Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) based variables.
With a similar methodological approach, De Clercq et al (2013) investigate the
moderating roles of a country’s institutions, as measured through the NIE formal and
informal dichotomy. This study considers the relationship between people’s access
to resources and their likelihood to start a new business, with particular interest
into how the relationship maybe influenced by North’s (1990) characterisation of
formal and informal institutions. Using a multi-source panel data set, their results
indicate that access to the different types of capital (social, financial and human)
increases new business creation. A country’s institutions appear to leverage both
individual human capital and social capital for the decision to start a new business.
Formal institutions inform the extent to which individuals can complement their
personal resources with resources developed via the institutional environment. Informal
institutions however determine the extent to which the resources embedded with the
institutional environment can be distributed and distributed across economic actors.
Whilst these studies have tended to concentrate their efforts on explaining the levels
of entrepreneurship, several studies have found that institutions also influence the types
of entrepreneurship undertaken. For example, Chowdury et al (2014) make the case
for the existence of disparate varieties of entrepreneurship by exploring and analysing
three distinct varieties of entrepreneurship largely ignored by previous NIE based
studies: new firm start-up, self-employment and early stage entrepreneurial activity.
Using the NIE formal/informal classification, their results suggest that institutional
factors influence the ‘varieties of entrepreneurship’ differently. Freedom from corruption,
property rights and fewer start-up procedures are positively related to nascent new firm
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ownership. Furthermore, property rights protection is significantly related (positively)
related to new firm start up, with regulatory burden seemingly having a positive impact
on self-employment but negatively related to new form start-up.
Similarly, Autio & Fu (2014) investigate the influence of economic and political
based formal institutions on the prevalence rate of formal and informal entrepreneurship.
Across a sample of 18 Asia-Pacific countries, they find that the quality of institutions
has a substantial influence on both types of entrepreneurship (formal and informal).
Their results show that one standard-deviation increase in the ‘quality’ of economic
and political institutions could double the rates of formal entrepreneurship and half the
rates of informal entrepreneurship. This shows that if institutions are lacking in quality,
more entrepreneurs will choose not to register and become ‘informal’ entrepreneurs.
With similar respect to the impact on the types of entrepreneurship, Simon-Moya
et al (2014) show that higher levels of economic freedom, or to use the phrase of
Estrin et al (2013), ‘strong formal institutions’ are associated with higher levels of
opportunity entrepreneurship. High level of private property protection, flexible
legislation for business procedures and general openness to trade leads to higher levels
of entrepreneurship that promote innovation vis-à-vis necessity based entrepreneurship.
Thai & Turkina (2014) however provide an empirically supported model, encompassing
a wider range of macro-level determinants that shows how formal entrepreneurship
and informal entrepreneurship are driven differently. Like Simon-Moya et al (2014),
Thai and Turkina’s (2014) results show strong support for the argument that the
same institutional factors have varied influence on formal entrepreneurship than on
informal entrepreneurship. Demand-side factors (economic opportunities), supply side
factors (resources and abilities derived from institutions), culture and governance
quality influence both rates of formal and informal entrepreneurship. However, the
statistical strength varies dependent upon the type of entrepreneurship and therefore
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is consistent with the view of other studies (e.g. Autio & Fu, 2015; Simon-Moya et al,
2014; Chowdury et al, 2014; Dilli et al, 2018) that different types of institutions offer
different entrepreneurial choices.
Against the backdrop of formal pro-market institutions, Dau & Cuervo-Cazurra
(2014) expand the work on examining the role of institutions upon types of entrepreneur-
ship by extending the sample towards 51 countries across a larger time period. Like
the other NIE based studies, Dau & Cuervo-Cazurra (2014) examine the effects of
‘pro-market institutions on both formal and informal entrepreneurship. These authors
break down their formal pro-market institutions into two main components: economic
liberalisation and governance levels. Similarly to Thai and Turkina (2014), their
results show that institutions have ‘one best way’ and that is liberal, market based
institutions. They find that economic liberalisation positively impacts both formal and
informal entrepreneurship, while governance levels have a positive impact on formal
entrepreneurship but a negative effect on informal entrepreneurship. Furthermore, they
show that governance levels reduce informal entrepreneurship to a greater extent than
the increase formal entrepreneurship, resulting in a net reduction in entrepreneurial
activity (Dau & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2014). Fuentelsaz et al (2015) find that improvements
in formal institutions, such as property rights, business freedom, fiscal freedom, financial
and educational capital positively influence the rates of opportunity entrepreneurship
that is usually considered to be of greater ‘quality’ and more closely related to economic
development in a country. In contrast to these studies, Aparicio et al (2016) find that
informal institutions have a higher impact on opportunity entrepreneurship than formal
institutions. Using the conceptual framework of new institutional economics, they
analysed the influence of informal and formal institutions on opportunity entrepreneur-
ship, which at the same time allow the achievement of economic growth (Aparicio et
al, 2016). Their research generates three key results. One, a positive relationship be-
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tween opportunity entrepreneurship and economic growth. Two, a positive relationship
between institutional factors and opportunity entrepreneurship; and three, variables
such as control of corruption, confidence in one’s abilities and ability to obtain credit
promote a positive effect of opportunity entrepreneurship on economic growth. These
results suggest that by joining these two sides of entrepreneurship research together,
as suggested by Carlsson et al (2013), it is possible to suggest that strong formal and
informal institutions encourage growth by leveraging an effect on entrepreneurship.
Where these studies have tended to emphasise more regulatory ‘formal’ NIE based
institutions, Dheer (2017) proposes that the cultural context of a nation moderates the
effects of antecedents such as corruption, education and political freedom. Consistent
with this argument, Dheer (2017) investigates the role of individualism-collectivism
in moderation the effects of the institutional environment, accounted for by political
freedom, corruption and education, on entrepreneurial activity across nations. This
study makes a novel contribution to the entrepreneurship literature. First, it recognises
the role formal institutions play in determining the level of entrepreneurial activity
across nations. However, unlike extant studies, it emphasises that the role and effect
of formal institutions is contingent on the cultural framework of society. Drawing on
cultural theory (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Fiske & Taylor, 2013), their results suggest
that individualism positively moderates the effects of political freedom, negatively
moderates the effect of corruption and positively moderates the effects of education
on the rate of entrepreneurial activity, as measured by GEM’s total entrepreneurial
activity (TEA) measure. Overall, whilst emphasising the NIE strand of institutional
theory, Dheer (2017) findings suggest that the effects of formal institutions is shaped
by more informal cultural institutions within society.
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In sum, whilst an array of findings are given, the nature of this survey highlights
several important implications for this thesis. Firstly, it is clearly and most profoundly
recognised that formal institutions play an important role in determining the propensity
to be entrepreneurial. In turn, this helps give some explanation to the diversity of
entrepreneurial activity across nations. Secondly, given the formal conception of
institutions is predominately emphasised, has led to overlooking the role of informal
institutions. In this pursuit of specifying the most important formal institutions has
therefore placed little emphasis on the institutional environment as a whole, that is,
how these different institutions interlink through functional relations to constitute the
‘overall’ institutional framework. Institutions are tested individually and in isolation. As
a result of this yields the third point, in that when identifying the link between specific
institutions, studies tend to specify at which end this relationship is most powerful.
Differently, formal institutions are more conducive where they are ‘liberal’, ‘pro-market’
and overall they have ‘one-best-way’. Indeed, these relationships are linear and ‘strong’
institutions are those that are most ‘liberal’. It promotes a ‘convergence’ view of
institutions. Whilst a broad set of institutions are surveyed from this perspective, they
all stress the implication that a narrowing down towards a few ’best’ sets of institutions
is indeed one that proposes a ’converge’ argument, and therefore is argued to be a
restrictive concept. Policy responses would emphasise deregulation and liberalisation,
yet is this wholly appropriate? Fourthly, there is a consensus that the rule of law and
private property rights matter; the most prominent formal institutions. Yet, developed
capitalist countries are built on such very premise. This tells us little on how present
industrialised countries can differentiate to promote their entrepreneurial society.
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3.5.2 New Organisational Institutionalism & Entrepreneur-
ship
A field established via the disciplines of organisational theory and sociology, new
organisational institutionalism focuses on organisational forms and practices rather
than the national level ‘rules of the game’. Here, institutions are established ways of
acting and transacting stemming from shared ‘regulative, cognitive and normative
frames’ (Morgan & Kristensen, 2006). The sharing across organisations of common
rules, traditions and norms provides the institutionalization of organisation forms,
ultimately because it provides reward. Conformity, or ‘institutional isomorphism’
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) increases organisational legitimacy, rents from resources
and transactions that ultimately extends the survival of the organisation (Meyer &
Rowan, 1977). These institutionalized behaviours are guided by normative pressure and
cognitive thought systems (Scott, 1995; 2008) rather than through NIEs perspective of
formal institutions.
Alongside NIE, new organisational institutionalism is a commonly featured frame-
work for comparative international entrepreneurship studies. Emphasising the reg-
ulative, cognitive and normative institutional frames, comparative international en-
trepreneurship has devoted much of its institutional attention by lending theoretical
application from the prominent work of Scott (1995). For Scott (1995), institutions
consist of “cognitive, normative and regulative structures and activities that provide
stability and meaning in social behaviour” where institutions are transported by various
cultures, structures and routines operating at multiple levels of jurisdiction (Scott,
1995, p. 33). These three parameters are formally known as Scott’s ‘three pillars’.
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It is from these structures that comparative international entrepreneurship studies
evaluate the institutional influence on the decisions of entrepreneurs. Authors have often
applied Scott’s pillars to show the differences between the entrepreneurial orientation
of comparative sets of countries residents. The work of Kostova (1997) proposed the
concept of a country institutional profile to analyse how the normative (value systems),
regulative (government policy) and cultural-cognitive (shared social knowledge) pillars
effect domestic business activity. From this, Busenitz et al (2000) developed a validated
measure of a countries institutional profile for entrepreneurship. This study introduces
statistical measures of the country institutional profile consisting of the regulatory,
cognitive and normative dimensions. By providing a three-dimensional institutional
profile, the authors clarify the distinct roles that institutional dimensions play in
determining level of entrepreneurship across countries. The development of their
factors, with the inclusion of reliability, discriminant and external validity statistics
provides researchers with a valuable resource for exploring why entrepreneurs in one
country may have a competitive advantage over entrepreneurs in other countries.
Specifically, it allowed comparative entrepreneurship scholars to query how specific
country-level institutional differences contribute differently to levels and types of
entrepreneurship. The Busenitz et al (2000) article gave way to a fresh wave of new
organisational institutionalism studies in comparative international entrepreneurship.
The are as follows.
Spencer and Gomez (2004) draw on Busenitz et al (2000) construct of a coun-
try institutional profile to identify normative, cognitive and regulatory institutional
structures that may influence a country’s entrepreneurial activity. Their results show
that Scott’s pillars, alongside economic factors, play distinct roles in promoting en-
trepreneurial activity in a country. Cognitive institutions explained the prevalence
of small firms in a country, as well as the number of new companies listed on the
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country’s stock exchange. Normative institutions, consisting of four items identifying
public attitudes toward entrepreneurial activities, was associated with self-employment
rates. Regulatory institutions were positively associated with new listings on the
country’s stock exchange, yet negatively associated with self-employment forms of
entrepreneurship.
Where these studies predominantly concentrated their data sample on industrialised
countries, Manolova et al (2008) validated the Busenitz et al (2000) instruments
to measure the country’s institutional profile in three Eastern European emerging
economies. They empirically validate an instrument for measuring country institutional
profiles for the promotion of entrepreneurship in a sample of 254 business students
in Bulgaria, Hungary and Latvia. Results from confirmatory factor analysis suggest
high reliability and construct validity of the institutional measures. Their research
finds important distinct differences in the three dimensions across the country sample,
reflecting their regulatory structures, cultural values and normative traditions in
promoting entrepreneurship. The focus on emerging countries was further extended by
Gupta et al (2012) whom compares the institutional environment for entrepreneurship,
focussing on Scott’s pillars, in South Korea and the United Arab Emirates.
However, as also argued by Bruton et al (2010), there has been a growing demand
to study the impact of institutional dimensions on entrepreneurial activity using wider
cross-national data. Several studies have aimed to fill this void through the new
organisational institutionalism strand of institutional theory. Using the Global En-
trepreneurship Monitor (GEM) and World Values Survey, De Clercq et al (2010) include
regulative, cognitive and normative frames as moderating effects in the relationship
between associational activity and new business activity in emerging economies. They
find a positive relationship between a country’s associational activity and new business
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activity, with the relationship stronger for higher regulatory and normative institutional
burdens and lower cognitive institutional burdens. Furthermore, Stenholm et al (2013)
develops a “novel” multidimensional measure of the entrepreneurial environment that
reveals how difference in institutional arrangements influence both the rate and the
types of entrepreneurial activity in a country. Drawing on Scott (1995), their newly
developed measures examines the regulatory, normative and cognitive dimensions of
entrepreneurial activity. Their results suggest that differences in institutional arrange-
ments are associated with the differences in the rates and types of entrepreneurial
activity across countries. They find that an environment with regulative arrangements
that support entrepreneurial activity matter more than other country level institu-
tions, such as the cognitive and normative dimensions. However, for the formation of
innovative, high growth new ventures, the regulative environment matters very little.
Valdez & Richardson (2013) similarity used the organisation institutionalism litera-
ture to gain a greater understanding of the determinants of macro-level entrepreneurship.
It was their aim to understand which aspects of national environments make countries
most fertile for entrepreneurship. For them, national differences in entrepreneurial ac-
tivity may represent differences in social, cultural and economic climates. Like Spencer
& Gomez (2004), Valdez & Richardson’s (2013) findings suggest that a societies nor-
mative, cultural-cognitive, and regulative institutions are related to entrepreneurial
activity. Specifically, the statistical relationship between the normative and cognitive
frames is higher than regulative institutions. Their results suggest that the difference in
belief systems, value patterns may play a greater role than regulatory measures aimed
at economic opportunity and reducing transaction costs. This study supports the
proposition that when a country’s citizens generally view entrepreneurs as favourable,
whilst feeling knowledgeable about entrepreneurship, they are more likely to be involved
in new venture creation. This proposition has clear implications for the role of public
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policy, which is often focussed on regulatory measures (Dilli et al, 2018). Indeed for
these, entrepreneurship may benefit from altering the norms and normative institutions,
which in turn may improve the climate for entrepreneurs.
Following with the same cross-national rationale, Urbano & Alvarez (2014) extend
the organisational institutionalism approach with the use of logistic regression. The
purpose of their study was again to examine the influence of Scott’s (1995) pillars
on the probability of becoming an entrepreneur. Their findings demonstrate that a
‘favourable’ institutions increase the probability of being entrepreneurial. Specifically,
fewer procedures to start a business (regulative dimension), higher media attention for
new business (normative dimension), and less fear of business failure (cultural-cognitive)
combine to ensure a greater probability of new business ventures. Again, using Global
Entrepreneurship Data (GEM) across a 30 country sample, their study advances
the international entrepreneurship literature by providing new evidence on the role of
environmental factors that affect entrepreneurial activity. In this line, Urbano & Alvarez
(2014) further complement the institutional focussed entrepreneurship literature from
within the current wave of new organisational institutionalism perspectives. Sambharya
& Musteen (2014) further examined the impact of the normative, regulatory and
cognitive aspects of the institutional environment on the entrepreneurial activity across
different countries. Using GEM data, they find that the cognitive dimension is a
strong predictor of the opportunity driven entrepreneurial activity across countries. In
contrast, the normative and cognitive pillars of institutional theory appear to be better
predictors of necessity driven entrepreneurship.
Again, the topography of these studies highlights several points of interest moving
forward. Firstly, it is clear that new organisational institutional perspectives are as
readily used in entrepreneurship studies as is new institutional economics perspectives.
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The reason for this can be explained in the fact it carries forth a direct and ‘neat’
framework to study institutions. In turn, secondly, Scott’s three pillars approach is a
readily used outline for studying entrepreneurship in these studies. As a result of this,
there is the similar issues as NIE based studies in that there is a lack of appreciation
for the overarching institutional environment. There is little consideration given to how
these separate institutions may form an overall structure through ‘complementarities’
they may take. A symptom of this gives a the third point that again, there is an emphasis
of these studies tending to frame their studies in such a way as to emphasise specific
institutions vis-a-vis neighbouring institutions, and as a result, overemphasising in
which ways these institutions maybe more powerful. For example, regulative institutions
have larger influence where there is less regulation; or normative institutions are more
powerful where society is more conducive towards business. Again this lends to the
idea that societies should ‘converge’ towards a ‘one-best-way’ of institutions. Indeed it
supports a ‘convergence’ view of institutional effectiveness. Again whilst a broad set of
institutions are surveyed from this perspective, they all stress the implication that a
narrowing down towards a few ‘best’ sets of institutions is indeed one that proposes a
converge argument, and therefore is argued to be a restrictive concept.
3.5.3 Comparative Institutionalism & Entrepreneurship
The third potential institutional approach is comparative (capitalist) institutionalism, a
fruitful and emergent discourse originating from socioeconomics and political economy.
Where new institutional economics (NIE) that focuses on the convergence upon the
institutional effectiveness of formal and informal institutions, comparative institutional-
ism approaches seek to explain and describe diversity in the socioeconomic architecture
of countries. From the NIE perspective, Germany, UK and Norway have similar
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institutions as measured by the convergence perspective of institutional effectiveness
(e.g. rule of law, private property rights). Conversely, the comparative institutionalism
lens highlights significant differences in the political economic architecture of these
three countries. The type of resources that are provided and how economic activities
are organized and controlled is unique to each country. Formally, comparative insti-
tutionalism seeks to identify the large intrinsic diversity amongst capitalist countries,
and it is these differences that provide a natural blueprint for understanding how
institutions matter for international entrepreneurship. From a theoretical perspective,
institutions matter because societal institutions provide unique resources, competencies
and practice norms to entrepreneurs (Chowdhury et al, 2014; Terjesen et al, 2013; Lim
et al, 2010). In turn, the specificity of the host institutional environment impacts the
challenges that entrepreneurs face when emerging, transacting and establishing local
linkages (Yueng, 2002).
However, despite the attempts of comparative international entrepreneurship re-
search to explain the effects of cross-country differences of entrepreneurship, comparative
institutionalism approaches remain significantly under-represented in the comparative
international entrepreneurship domain. Notwithstanding the calls for encompassing
a broader institutional context in entrepreneurship (Herrmann, 2019; Szyliowicz &
Galvin, 2010; Terjesen et al, 2013; Su, Zhai & Karlsson, 2017), studies taking a com-
parative institutionalism perspective are limited to only the efforts of four studies. It
is clear that against the backdrop of potential institutional approaches, comparative
institutionalism is an overlooked strand of institutional theory.
Lending the framework of Whitley’s (1999, 2007) national business systems (NBS)
approach to comparative institutionalism, Bowen & De Clerq (2008) seek to investigate
whether a country’s institutional context influences the extent to which entrepreneurs
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allocate their efforts towards high-growth activities. By using the NBS approach as a
framework to identify the relationship between specific institutional dimensions and the
allocation of entrepreneurial effort, they find a positive relationship between the level of
both financial and human capital, and the proportion of high-growth entrepreneurship.
In doing so, they offer a more encompassing view of how the institutional context
influences the nature of a country’s entrepreneurial endeavours. Their analysis highlights
how the comparative institutionalism literature, in the form of Whitley’s NBS approach,
can be leveraged to explain variations across countries with respect to their ‘economic
prosperity’. Despite the limited cross-sectional sample, Bowen & De Clerq (2008) are
the first to acknowledge the wealthy prospects comparative institutionalism literature
has to offer to the comparative international entrepreneurship literature.
Similarly to Bowen and De Clerq (2008), Lim et al (2010) further take a national
business systems perspective to investigate the relationship between institutional
environment and the entrepreneurial cognitions which lead to an individual’s venture
creation decision. Taking a sample from eight countries, they examine the extent
to which institutions, such as the financial and education system, influence venture
creation decisions. They find that the legal system, financial system and education
system all have statistical influence upon entrepreneurial cognitions. By taking a
socioeconomic approach to institutions, they provide an alternative and novel way of
investigating the various contextual influences that impact entrepreneurship activity.
Where these two studies have blended the NBS comparative institutionalism work,
Terjesen & Hessels (2009) draw upon the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) (Hall & Soskice,
2001) literature in an attempt to explore the differences in the proportion of export-
oriented early stage entrepreneurial activity in 12 Asian countries. Using the ‘industrial
relations’, ‘training & education’, ‘corporate governance’, ‘inter-firm relations’ and
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‘employee relations’ institutional sub-spheres, this study explores how differences in
institutional structures relate to new firm entrepreneurship. Their findings suggest that
countries exhibit a higher proportion of export-orientated entrepreneurial activity when
industrial relations are more flexible, training institutions are of ‘high’ quality, and
labour-employer relations are confrontational. In accordance with VoC, they find that
national institutions affect economic behaviour, in particular firm exporting. Yet, while
VoC would predict that variety in national institutional set-ups can result in similar
outcomes for economic behaviour among nations, Terjesen & Hessels (2009) suggest
that a linear relationship exists between the composition of a country’s institutions and
new venture export. Most recently, Dilli et al (2018) similarly employ perspective from
varieties of capitalism to derive a set of institutional indicators that can explain ‘varieties
of entrepreneurship’. They conclude that four different ‘Varieties of Entrepreneurship’
can be identified across the Western world. Using OLS regressions, they show how
these institutional constellations are related to types of entrepreneurship. They argue,
alongside Herrmann (2019), that the literature on ‘varieties of capitalism’ offer a
parsimonious theoretical framework to explain different types of entrepreneurship.
Drawing this together illuminates three interesting implications for this thesis.
Firstly, with only four studies stemming from this comparative institutionalism per-
spective, it can be argued that such approach is largely overlooked. In an attempt to
understand the diversity and allocation of entrepreneurial activities nationally, it is
surprising that scholars do not draw on approaches which emphasise cross-national
differences in institutional context. Institutions here are seen as divergent and broad
structures. Secondly, building upon this, given how such approach conceptualises the
institutional environment, can provide a natural parsimonious blueprint for further
entrepreneurial studies. In an attempt to investigate institutional context, approaches
which illuminate the interconnectedness and interdependence of institutional sub-
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spheres can further shift the literature away from stylising an individual isolated
institutional analysis akin to convergence based approaches. Yet thirdly, these four
studies have yet to examine and test the institutional environment as a whole, that is,
taking account of the institutional complementarities and potential functional equiva-
lence drawing from a pure comparative institutionalism analysis. A formal discussion
between converge based theories and diversity led approaches will be given in the next
section. An overview of the varied applications of institutional theory is given by Table
3.1.
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3.6 Moving ‘Institutional Explanations’ Forward
This section identifies two overarching themes with the current trajectory of the
literature. The first identifies divisions within institutional theory. One set of theories
sees institutions as converging creations, and the other set sees institutions as divergent
creations. Weaknesses within the application of institutional approaches can be seen
to start here. The second is built upon the first issue, in that there is no justifiable
application of diversity perspectives accounting for the intricacies within institutional
environments. This section therefore acts as a ‘critical review’ by stylising key literature
gap themes in a bid to move ‘institutional explanations’ forward.
3.6.1 Converge versus Diversity Institutional Perspectives
The current body of institutional work provides institutional explanations that help
emphasise how different countries have developed under varied conditions and at varying
trajectories. This work displays distinctive features of the institutional environment that
influence the innovative capabilities of economies and shape entrepreneurial activities.
However, research in this vein has attempted to explain differences in the allocation of
entrepreneurial activity without a complex understanding of the nature of institutional
theory and frameworks. This has led to numerous gaps in the application of institutions
in comparative international entrepreneurship studies.
Firstly, much work has attempted to explain differences in entrepreneurial patterns
of activity without a grounded understanding of the institutional framework within
which recognises the combinations of their constituent institutional components. Work
has often treated institutions as stand-alone structures which posit no endogeneity with
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other institutional spheres. As the work of Boyer & Saillard (1995) suggests, institutions
and the pressure for institutional change is conditioned by the interconnectedness of the
institutional structures, to which form and constitute the entrepreneurial environments.
Scholars writing from this perspective in international entrepreneurship often assume
variation can be explained by national differences in path dependencies, technologies
or social structures. In the absence of acknowledged institutional commonalities, any
cross national comparisons becomes difficult (Szyliowicz & Galvin, 2010).
Secondly, much of the literature does not acknowledge the plurality and thickness
of institutional theory. As foregoing discussion suggests, there is a clear dominance
of certain strands of institutional theory. Comparative international entrepreneurship
studies have tended to adopt both New Institutional Economics and New Organisational
Institutionalism approaches, with neglect for more nuanced diversity perspectives as
developed within the comparative institutionalism branch of theory. In such vain,
the majority of studies adopt an approach developed in line with North’s (1994)
characterisation of formal and informal institutions. Others apply Scott’s (1995) three
pillars of regulative, normative and cognitive institutions when seeking to understand
the influence on entrepreneurial activity. This has led the comparative international
entrepreneurship literature to adopt a relatively narrow definition of institutions and
their institutional setup. For example, many studies focus on a relatively narrow
range of formal, regulation based institutions that shape the activities of entrepreneurs.
However, institutional approaches developed in other disciplines, namely political
economy, are seldom applied. Taken together, although international entrepreneurship
interpretations of institutional are varied, existing literature focuses on a limited set
of institutions, overlooking the nuanced diversity and complementarities between a
country’s institutions. Given the large differences in how certain strands of institutional
theory conceptualise and define institutions, the institutional approach applied has
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considerable implications for how institutions ‘matter’. This raises several implications
moving forward.
One, it is argued that both NIE and NOI take a narrow view of institutions, arguably
pertaining to a ‘convergent’ view of institutions. This is because institutions from
these branches emphasise the one ‘best’ and perfect set of institutions or composition
of an institution, which is often argued to be the most liberal and open. As such,
countries should ‘converge’ on the ‘best’ format of institutions hereby arguing there is
a ‘one-size-fits-all’ institutional environment for entrepreneurship. This leads public
policy-makers to emphasise liberalisation ‘monocropping’ strategies, with neglect for the
interconnectedness and path dependencies of national institutions. These perspectives
typically consider the quality, development and effectiveness of institutions in a country.
Two, given comparative institutionalism perspectives wish to highlight and analyse
the inherent diversities between national institutional environments, these political
economy approaches defines institutions as ‘divergent’ creations. The comparative
institutionalism literature assesses the conditions under which countries are likely to
continue to have divergent sets of institutions, as there is no one specific institutional
regime that is associated with superior performance of the economy (Lane & Wood,
2009; Allen & Aldred, 2012; Hall & Soskice, 2001), and speaking to debates around
equifinality (Herrmann, 2019). Given there is a lack of comparative institutionalism
approaches, there is a clear neglect of how institutional diversity can explain divergent
rates of entrepreneurship. The emphasis of NIE and NIO, which views institutions as
convergent creations, has perhaps led policy-makers to focus on reforming institutions
to a certain direction, with neglect for the diversity and potential bifurcation of
institutions for entrepreneurship. With high rates of entrepreneurship in non-liberal
political economies, it is clear that the lack of detailed treatment of the ways institutional
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diversity can explain entrepreneurship gives scholars and policy-makers a narrow view
of how institutions matter. Unlike convergent perspectives on institutions, comparative
institutionalism acknowledges that there are different ways of configuring institutions
which breads fertile ground for divergent trajectories of institutional building.
It is this issue of diversity ‘versus’ convergence that the most prominent literature gap
arises. Comparative international literature has focussed on convergence perspectives,
which gives a partial picture of how institutions may affect entrepreneurial activity. By
contrast, the comparative institutionalism perspective may lead to expectations that
there are likely to be ‘functional equivalence’ and a number of ‘best ways’ that lead
to superior entrepreneurial performance. In short, the comparative institutionalism
perspective does not just focus on narrow ‘formal’ institutions to explain entrepreneurial
activity, but takes consideration of a broader set of institutional factors to assess the
conditions under which entrepreneurs from different institutional environments are
able to arise. A key analytical focus of comparative institutionalism is to emphasise
the inherent institutional differences between political economies, and as such pays
closer attention to the particular yet variety of institutional contexts within which
entrepreneurs operate.
3.6.2 Application of Institutional ‘Diversity’ Perspectives
The previous section has illuminated the fruitfulness of considering approaches from
comparative institutionalism. That is, moving towards seeing institutions as divergent
but equal creations. Whilst Bowen & DeClerq (2008), Lim et al (2010), Terjesen &
Hessels (2009) and Dilli et al (2019) are the only authors to draw upon the comparative
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institutionalism literature, they are not without limitations. Indeed, several gaps can
be identified with how this comparative institutionalism literature is employed.
Firstly, one of the key theoretical tenants of comparative institutionalism work,
namely institutional complementarities, is ignored. Whilst these studies are novel in
the sense they are the first to draw upon the institutional sub-spheres introduced by
Hall & Soskice (2001) and Whitley (1999) alike, they overlook the interconnectedness
of individual institutions. For example, these scholars use variables to define trade
union centralisation, asset specificity of countries education systems and regulatory
climate. Yet their research has focussed on testing the statistical influence of institutions
individually, with a large absence of how individual institutions interact. If studies are
to account for the institutional context, then overlooking how institutions complement
one another is a key limitation of their studies.
Secondly, these studies fail to assess any potential ‘functional equivalence’ of varied
institutional frameworks. According to Hall & Soskice (2001) and Hall & Gingerich
(2009), there is more than one way to configure a nation’s political economy to increase
macroeconomic performance. For comparative institutionalism scholars, there is no
one institutional regime that is associated with superior performance, but rather
institutional diversity can lend itself to varied economic patterns of activity, such as
different competitive advantages or economic logics. Comparative institutionalism is
therefore less about the ‘one-best-way’, but rather how institutional diversity influences
economic activities of a nation. Yet, Bowen & Clerq (2008), Lim et al (2010) and
Terjesen & Hessels (2009) merely employ a classical linear regression technique, which
by definition assumes there is a ‘one-best-way’.
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Thirdly, whilst it is appreciated that the comparative institutionalism literature
proves a novel strand of institutional theory, it should be noted, as Chapter 2 highlights,
that there are multiple comparative institutionalism approaches. These can be confined
to the Varieties of Capitalism approach (Hall & Soskice, 2001), National Business
Systems approach (Whitely, 1999) and the Governance approach (Boyer, 1987; Amable,
2003). As there are calls in the comparative institutionalism literature to construct a
‘post-VoC’ era by extending the Governance work (Bieling, 2014) of Amable (2003) and
Boyer (1987), drawing upon such work for comparative international entrepreneurship
research proves a potential fruitful and original approach. Drawing upon this work will
also contribute further to the comparative institutionalism literature with perspectives
beyond the present VoC hegemony.
Fourthly, these studies are based on limited samples. For example, Lim et al (2010)
use a sample of eight countries, Bowen & De Clercq (2008) use 40 observations for
their regression models, and Terjesen & Hessels (2009) examine activities in 12 Asian
countries. These comparative institutionalism based studies are limited by their ‘basket’
of countries and the data points they employ. Thus naturally, these three studies are
based on cross-sectional data, and do not explain entrepreneurship rates with a time
dimension. As such, whilst comparative institutionalism brings a broader perspective
to the study of international entrepreneurship, it is clear that the aim of the three
studies currently seeking to explore this area have been limited by the way they employ
such institutional theory.
Overall, what is lacking from international entrepreneurship research is a compre-
hensive assessment of the ways comparative institutional diversity impacts capabilities,
forms of innovation and areas of competitive advantage. From the comparative in-
stitutionalism approach, the addition of a wider framework of institutions and the
3.7 Orienting This Study 97
corresponding nexus of institutional complementarities can provide the specification of
how parsimonious institutional diversities are likely to shape entrepreneurs decision
making. Bringing forward comparative institutionalism perspectives provides attention
to the varied institutional context within which entrepreneurs may operate. In short,
drawing upon comparative institutionalism remains essential to extending the trajectory
of existing comparative international entrepreneurship research.
3.7 Orienting This Study
3.7.1 ‘Reconceptualising Institutional Approaches to Compar-
ative International Entrepreneurship’
The comparative institutionalism approach holds considerable promise for improving the
understanding of relations between societal institutions and entrepreneurial, economic
outcomes. As is argued, comparative international entrepreneurship literature has
largely overlooked institutional perspectives which underline institutional diversity in
favour of convergent perspectives. In the comparative institutionalism literature, there
have been surprisingly few attempts to validate the original governance based typologies
(Amable, 2003) proposing the topography of capitalist political economies. As Bieling
(2014) and Hancke (2009) illustrate, while the governance capitalist typologies need
to be extended, it remains relevant for describing variety in national institutional
frameworks. This can help provide the nuance needed for exploring the relations
between institutions and entrepreneurship, where institutions are seen as diverse and
complex webs creating specific economic logics.
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Present influences of new institutional economics and Scott’s (1995) definition of
institutional spheres has promoted again here a narrow and homogeneous view of
institutions, and this study intends to exploit this with fresh perspectives from the field
of comparative political economy. These calls for institutional perspectives beyond an
institutional economics focus are strengthened by Lim et al (2010) and Tejersen et
al (2013) who suggests that political economy and comparative institutionalism have
novel and interesting insights for the study of international phenomena.
This study will attempt to offer a response to these issues by providing a multilevel
methodological framework and ‘institutional configuration’ approach to situate the
specific role of institutional context within the study of entrepreneurship, with the
aim of emphasising how the allocation of resources to institutional environments that
support entrepreneurship should remain a development policy imperative. The formal
research aim is therefore given as:
Research Aim:
To explore the influence of national institutional environments on the levels of
entrepreneurship.
The main research aim can be elaborated and explored in terms of the following three
specific research objectives.
Research Objective 1:
To ascertain whether capitalist institutional diversity exists, and if so, how can
diversities be characterised between political economies.
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Research Objective 2:
To ascertain the effects of institutional diversity on aggregate entrepreneurship.
Research Objective 3:
To ascertain whether perspectives from comparative institutionalism can explain the
divergent nature of entrepreneurial activity across nations.
These research objectives are used to provide a guiding framework for this research
study. The next sections are concerned with providing the correct architecture to
conceptualise the main research aims and objectives.
3.7.2 Comparative Institutionalism, Institutional Complemen-
taries & Functional Equivalents
It has been appreciated that the impact of institutions can be best appreciated by
drawing upon comparative institutionalism ‘diversity’ approaches. This section further
demonstrates the key leitmotifs of this approach in an attempt to suitably address how
the aspects of such theory can be leveraged in a bid to contextualise this institutional
configurational approach.
The comparative institutionalism literature is predominantly based on institutional
structures, forms and functions of a political economies production regime. Here,
attention has been redirected away from the study of isolated individual institutions
to the internal logics of institutional configurations as a whole. The concept of
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institutional complementarities is the central theme of this debate, referring to a
functional process whereby the effectiveness of an institutional form in one area is
conditioned by institutions in other areas (Aoki, 1994; Boyer, 2005; Amable, 2016).
This provides an institutional based theory which shifts attention away from the
stylised search for a one best set or form of institutions, but rather underlining the
multiplicity of equitable institutional configurations/models. Differently, comparative
institutionalism perspectives bring forth the study of institutional interaction which
constitutes an overall functional equivalent. It is therefore the existence of institutional
complementarities which explain how and why differentiated ‘varieties of capitalism’
are present, yet equally provide potential general efficiencies to the political economy
(Amable, 2016; Hopner, 2005b).
The models of capitalism debate focus on the presence of potential complementarity
effects between institutions within the production regime. Per the literature, institu-
tional complementarities maybe born through a specific organisation of skill formation
(Streeck, 1991), company finance, cooperation between economic agents, exposure to
competition, or forms of economic adjustment (Amable, 2003; Hall & Soskice, 2001;
Hall & Gingerich, 2009). The theme of institutional complementarities is important
for several reasons.
Firstly, it expresses the idea that certain institutional forms function together to
underscore the nature of capitalist diversity. Capitalist diversity is based on the notion
of specific forms of institutional configurations which are ‘stable’ given the presence of
institutional complementarities. The stability of differentiated varieties of capitalism
stems from their institutional coherence. Political economies are ‘institutionally coher-
ent’ where their specific and unique forms of institutional configurations derive equally
efficient forms of economic competitiveness. The general performance of the economy
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is said to depend on the degree of institutional coherence (Hall & Gingerich, 2009).
Institutional complementarity therefore gains relevance from its effect on outcomes, and
coherent forms of capitalism models stems from the compatibility of the internal logics
of political economies. The search for effects of isolated institutions may be misleading
as effects may be due to the constellation of which the respective institutions are
part (Hopner, 2005a; Stephan et al, 2015). It is therefore important that institutional
applications are representative of debates within institutional complementarities and
coherence.
Secondly, it is important to highlight the specific forms of complementarities to be
able to explain the underlying mechanism within which institutions have an effect on
specific outcomes. It is beneficial for institutional scholars to identify with specific sets
of institutional complementarity in order to understand the institutional mechanisms
upon which the coherence of numerous developed political economies is based. Providing
an overview of institutional complementarities goes beyond the apparent dissimilarities
between economies and to an appreciation of their common structural traits. Thus,
scholars can appreciate how a specific configuration of institutions may give rise to
specific forms of economic outcomes.
Akin to the literature, political economies are ‘institutionally coherent’ the more they
resemble the structural traits of a market based system or a coordinated based system
(Hall & Gingerich, 2009; Amable, 2009, 2016; Kenworthy, 2006). The institutional
complementarities associated with these sets of capitalism(s) are indeed specific, they
define the distinctive type of capitalism or institutional environment. Like Hall &
Soskice, one political economy is based on the accumulation of patient capital and
specific skill investments, whilst another relies on general skill provision and fast
adaptation of markets as determined by marketized forces. In the former type, agents
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are incentivised to invest in specific skills through an array of protective institutions
namely rigid labour markets, job security, wage protection and patient led capital.
These institutions enable long term strategies through reinforcing strategic coordination
amongst firms, the financial system and the labour market. These are complementary
to one another given each institutional form reinforces efficiency of the other for a
competitive outcome (Amable, 2016). For varieties of capitalism scholars, these are
called ‘coordinated market economies’ (CME), in contrast to the market led model
of ‘liberal market economies’ (LME). Again, these are derived by the specific form of
institutional complementarities which define the structure of the political economy.
In the market based mode of capitalism, low product-market regulation exposes
firms to increasing competition, making them more sensitive to adverse market shocks.
Flexible labour markets and decentralised wage bargaining systems allow firms to
both alter their prices, but also adjust their quantity of labour in the event of adverse
changes in the market dynamics. Liberal product markets are therefore complemented
by a labour market which provides the ease of flexible adjustment. This has been
empirically validated by Amable et al (2011). In addition, financial systems dominated
by short term capital aimed at seeking immediate financial returns make firms adjust
their strategies accordingly. Firms are exposed to a pure profit maximisation motive,
which is supported by allowing managers to control costs, particularly through labour
market adjustment. This economic model consequently favours fast adjustment, rapid
structural change and entails a high degree of risk for the investment in specific skills.
For this reason, the education system complements its neighbouring institutions by
investing in general skills. This is complementarity for two reasons. Firstly, general
skill profiles dampen economic downturns as they support firms in adapting to a new
market paradigm. Secondly, individuals with general skills have reduced bargaining
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power relative to specific skill profiles, which underpins the control of firm based costs
(Estevez-Abe et al, 2001; Hall & Soskice, 2001).
The coordinated mode of capitalism is organised per a different set of comple-
mentarities. Semi-governed and protected product markets implies some flexibility of
the productive system, which is not only achieved through labour market shedding
and market adjustments as exercised in the market based model. Instead, retraining
of a highly skilled workforce in a market reinforcing manner plays an imperative
role in the adaptability of firms to competitive pressures. Training labour with the
institutionalisation of specific skills is supported by a combination of high employment
protection, centralised wage bargaining and active labour market policies. This array
of ‘insurance’ based institutions complements the investment and sunk costs towards
the creation of skill specific assets. The financial system further complements the rest
of the production regime by providing patient led capital. This enables firms to develop
long-term strategies in the absence of being exposed to short-term profit constraints.
These are stylised by Table 3.2.
Modes of capitalism therefore constitute an important benchmark for understanding
the effect of institutions on entrepreneurship. Identifying and appreciating the impact
of institutions on entrepreneurship requires a better understanding of the varieties of
institutional ‘environments’ and the forms of institutional complementarities within
which define them. Research into the effect of institutions should take note of the
overall mode of institutional configuration and move beyond institutional research
based on single institutions in isolation (Stephan et al, 2015; Syliowicz & Galvin,
2010). The institutional environment, dominated by a matrix of complementing
institutional sub-spheres, give rise to specific forms of incentive and entrepreneurial
endowments. It is a result of this that entrepreneurs are provided with unique forms
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Table 3.2 General Features of Coherent Political Economies
Model of Capital-
ism




• Low Product Market regulation making firms more sensitive to
supply and demand shocks/changes
• Labour markets are flexible and decentralised, which allows labour
to become the key instrument of macroeconomic adjustment, which
underpins product markets prominence of cost-based competition
or unique product differentiation
• Market pressures make firms adapt their business strategies to
cost pressures, promoting industrial dynamism
• Quick reacting financial markets allow fast restructuring and the
provision of rapid capital, supported by general skill profiles
• Education systems focus at building a skill profile of low asset
specificity which underpins the fast restructuring of industrial
bases and structural change
• Education system reinforces the inactiveness of labour market
spending by institutionalising a skill profile which matches the
changes in derived requirements of economic sectors
• Lifelong and specific learning is encouraged given the fluidity of
labour markets, empowering individuals to accumulate knowledge
to maintain job positions
• Low specific skill investment, hence no hold-up problem, less need




• Strong external competitive pressures, and semi-governed product
markets implies some flexibility for the production regime which
is not only achieved through lay-offs and market adjustments (as
in market-based)
• Training and retraining of a highly-skilled workforce, as reinforced
by the institutionalised skill regime of the education system plays
a crucial role in the adaptability of workers and incrementalism of
key ‘legacy’ industries
• Protection of specific investments in labour by governments or
industrial bodies through rigid labour markets (high legal protec-
tion of those employed), social protection, active labour market
spending and centralised wage bargaining
• Coordinated wage bargaining system allows solidarity wage setting
which favours innovation and productivity of industries
• Centralised and ‘patient’ financial markets provides the economy
with long-term finance to build and enhance specific sectors
• Institutionalised frictions against fast structural change provides
businesses and employees with security and social cohesion
• Financial systems not sensitive to the profitability of industries
enables long-termism strategies akin to the demands of central
authorities, accelerated by high asset specificity of labour
• Employment protection is an incentive to invest in specific skills,
centralisation favour the definition of useful specific skills as re-
quired by the economic base
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of institutional logic under varied models of capitalism. Institutional diversities,
institutional coherence and institutional complementarities, key theoretical tenants of
the comparative institutionalism literature, can provide fruitful insight for the study
of international comparative entrepreneurship. It is from this identification that this
study can take context.
The Constituent Sub-spheres of the Institutional Environment
Lending from the comparative institutionalism of Amable (2003), the institutional
environment can be defined by institutional sub-spheres including product markets,
labour markets, education system and the financial system. This institutional frame-
work also provides the appropriate structure that guides how this study will define
the institutional environment that facilitates the gathering of empirical data and the
aggregate analysis of research findings.
As noted earlier, the Governance-inspired institutional approach distinguishes
between varied institutional sub-spheres. Consistent with this reasoning, the national
institutional environment in this study is conceptualised and examined in terms of
the characterisation put forward by the leading comparative institutionalism work of
Amable (2003) and their implementation characteristics.
The reason this study has chosen Amable’s (2003) as the central institutional
framework is three-fold. Firstly, there have been numerous empirical rejections of the
traditional logic of varieties of capitalism. The basic assumption of the VoC work is
that different economic systems are characterized by institutional complementarities,
leading to a stability of paths. Yet, empirical tests of VoC, such as Witt et al (2017)
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yield models of capitalism beyond the LME-CME dualism, and the institutional
complementarities of Hall & Soskice cannot be explained from this perspective, but can
with governance perspectives as they encourage ’binary classifications’ (Amable, 2003).
This has lead authors to suggest that comparative institutionalism is in the ’post-VoC’
era (Bieling, 2014), acknowledging that competing conceptions of the institutional
environment, such as Amable (2003), are as important. Related to this point, secondly,
there is growing calls (e.g. Witt & Gregory, 2016) for studies to empirically test each
comparative institutionalism perspective as a way to contribute to discussions on
institutional change over time (e.g. Schneider & Paunescu, 2012). Given this study
attempts to measure entrepreneurship and institutions independently, it is felt that
the measurement of the under-represented Amable (2003) perspective would answer
calls to analytically and empirically contribute to the comparative institutionalism
literature (Nolke, 2015). Thirdly, taking consideration from Amable (2003) answers
calls by Urbano & Alvarez (2014) and Urbano et al (2019) to introduce comparative
international entrepreneurship to institutional perspectives beyond the VoC framework.
Table 3.3 highlights the selection of institutions, against a comparative set of leading
models of comparative institutional analysis1. As argued, the field of comparative
institutionalism is defined by the width of methodological approaches, definitions of
the institutional environment and the plethora of institutional dimensions chosen.
Methodologically, institutions are difficult to quantify and measure. Indeed, there
is no clear-cut definition of the institutional sub-spheres make-up. Studies therefore
can often leave a methodological void between the ’concept’ of institutions and their
1It should be noted that the ‘welfare system’ was not selected as an institutional sub-sphere in
this study given the lack and width of data available to support any meaningful latent variable
development. To maintain the broad selection of countries and the time series depth, it was decided
that ’social protection/welfare system’ should not be included in a bid to maintain a range of country
selection and multi-dimensionality allowed by such other institutional sub-spheres.
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Table 3.3 Institutional Dimensions of Leading Models of Comparative Institutional











Yes Education & Skill Formation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Employment Relations/Labour
Markets
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Financial System Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Product Markets Yes
Interfirm Networks Yes Yes Yes
Internal Dynamics of the Firm Yes Yes Yes
Ownership & Corporate Gover-
nance
Yes Yes Yes
Social Capital Yes Yes
Social Protection Yes
State Role Yes Yes
empirical structure. Put differently, there can be issues of construct validity. Given
institutions are latent constructs, this study makes use of principal components analysis
(PCA) in an attempt to quantify institutional dimensions within each sub-sphere.
However, it then becomes an issue behind ’which’ variables to select in a bid to
structure said institutions. Authors has the choice behind which (manifest) variables
to select for data treatment, but do not have a direct choice behind any principal
components created as these are outcome variables of the PCA process. Authors
therefore have a decision and discretion behind filling the theoretical-empirical gap
through their variable selection.
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Product Markets
Product markets have become a key focal point when observing the diversity amongst
countries. Productivity gains, absorption of asymmetrical shocks, real convergence
and increased innovation have all been attributed to the composition of product
markets, that is, where product factors are exchanged. Open, liberal product markets
make firms more susceptible to market pressures, and thus the potential adversity
of demand and supply shocks which are primarily absorbed via a change in prices.
If prices fail to ‘cushion’ adverse shocks, adjustment via quantities becomes the key
mechanism of change, which is primarily concerned with labour force adjustment. As
such, product markets have become an emergent theme when discussing structural
reforms, institutional change and diversity, especially within the European Monetary
Union (EMU). Overall, product markets may differ substantially across countries with
respect to intensity of competition. These differences may stem from differences in the
average size of firms, or the type of technology used, or more basically from variations
in competition regulation (Nicoletti et al, 2000).
Labour Markets
The labour market has become a key institutional point of analysis within political
economy and economics. It is now widely acknowledged that the structure of labour
market institutions is of significant importance to many contemporary economic issues.
For example, achieving inclusiveness and equity has been seen to require constructing
labour market institutions that support people in and out of work (Berg, 2015).
Furthermore, neoclassical beliefs hold that labour markets should be deregulated and
organised so the economy and firm can benefit most from the dynamic process of
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creative destruction, increasing pressure to maintain decentralised wage bargaining
systems and flexible labour protection (Amable, 2009; 2016; Bassanini & Ernst, 2002).
There is also the heterodox thought that wage bargaining systems under the Economic
Monetary Union (EMU) should allow for the centralisation of wage-setting, hereby
allowing the sovereignty over real exchange rate (RER) control, and therefore national
competitiveness (Hancke, 2013; Soskice, 1990). As such, labour market institutions
matter in relation to a range of economic issues.
Labour markets are important for three reasons. Firstly, they provide the functional
requirement of skills and human capital in an advanced capitalist economy (Berg, 2015).
Secondly, they provide labour with (potential) political power through trade unions
and centre-left politics (Soskice, 2007). Thirdly, labour markets provide a natural
macroeconomic adjustment mechanism through both wage moderation and changes
in labour employment (Hancke, 2013). Labour markets have therefore become a
fundamental point of attention for those studying the functioning of the Eurozone, where
naturally, other forms of macroeconomic adjustment have transitioned to supranational
European polities (monetary policy, exchange rates and to a lesser extent, fiscal policy).
Education System
The study of education systems provides a natural point of analysis for understanding
knowledge accumulation and skill formation within countries. There is growing ac-
ceptance that knowledge accumulation leads to innovation and technological progress,
leveraging economics growth where other factors of production remain constant (Gross-
man & Helpman, 1994; Romer, 1994). Despite this relationship, studies into the
structure of educational systems remain limited.
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Financial System
Financial systems provide distinctive characteristics in the comparative institutional
analysis of capitalist economies. Despite globalization and the growing trend of
financialisation, financial systems still attains a sizeable degree of institutional variety,
particularly in relation to the ability of financial systems to provide capital. This
diversity seems to have maintained itself considering the liberalisation of many financial
activities, growing interdependence between financial systems and the prevalence of
capital in everyday activities (Lapavitsas & Powell, 2013; van der Zwan, 2014; Kornich
& Hicks, 2015). The varied national institutional context reflects the influence of
historically path dependent political settlements about the composition and prominence
of financial systems, and the distribution of power within it.
To illustrate the differentiated construction of financial systems, scholars of the
comparative (political economy of) finance have focused their attention to ideal types
for the ordering of finance: the variance between short-termism ‘shareholder’ capitalism
versus long-termism ‘stakeholder’ capitalism. Whilst important, this dichotomy has
created an idealization of two polar extremes; financial systems are either market or
bank-based. This often-qualitative assessment has become the foundation of much
comparative institutionalism financial literature and therefore should not be completely
ignored. As such, we complement the work of comparative capitalist scholars assessing
financial system variance by quantifying the centralisation of financial markets, coupled
with the inclusion of further important aspects to the core institutional structures of
national financial system. For example, key institutional differences remain in relation
to the provision of capital, stock market capitalisation, pension fund assets, competition
and concentration of the banking system.
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3.8 Theoretical & Empirical Framework
Extending upon the foregoing discussion, this section will attempt to outline how
these potential contributions can be executed through a theoretical framework. It will
achieve this by conceptualising the institutional configurational approach outlined be-
forehand stemming from the key empirical leitmotifs of the comparative institutionalism
perspective.
3.8.1 Towards an Institutional Diversity Perspective on En-
trepreneurship: An Institutional Configurational Frame-
work
The configurational approach to national institutions is a way of distilling a complex
array of interdependent variables into a unified whole. This is imperative for
understanding the institutional environment for entrepreneurship.
Variations in institutional structures and political economies significantly explain the
sources and variations of resource and capability endowments enjoyed by
entrepreneurs (Yeung, 2002). The divergent forms of capitalism are explained by their
unique configurations of the institutional infrastructure as underpinned by
institutional complementarity links and historical path dependencies. For example,
Hall & Soskice (2001) identify several sets of capitalist clusters, which given their
patterns of institutional configurations, give birth to a multitude of diverse political
economies. Indeed, this diverse institutional structuring of countries is evident in the
substantial variations within institutional sub-spheres. As argued by Amable (2003),
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the structure and practices of national level institutions produce distinctive forms of
economic organisation. It is argued that the relationship between the institutional
architecture of political economies and the entrepreneurial process is hypothesised to
depend on the nature of institutional complementarities to which leverage’s potential
general efficiencies via supporting entrepreneurial endowments.
These significant variations in home country institutional structures can explain
variations in the entrepreneurial endowments and resources of prospective entrepreneurs
and intrapreneurs (Yeung, 2002). These structures form and enforce conventions, values,
norms, practices and rules of the game to shape the logics governing economic decisions
and actions, which in turn would influence the allocation of entrepreneurial activity.
An entrepreneur must be endowed with at least some resources to be able to act
within the competitive marketplace. These are often nationally based in that they are
embedded in an institutional context and are structured by pre-existing institutional
arrangements. This geographic specificity of entrepreneurial endowments and resources
explains why some countries tend to produce more entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial
activities (Baumol, 1990; Bowen & De Clercq, 2008). Indeed, the difference in global
entrepreneurial rates can be explained by entrepreneur’s access to varied entrepreneurial
endowments (Yeung, 2002). How then do individual entrepreneurs from the home
countries benefit for their entrepreneurial endowments and resources provided by the
institutional context? Building on Yeung (2002), entrepreneurial endowments can be
divided into several dimensions: (1) information asymmetry; (2) risks and opportunities;
(3) finance; (4) human capital and (5) micro interaction.
Information asymmetry is an essential endowment to potential entrepreneurs. If
neo-classical economic theory holds, entrepreneurship would not exist as returns to
such activities will be less than market based allocation against the backdrop of perfect
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information and pure economic rationality. Information asymmetries are a precondition
for entrepreneurs to exist and generate profit as entrepreneurs are ‘specialists in taking
judgemental decisions in resource allocation’ (Casson, 1982; 1995). If markets were
free of informational imperfections, then entrepreneurs would not have an economic
incentive to operate. But from an institutionalist perspective, how does such a
situation of informational asymmetry exist? Simply, certain institutional structures
and configurations tend to increase information asymmetries. Varied institutional
formats can increase the degree of bounded rationality, informational ‘impactedness’
and the concentration of information with certain economic agents (Williamson, 1975;
1981). For example, institutions which rely on statist interventions and intensive
intra-group transactions tend to increase the level of market imperfection (Yeung,
2002). As institutionalist economists have it, this leads to a bypass of the market in
the form of ‘hierarchical’ allocation of resources (Williamson, 1981; Coase, 1937).
However, institutional economics concentrates itself with transaction costs and the
alternative governance structures of whom allocates resources; market or hierarchies.
It is their analytical focus which seeks to explain the comparative transaction costs
under these alternatives to markets, and thus specifies the ownership patterns within
society. Rather, we are interested in how informational asymmetries stimulate or
constrain entrepreneurial activities. In institutional economics, the entrepreneur is
the one responsible for choosing the boundaries of the firm against the backdrop of
institutional arrangements. However, as Casson (1982) and Schumpeter (1934) have it,
entrepreneurship is less about ownership functions, but rather ‘control and negotiation’.
Specifically, high informational asymmetries tend to encourage economic actors,
who have access to information, to be entrepreneurial and exploit the rents available
from market imperfections (Yeung, 2002). Whilst new institutional economics implies
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that anyone can exploit market asymmetries, we argue that those whom have control
of information are the only ones that can sufficiently act. The control of information
therefore defines who can be an entrepreneur. The institutional context which provides
efficient channels of information dissemination will be the one that provides the
most valuable and volume of entrepreneurial endowments. In these institutional
configurations, those entrepreneurs endowed with specific information are most likely to
engage in entrepreneurial activities; those whom act upon informational asymmetries.
This explains why institutional contexts relying on non-market forms of coordination
can also exhibit relative equal rates of entrepreneurial activity. It could be theorised
that the higher the degree of institutional coherence, the more to which the institutional
context corresponds to established modes of institutional complementarity, the higher
the rates of entrepreneurial activity.
Therefore, the institutional system that empowers economic agents with such
entrepreneurial endowments tend to pose greater ‘risks and opportunities’ because not
every actor is aware of such information. Business risks and opportunities are in turn
an entrepreneurial endowment because they directly condition whether social actors
become entrepreneurial or not. The endowments of risks and opportunities are born
from the institutional context given that the diversity of institutions will imply varying
degrees of entrepreneurial risk and opportunity. For example, institutional systems
that are characterised by rigid labour markets and semi-governed product markets
tend to display lower business risks and opportunities (Yeung, 2002; Henrekson, 2014).
Governance within product markets tends to ensure the dominance of large firms
whom may enjoy political rents and relative monopsony of specific skills (Amable, 2003;
Estevez-Abe et al, 2001). There is therefore little scope for further entrepreneurial
activities to penetrate such market saturation and lessening scope for complementary
markets to develop. Stable yet strict employment relations and extensive labour
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protection increases employee’s opportunity cost of changing employers or leaving
salaried work to undertake entrepreneurial activities (Henrekson, 2014). On the other
hand, countries which are based upon flexible, fluid institutional frameworks and market
institutional complementarities may tend to encourage entrepreneurship because of the
greater potential payoffs and more scope for genuine innovative enterprise. Whilst this
may differ with each case, the institutional structuring of the political economy can
ultimately define the degree to which entrepreneurship is a risk based on the available
opportunities available for new enterprise.
For entrepreneurship to flourish under these institutional conditions, they need
to be complemented by a further set of entrepreneurial endowments. Indeed, the
absence of finance and capital will lend little return from other institutional induced
entrepreneurial endowments. Without significant financial and capital support, the
realisation of returns to entrepreneurial action will be difficult and marginal. For those
who have access to information and learnt of their potential returns to brokering risk,
will need significant pecuniary support to assume the venture. Certain institutional
contexts tend to create greater opportunities for financial support, in relation to the
institutional logic of the financial system. The institutional architecture of financial
systems is important for three reasons: (1) it provides capital and finance, (2) it
attaches conditions to capital allocation and (3) it allocates capital to particular sectors.
Whilst most developed capital markets allow for the provision of ample capital, the
conditions they attach to capital may have an impact on the actions of entrepreneurs in
different ways. For example, market based financial systems tend to allocate capital on
a basis of potential short term financial returns, which poses entrepreneurs with fresh
short-term risks. Other financial markets, such as ‘insider systems’, allocate capital
differently, usually on a basis of networks which induces more ‘patient led capital’.
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These all have implications for the endowments available to entrepreneurs, yet in varied
ways.
The degree to which entrepreneurs can capitalise upon the institutionally gener-
ated endowments is dependent on human capital/skills. How the political economy
institutionalises the development of skills and education has important implications
for the judgement of entrepreneurs and how/where economic activity is allocated.
Human capital is therefore an important entrepreneurial endowment. Whilst some
authors claim that the propensity to be entrepreneurial is a natural trait retained by
specific and “great” individuals (McCelland, 1961), institutionalists argue that skills
are attained by entrepreneurs as developed through the institutional framework (Her-
rmann, 2010; Iversen, 2005; Estevez-Abe et al, 2001). With skills fostered through the
institutional setting, human capital becomes a critical determinant of the capabilities
of an entrepreneur to capitalise on market imperfections and make credible business
judgements.
The acquisition of capital, skills and education within different political economies is
related to several institutional structures, specifically within the education and labour
markets. For example, the education system can reinforce the potential portability and
specificity of skills (Becker, 1964) through allocative spending (Amable, 2003). The
institutional structure of the education system can determine where labour will be
‘absorbed’, which defines the relative opportunity cost of self-employment (Estevez-Abe
et al, 2001). Active labour market policies (ALMPs) can define the institutionalisation of
skills sets which is reinforced by public support for specific sectors and advanced learning.
Indeed, the role of education is important in shaping entrepreneurial experience and
capabilities. Whilst the institutions structure explicitly defines where the political
economy builds it comparative advantages through the institutionalisation of skill
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types, the role of education implicitly play an important role in developing certain
‘soft skills’ applicable to entrepreneurial action. Coupled with real life experience in
business, these economic actors will be in a better position to explore, exploit and
broker entrepreneurial endowments. The size of this influence will be unique to specific
sets of institutional structuring, and therefore the relative action and opportunity cost
of entrepreneurs will be contingent on the configuration of institutions.
Entrepreneurs maybe endowed with opportunities and information, but the marginal
returns to these endowments is contingent on how the institutional system provides
specific forms of finance and human capital. Furthermore, as entrepreneurs become
exposed to the ‘market process’ through the establishment of new venture creation,
they will find themselves interacting with other market agents. How they interact with
suppliers and customers for example plays an important role in defining the risks and
opportunities of venture creation, but also how entrepreneurial outcomes will be shaped.
The institutional system determines the mode of agent cooperation and informational
coordination between agents. For example, different institutional contexts tend to
favour specific forms of relationships, such as cooperative or competitive. Unique
forms of relationships have implications for the shape of entrepreneurial action. In
coordinated capitalism, which is built upon cooperative relations, firms are not directly
exposed to competitive market pressures. Rather, agents build strong cooperative
networks within which they are embedded and these network systems rather compete
with other network-based conglomerates rather than within (Yeung, 2002; Whitley,
1999). Entrepreneurs who can establish strong relationships with other micro agents is
more likely to have success within such institutional context because political economies
built upon inter-firm coordination are governed less by price competition but more on
quality and trust-worthy networks.
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Indeed, institutions that underpin trust in economic relations are essential in the
‘maintenance of the economy and social relations’ (Chang, 2011). Institutions allow
for ‘transactional trust’ by minimising the potential of opportunism and cognitive
imperfections therefore interacting parties can equally reach Pareto efficiencies (Fogel
et al, 2006). It promotes a better flow of information between micro agents, hereby
increasing the quality of entrepreneurial endowments. Trust relations can therefore
diminish the need for hierarchical equity based ownership, and serves as an alternative
coordination system within which entrepreneurs can operate.
As highlighted above, these dimensions of endowments provide an institutional
foundation of entrepreneurship to emerge in diverse sets of institutional configuration.
Differently, entrepreneurship is an institutionalised process which is defined by the
unique generation of endowments available for entrepreneurs to process and capitalise
upon. The relationship between the institutional architecture of political economies
and the entrepreneurial process is hypothesised to depend on the nature of institutional
complementarities to which leverage’s potential general efficiencies via supporting
entrepreneurial endowments. The national institutional environment is conceptualised
and examined in terms of the characterisation put forward by the work of Amable
(2003). This is stylised by Figure 3.1.
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3.8.2 Institutional Sub-Spheres & Total Entrepreneurial Ac-
tivity
The relationship between the institutional architecture of the political economies and
the entrepreneurial process is hypothesised to depend on the nature of institutional
complementarities, to which leverage’s potential general efficiencies via supporting
entrepreneurial endowments. The impact on total entrepreneurial activity (TEA) is
theoretically hypothesised to depend on the nature of economic coordination, which is
a function of the nature of institutional complementarities. This said, at the individual
institutional levels, it is important to establish a clear-cut link between institutional
sub-spheres and TEA, as such, theoretically discussing the influence that the distinct
types of institutions have on TEA. Importantly, Amable’s (2003) reasoning about how
institutions governing the exchange between economic agents translate into different
forms of economic activity can be applied to entrepreneurial ventures (Dilli et al, 2018).
As with the financial system institutional sub-sphere, the comparative institution-
alism literature points out how institutions differ in how they solve the principal agent
problem related to the provision of short term, shareholder capital. To be willing to
provide funding, shareholders need be assured that their investment is used in the most
efficient way (Dilli et al, 2018), which is impacted by both the nature of the labour
market institution, educational system and product market institutions.
Major institutional differences exist regarding the extent to which national insti-
tutions facilitate access to varied forms of capital. In many Continental European
economies (often CMEs), companies are required to take provisions and thus administer
huge amounts for future pensions, whereas in most Anglo-Saxon economies (LMEs),
individuals need to provide for their pensions. Notably, companies in charge of their
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employees’ future pensions tend to be more conservative in their investment strategies
than individuals. They often choose less risky investment options, hardly investing
in venture capital funds. Consequently, the availability of venture capital funds is
systematically more limited in CMEs than in the LMEs (Dilli et al, 2018), and therefore
one would expect to see institutional variety amongst a measure of institutional capital
availability.
Capital availability and the nature of the capital (shareholder versus stakeholder
capital) is also a function of the degree of concentration and competition in the banking
system, which in turn illustrate the type of the financial system. In particular, liberal
based economies tend to embody a high degree of pension funds and stock market
activity that underpins the allocation of short term capital. That is, market relations
determine issues of firm and corporate control, with capital issues on a basis of profit
market returns rather than on a longer term patient capital basis. Taken together, we
expect that institutions facilitating the availability of short termism capital stimulate
the development of entrepreneurial ventures. Despite this, there is theoretical reasoning
to consider that where the financial system provides complementarity logic, then this
could positively effect entrepreneurial activity. The tighter the financial system is based
around the short termism type or the longer term patient capital coordinated market
type, the greater the degree which market imperfections are overcome, representing
positively in the degree of market TEA.
Moving to the labour market, the comparative institutionalism literature highlights
how national labour market institutions address the free-riding problem and contrast-
ingly building agility into the economy. To begin with labour- market institutions
regulating permanent employment, rigid institutions (e.g. CMEs), such as centralised
wage bargaining, high union density, high protection against dismissal and active labour
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market policies tie employees to the same firm for a long period of time. Consequently,
both employers and employees are assured that their investment in sophisticated,
firm-specific skills will pay off (Hall & Soskice 2001). Employees in rigid labour markets
therefore often have in-depth corporate knowledge and long-standing relationships with
supplying companies. Such firm-specific skills enable them to autonomously propose
and develop improvements that translate into incremental innovations and high-quality
products (Hancke & Herrmann, 2007) at the basis of stable yet slow-growth forms of
entrepreneurship.
In contrast, he opposite applies to flexible labour-market institutions regulating
dependent employment (typical for LMEs), such as wage-bargaining decentralisation,
weak union coverage, short notice periods, and a inactive labour market policy. Faced
with the possibility of hire-and-fire at short notice, employees acquire general skills
that are useful for, and thus adequately rewarded by, all firms needing a certain
business function. General skills facilitate radical innovations, and new business ideas
as employees are particularly imaginative and flexible in adapting to new corporate
environments be- cause of their frequent job changes (Delli et al, 2018). One would
therefore expect that flexible labour- market institutions regulating permanent employ-
ment will facilitate the development of radically innovative entrepreneurial ventures
and elevated TEA levels.
The entrepreneurship literature highlights that entrepreneurial ventures often
employ their workforces on a temporary basis in order the remain agile against economic
context. Labour market institutions also differ substantially to the degree they allow for
temporary employment. While flexible labour-market institutions allow for systematic
and repeated temporary work, rigid labour-market institutions require temporary
work to be changed into permanent employment under specific circumstances. Rigid
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labour-market institutions thus tie employees to the same firm, whereas flexible labour
market institutions have the opposite effect. Again, flexible labour-market institutions
regulating temporary employment will facilitate the development of entrepreneurial
ventures, and is a more conducive environment for general total entrepreneurial activity.
Together, low labour market flexibility, high wage bargaining and active labour market
policy increase the risk envelope of starting a new venture, lowering the expected
pay-off of setting up a new firm in light of being protected and trained in permanent
established employment (Kirzner, 1997).
In turn, workforces the acquisition of skill profiles supporting entrepreneurship is not
just through labour market institutions, but also through the institution of the education
system. Institutions governing a country’s education system differ in the extent to which
they endow the workforce with skills, but it is the composition of the skills which are of
importance for entrepreneurship. The comparative institutionalism literature illustrates
how rigid labour- market institutions (typical for CMEs) are often complementary to
sophisticated national vocational training programmes that train future workforces in
firm-specific skills—often in close collaboration with companies needing these skills.
The institutions foster high asset specific skill acquisition (Schneider & Paunescu,
2012). Tertiary education programmes, on the other hand, teach general skills that
can be used across different companies and industries, hereby low asset specificity
(Hall & Soskice, 2001). In line with the comparative institutionalism reasoning, one
would expect that countries with less well- developed vocational training systems will
lead more workforces to engage in tertiary education and thus, to be better equipped
with general skills, facilitating entrepreneurial ventures. But again, one could expect
institutions that foster high asset specificity to also foster entrepreneurial activity, but
of different composition, such as non-Schumpeterian ventures, given the provision of
skills is still apparent. Yet, one could expect education institutions that formally foster
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neither general or specific skills would suffer lower levels of entrepreneurial activity,
and so educational system institutions matter to the degree they adhere to the logics
of institutional complementarities.
In line with the work of Amable (2003), the labour market, education system and
financial system are interlinked with the product markets of the political economy.
The institutions governing a country’s product market differ in the extent to which
there is regulation and governance across the internal and external markets. As
such, the configuration of the varieties of product markets can primarily be based
on the according intensity of market competition. The impact of product markets
on entrepreneurial activity is dependant on how the institutions complement with
the other related sub-spheres of the economy. Low product market regulation and
marketised product markets makes ventures more receptive to market changes, with
the labour market adapting by flexible changes in labour commitments. This creates
more of an interaction via marginal effects of profitability of product markets (Amable,
2013), which promotes clearer strategies of ventures to maintain profit gains.
There is a clear liberal attitude towards new entrepreneurial ventures, and with
more of an even-playing-field in terms of competitive behaviours, this can encourage
entrepreneurial activity (Dheer, 2017). Alternatively, higher levels of regulation infers
lower levels of competitive practice, tending towards imperfect forms of industrial
structures which could crowd out new entrepreneurial ventures (Amable, 2003; Urbano
& Alvarez, 2014).
3.9 Chapter Summary 125
3.9 Chapter Summary
The literature for this study was reviewed in two parts. This chapter presented
an overview of three streams of literature that deal with the main empirical frame
of reference, which is to understand institutions and its application in comparative
international entrepreneurship studies. This study adopts a comparative institutional
approach given the literature gaps highlighted by the critical review in this section.
This approach helps explore a more nuanced line of questioning and argues that this
novel perspective is more appropriate in understanding the structure and composition
of aggregate entrepreneurial activity. The chapter has also presented an overview
of the conceptual framework adopted in this study, with then specific details of the
dominant themes of comparative institutionalism, institutional complementarities and
functional equivalents. Nonetheless, the discussion of the institutional approach in this
chapter has highlighted that institutions matter for economic activity and economic
performance. By drawing on the institutional configurational framework building on
the work of Amable (2003) outlined above and adopting a quantitative approach, the
study aims to explore the influence of national institutional environments on the levels
of entrepreneurship. Thus, the main research aim can be elaborated and explored in
terms of the following three specific research objectives.
Research Aim:
To explore the influence of national institutional environments on the levels of
entrepreneurship.
Research Objective 1:
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To ascertain whether capitalist institutional diversity exists, and if so, how can
diversities be characterised between political economies.
Research Objective 2:
To ascertain the effects of institutional diversity on aggregate entrepreneurship.
Research Objective 3:
To ascertain whether perspectives from comparative institutionalism can explain the
divergent nature of entrepreneurial activity across nations.
These research objectives are used to provide a guiding framework for this research
study. The next chapter is concerned with outlining the research approach and
methodology adopted in this study.
Chapter 4
Methodology
It is necessary to exploit the gaps of the relevant literature outlined in the previous
chapters with a pertinent methodology to address the research questions posed below.
This chapter aims to discuss the research approach of this study and outline the
two-pronged research design utilised to achieve the core research aims and objectives.
In this respect, the chapter begins by outlining the intended research questions within
the context of the recently acknowledged literature voids. From this perspective, it is
acknowledged that methodological approaches are based on a philosophical founda-
tion, hereby presenting a discussion on epistemological and ontological perspectives
of the study. The study of the diversity of entrepreneurial activity from an institu-
tional diversity perspective undertaken here is rooted in the positivist paradigm and
correspondingly it employs a two-step quantitative approach to answer the research
questions rigorously. The research design for this study is specified by two sequential
steps. The first step comprises of a principal components analysis with the attempt to
develop robust quantitative variables which proxy for a countries institutional context.
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A cluster analysis of these variables is further employed to provide a descriptive context
of institutional diversity and specify robust institutional differences. This objective
contextual taxonomy of institutions and countries helps give legitimacy to such diversity
approach. The variables here are then utilised in specified ways for the second step,
which employs a multivariate panel model. The overall aim of this step is to test
various mode specifications outlining potential statistical relationships and directions
between institutional diversities and aggregate level of entrepreneurship nationally.
The sample here is specified by 30 OECD countries, with a time dimension of 6 years.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.1 outlines the research questions
pursued in this thesis; Section 4.2 explains the research approach, leading onto Section
4.3 which explains the research paradigm this study is set within; Section 4.4 specifies
the research design which is split into Section 4.4.1, the specification of the factor
analysis of step one, and Section 4.4.2, the panel analysis and its pertaining model
specification, hypotheses, data structure and threshold statements.
4.1 Research Questions
From the literature review presented in the previous chapters a number of theoret-
ical and empirical ‘gaps’. Institutional theory is multidisciplinary and plural, yet
entrepreneurship studies have largely overlooked some strands of institutional theory
in favour of another. As explained in the previous chapters, entrepreneurship studies
tend to devote their attention to ‘convergence’ perspectives of institutions rather than
an institutional ‘diversity’ lens which can underscore and highlight the multitude
of varied configurations of political economies. Present comparative international
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entrepreneurship studies overlook the combination of institutions together, which per
some scholars overlooks the ‘institutional complementarities’ present in industrialised
political economies. These literature gaps lead to the main research questions:
Research Question 1:
Does capitalist institutional diversity exist and if so, how can diversities be
characterised between political economies?
Research Question 2:
What are the effects of institutional diversity on aggregate entrepreneurship?
Research Question 3:
Can perspectives from comparative institutionalism explain the divergent nature of
entrepreneurial activity between nations?
What follows explains how the answers to these questions were pursued, looking at
the methodology and research philosophy employed in this thesis.
4.2 Research Approach
Research approach is the process which social science theories are generated, evaluated
and justified (Gill & Johnson, 2010). The research approach is concerned with the
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general orientation of the relationship between theory and research (Saunders et al,
2009). There are two major approaches to research: induction (for theory building) and
deduction (for theory testing). Inductive research develops theory from initial data, via
describing and analysing data to determine if there are patterns emerging as a basis
for explaining what is observed. Unlike inductive research, the deductive approach
reverses the research process sequence. Deductive research works from theory to the
specific observations. It stars with existing theory, which through data analysis refutes
or confirms a set of hypotheses. These two approaches are not mutually exclusive but
rather in many cases, they can complement each other (Peirce, 1903).
Broadly, methodological issues have always a point of contest in social science
research, none more so than in the specific field of entrepreneurship (Busenitz et al,
2003). Given the heterogeneous complex nature of entrepreneurship phenomenon
(Coviello et al, 2011; McDougall & Oviatt, 2000), there is no single approach that could
be easily adopted for all entrepreneurship research. However, selected methods should
be compatible with the aims of the study whilst reflecting the relationship between
theory and research.
This thesis adopts a quantitative, deductive approach to explore the influence of
institutions on aggregate entrepreneurship performance in OECD based countries. It
is therefore concerned with testing objective hypotheses by examining the relationship
among variables. This study takes forward the claim that understanding aggregate
entrepreneurship, embedded within specific institutional contexts, can best be explained
by advancing the relationships among variables posed using questions and hypotheses
(Davidsson, 2004).
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The rationale for this approach is that the quantitative data and their subsequent
analysis provide a general understanding of the research problems. Given this study has
identified literature gaps in the underutilisation of certain institutional approaches, it
is felt that using a quantitative approach and the subsequent results opens the domain
to a potential multitude of methods. Quantitative approaches are largely exploratory
in this regard. The research agenda takes a different institutional approach to the
current entrepreneurship literature, and quantitative methods allows the study to test
fresh theoretical arguments within a set of established rules.
Whilst it is seen that qualitative approaches provide depth and detail, quantitative
methods can statistically measure and evaluate a ‘great number of people’ (Patton,
2002). Qualitative studies can yet reach the same breath due to a reduced number
of cases, and therefore quantitative methods is more fitting for understanding the
allocation of economic activity across a large breadth of countries. At a more general
level, deductive research allows the study to use formal logic to deduce conclusions
from given premises (Bryman & Bell, 2011). It allows researchers to conclude whether
their theories are valid or not, and is therefore useful for understanding aggregate
patterns of economic activity within countries.
4.3 Philosophical Foundations
As Jennings et al describes, “Either explicitly or implicitly, researchers base their
work on a series of philosophical assumptions regarding ontology, epistemology, and
human nature, which have methodological consequences” (2005, pg. 145). Research
methods are therefore based upon a deeper philosophical foundation. Given there is
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Table 4.1 Central Features of Subjective & Objective Research
Subjectivist Approach Objective Approach
Ontology Social world is anartificial creation
Social world is external
to the individual
Epistemology Based on the perspectiveof the individual(s)
Based on the approach
of natural science
Human Nature Free will External environmentdetermines action
Methodology Based on gaining primary,first hand knowledge
Based on a systematic
approach that generates
and tests hypotheses
no one method of undertaking research, but a series of methods, the philosophical
underpinning regarding both the nature of society and the approach of undertaking
the research will be varied and distinct. The point is echoed by Burrell and Morgan
(1979) who argue that the key debates in social science centre on two dimensions; the
first regarding the nature of social science and the second regarding the nature of
society. The first debate centres around whether an objective or subjective approach
yields a better understanding of the real world. In particular, is is concerned with
whether society exists as a real object, which is external to the individual. In contrast,
a subjectivist approach sees society as a human construct which is an artificial creation
internal to the perspective of said individual. Adapted from Burrell and Morgan (1979),
Table 4.1 outlines the central features of these two positions with respect to their
ontological, epistemological, human nature and methodologies.
The second dimension is largely concerned with the sociological view of subjects
under investigation. Here, there is a ’loose’ continuum between examining phenomenon
in terms of an ‘ordered society tending to equilibrium’ (Bowring, 2016) or a view
characterised by change and conflict. According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), the
former ‘regulation school’ views are characterised by functional coordination, stability
4.3 Philosophical Foundations 133
and integration, with the main foundations developed from Emile Durkheim (1893)
and Herbert Spencer (1873). According to functionalism, society is a system of
interconnected parts that work together in harmony to maintain a state of balance and
social equilibrium for the whole. The second contrasting school sees society as marked
by conflict, coercion and thus disintegration, with much match to the seminal works of
Karl Marx.
Stemming from this, Burrell and Morgan (1979) lead to the central claim that
organisation studies can be captured in four paradigms based on the configurations of
the above axis, as outlined by Table 4.2.
Table 4.2 The Four Paradigms of Social Science Research
The Sociology of Radical Change
Subjective ‘Radical humanist’ ‘Radical structuralist’ Objective
‘Interpretive’ ‘Functionalist’
The Sociology of Regulation
Despite the criticisms directed by scholars such as Deetz (1996) and Scherer &
Steinmann (1999), these four paradigms are still the accepted categorisation of the
multiplicities involved in social science research (Grant & Perren, 2002). As such,
it is appropriate to further outline these four paradigms in order to evaluate the
philosophical and methodological underpinnings of this research. The four mutually
exclusive paradigms of social science research, outlined in Table 4.2, are summarised in
Table 4.3.
Given that the research design of this thesis is embedded deep within a series of
philosophical assumptions, it is beneficial to understand the philosophical underpinnings
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Table 4.3 Paradigms in Social Science Research
Paradigm Philosophical Basis
Interpretive Basis in subjective thought with society viewed
through an interpretative lens. Therefore there is
no one single reality. Therefore each human has free
will and is independent from external factors. Theo-
rists within this paradigm seek to explore the basis
of social reality and how actors interpret this. Thus,
methodologies are neither positivist given no gener-
alisations are made, hereby relying on a ’ideographic’
approach to research.
Radical Humanist This paradigm has its basis in subjective thought but
focuses on changing the status quo of society. External
ideologies are said to influence an individuals inter-
pretation of society. This approach therefore focuses
on how these influences can be controlled in order
to allow change. As the paradigm has a subjective
basis the methodologies employed are non-positivist
and research methods are ’ideographic’, focussing on
obtaining first hand experiences from actors.
Radical Structuralist This paradigm is symbolised by the belief that society
is characterised by conflict between its members. This
conflict manifests itself in terms of crises which alter
societal relations. There is therefore no permanent
status quo but a number of episodic epochs as society
evolves. However, society is viewed in Functional-
ist regulationist terms with society being viewed as
observable activity. Due to the objective viewpoint,
methodologies are positivist and research methods are
nomothetic.
Functionalist This paradigm has its basis in the sociology of regula-
tion in that society is viewed as being ordered and the
structure of society is based on maintaining a stable
equilibrium. Society itself is viewed as an objective
reality in that social structures are observable factors
applicable to all rather than being a result of indi-
vidual interpretation. The Functionalist paradigm is
positivist in methodology and nomethetic in terms
of research method in that it seeks to measure and
explain social structures in order to produce general-
isable findings.
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and discuss the merits of the various approaches taken to solve the research questions
posed by this thesis.
The first point to be made is that empirical research and application of institutional
theory within the thesis context are distinctly regulationist in the sense that they are
characterised by both consensus and cooperation. The general concept of ‘institutions’
is defined by their structuralist power, where they enable and constrain, independent to
the individual. By definition, institutions determine the action of individuals, mirroring
Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) concept of objectivity and social regulation. A large
body of institutional theory is borrowed from the earlier works of regulationist scholars
(Boyer, 1987).
It is also clear from the literature reviewed that the approach is mainly functionalist
as institutions are seen as observable entities and measurable objective facts, largely
through the use of statistical proxies and manifest variables. Given the growing body
of secondary data available for entrepreneurship rates of said country means that
international entrepreneurship is also seen as an objective phenomenon worthy of
measurement.
Utilising a functionalist approach and a positivist methodology allows this research
to be comparable to the ‘institutional turn’ in explaining economic action. This helps
add greater contributions in terms of the body of knowledge. This thesis is firmly
rooted in the positivist realm as it is based on deductive methods of investigation.
Thus relevant theories are examined, hypotheses are generated based on these, with
empirical work examining these relationships (Bryman & Bell, 2011). The conclusions
then evaluate the findings in terms of the theory to assess whether the hypotheses can
be considered valid or not and the implications for the body of theory because of this.
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4.4 Research Design
This study utilises a quantitative approach with two sequential sections. The results
of the first quantitative section are used to underpin the second quantitative section.
Specifically, the variables created in the first section are those which specify the
econometric models of the second section. The research design is conceptualised by
Figure 4.1.
The first quantitative ‘step’ comprises of a principal components analysis and
then a discriminant variable analysis in the form of a hierarchical ascending cluster
analysis. The purpose of this factor analysis technique is to develop robust quantitative
variables which proxy for the institutional environment within countries. The data
used within the principal components analysis comprises of 42 manifest variables
collected from numerous online secondary data sources. This data is enriched with
databases that contain certain information on labour market structure, financial system
depth and education spending on a relative large set of countries. Consequently, to
maintain consistency, validity and scope from such a multiple source approach, the
analysis is performed on 30 countries which are all members of the OECD using data
collected from 2010 to 2015. Cluster analysis is then performed on these developed
variables. This outlines the similarities and dissimilarities between countries, which
clusters countries into groups; it is a contextual tool. This descriptively classifies
the institutional diversity between countries and talks directly to the comparative
institutionalism literature. The method used in this thesis is different from the usual
ideal-typical methods of comparative capitalism (i.e. Hall & Soskice, 2001).
This study starts from the consideration of Amable’s (2003) four fundamental
institutional sub-spheres: product-market competition; the wage–labour nexus and
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labour-market institutions; the financial intermediation sector; and the education sector.
Different complementarities between institutions are envisaged, based on the theoretical
work on this topic accomplished over the last several years. Then, on the basis of both
the results and the previous characterizations of capitalism found in the literature, this
study posits the existence of varied types of capitalism, each characterized by specific
institutional forms and particular institutional complementarities. The aim is to identify
institutional dimensions and clusters of countries with common characteristics as well
as obtaining a representation of the main dimension(s) that contribute to differentiating
countries within a given institutional area, akin to the first research objective. These
dimensions can then be carried forth for model specifications pertaining to the effect
of institutional diversity on economic outcomes.
The second subsequent step uses a multivariate panel analysis. Using the institu-
tional factors created in the first section, this step/section tests several econometric
model specifications outlining the statistical relationships between institutions, their
collective diversity and the levels of international entrepreneurship within the country
sample. Departing from the narrow definition of institutions, the factor and cluster
analysis underlines the diversity of political economies which are built upon unique
configurations of institutions. In the second section, these factors are used to create
coordination indices for each institutional sub-sphere, which highlights the degree
of non-market coordination present within institutional sub-spheres. To account for
institutional complementarities, this section creates an institutional complementarity
term which measures the institutional form of each country. These measures then form
the data specification of the panel models. Amongst a backdrop of control variables,
the aim is to test the relationship between institutional diversity, there aggregate
compositions and aggregate entrepreneurship performance. Specifically, this section
uses time varied dependant and control variables between 2010 and 2015. The number
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of observations are therefore 1451. This section then employs a range of robustness
analysis to test the reliability of the empirical findings.
The use of this approach is dictated by the complexity of the investigated process
which has certain specification difficulties. Firstly, there is a lack of secondary data
which can be used to ‘measure’ institutions. Data is often confined to a narrow
set of countries, with data coverage often weak. As such, it was important that
this study attempts to measure the deeper concept of institutions. This is aimed at
being an empirical contribution itself. Secondly, the literature review highlighted the
lack of ‘Governance approaches’ to both comparative capitalism and international
entrepreneurship. Institutional data in these areas were not available, to which
oriented the study towards using factor analysis in an attempt to measures institutions
within the data set. Thirdly, this study uses cluster analysis to underpin where
the contextual diversity between political economies lie. This enables the study to
test the institutional complementarities hypotheses developed within the comparative
institutionalism literature. Overall, the design of this methodological enquiry is aimed
at contributing to scholarship in both comparative institutionalism and comparative
international entrepreneurship by situating this study within the literature voids
identified beforehand.
1Given the inclusion of a distributed lag model for purposes of endogeneity, the specification loses
one year, hereby 29 observations over 5 years. The country sample was reduced from 30 to 29 for this
step given the removal of GEM data on New Zealand.
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4.4.1 Step 1: Institutional Capitalist Diversity
4.4.1.1 Factor Analysis: Principal Components Analysis
Factor analysis in the form of principal components analysis (PCA) operates on the
notion that measurable variables, in the form of manifest variables, are reduced to fewer
latent variables that share a common linear variance. The reduction in dimensionality
of observable variables allows researchers to account for concepts and variables that
are not directly observable but are hypothetical constructs that are used to represent
variables (Cattell, 1973). As a multivariate statistical method, PCA aims to produce
linear combinations of original variables. This is achieved by extracting variables that
correlate highly with a group of other variables but do not correlate with variables
outside the group. Its main objective is the reduction of a larger set of ‘manifest’
variables into a smaller number of ‘latent’ variables namely ‘components’, to impact the
size of the original matrix and to locate a set of synthetic dimensions for the interests
of interpretability. Overall, PCA has two key uses. Firstly, it allows researchers to
understand the underlying structure of a set of variables. Which means secondly,
large datasets can be reduced by observing ‘groupings’ of variables which assembles
common variables into a descriptive category (factor). As such, PCA is useful for
studies that involve an extensive use of variables, items from questionnaires or involve
the measurement of unobservable concepts (e.g. happiness, anxiety). Therefore, it is
easier to focus on smaller sets of key factors, rather than considering too many variables
that may be trivial. PCA is therefore useful for placing variables into meaningful and
measurable categories.
Mathematically, principal components analysis (PCA) is primarily concerned with
describing both the variation and variation shared by each unit of each variable. This
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is referred to as common variance, in contrast to specific variance. Specific variance
describes the variances which is unique to a variable for which is not shared with any
other variable. Any variance not accounted for by common and unique variance is due
to error variance. Total variance is therefore the sum of these three types of variance
within variables. The extraction of the sum of specific and common variance (combined
to make ‘unique variance) is the aim of PCA (Bryman & Cramer, 1990). PCA aims to
extract the component that accounts for the largest degree of unique variance amongst
variables. These variables are therefore linear functions of the component which account
for the largest set of variance.
The linear functionality under factor analysis can be represented by a simple
mathematical model (as follows). Firstly, data is mean centered on each variable given
a data matrix with n samples and p variables. This ensures that variables do not affect
the spatial relationships of the variables nor the variance along the data matrix. The
first principal component, represented by Y1 is given by the linear relationships along
manifest variables X1, X2, . . . ., Xp along the notation of the following terms:
Y1 = α11X1 + α12X2 + +α1pXp
Specified by the following matrix notation:
Y1 = αT1 X
Where α denotes the factor loading coefficient of interest, of Xp variable. As such,
Y1 is accounted for by the greatest possible variance of the data matrix. However,
variance is bound by constraining the sum of squares of α1p to 1:
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α1
2
1 + α122 + · · · + α1p2 = 1
The same process of maximising linearity is followed through to the second principal
component Y2. However, unlike the first principal component, Y2 must be perpendicular
and uncorrelated with Y1 accounting for the next highest ‘unique’ variance as such
that:
Y2 = α21X1 + α22X2 + · · · + α2pXp
The process of extracting variance continues until p number of Yp is equal to the
number of p. This results in a situation where all transformations of the manifest
variables are equal to the principal components:
Y = AX
Overall, these models postulate that observable manifest variables (Xp) are under-
pinned by common factors. Measuring the dimensionality provided by each variable
means estimating the factor loadings (αp) of Xp. There are several ways of estimat-
ing the parameters of interest, of which we highlight two key methods, ‘Maximum
Likelihood’ and ‘Principal Components Analysis’. By investigating the correlation
matrix, Maximum Likelihood attempts to analyse the maximum likelihood of sampling
by estimating the factor loadings for a population (Yong & Pearce, 2013). Factors
are therefore extracted until there is enough variance accounted for in the correlation
matrix. Principal components analysis however extracts the maximum linear variance,
which reduces a large set of variables into smaller ‘interpretable’ components (Costello
& Obsorne, 2005).
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The key issue with PCA is that components are often, in their raw form, hard
to interpret. This is due to the data structure not loading perfectly on the Y and
X-axis at a 90-degree angle. Therefore, as argued by Tabachnick & Fidell (2007),
any component should be further ‘rotated’ to increase interpretability. The aim of
rotation is to attain an optimal simple structure which is underpinned by the loading
of variables on the minimum number of components possible (DeCoster, 1998). By
rotating, components are defined by a distinct cluster of linearly interrelated variables
and minimised cross-loadings, which makes interpretation easier (Rummel, 1970).
There are two types of rotation methods, namely orthogonal and oblique rotation.
Orthogonal rotation involves rotating both components at a 90-degree angle from each
other. This rotates each component axis to match the variable structure to maximise
the interrelatedness of each variable. The two main orthogonal rotation techniques are
Varimax and Quartimax rotation. Varimax rotation minimises the number of manifest
variables that load highly on a factor, whilst condensing small loadings into obsolete
loadings. Quartimax rotation works by minimising the number of factors needed to
explain specific interrelated clusters of variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).
Unlike orthogonal rotation, oblique rotation work through changing the angle
between axes. In turn, oblique rotation produces a pattern matrix which comprises of
variable loadings and a correlation matrix that includes the correlations between factors.
Here, factors are correlated. This is undertaken by two main techniques, Promax and
Direct Oblimin. Promax rotation maximises factor correlations by multiplying factor
loadings by the power of four. Direct Oblimin aims to maximise the eigenvalues of
each factor by diminishing the interpretability of the factor loadings.
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To facilitate the design of institutional data, the first step of data analysis will
be to perform factor analysis, namely principal components analysis (PCA). Given
the perceived difficulty in measuring (latent) institutions (Voigt, 2013) coupled with
the desire to measure ‘input’ versus ‘output’ variables, the use of PCA will allow the
measurement of the underlying structures of institutional dimensions with the creation
of synthetic indicators. The objective is to obtain a representation of institutional
variables to assess countries along the spectrum of a given institutional dimension.
Country projections along the factorial planes will produce a more objective assessment
of diversity between countries, providing initial data for the subsequent steps of data
analysis; cluster analysis and panel modelling. One advantage of factor analysis is
that it broadens the scope of data by overcoming missing data, allowing the inclusion
of countries that would otherwise be ignored if the data coverage were initially weak
(Witt & Redding, 2013). Furthermore, single indicators provide a one-dimensional
perspective, whereas the inclusion of numerous indicators within a factor provides
added dimensionality. This is imperative when undertaking comparative analysis
(Voigt, 2013).
Additionally, this study further employs an orthogonal Varimax rotation technique.
The reason for this is two-fold. Firstly, Varimax rotation minimises the number of
manifest variables which load highly on a factor, and thus has been argued to increase
the reliability of individual components (Abdi & Williams, 2010; Simon-Moya et al,
2014). Secondly, it is in line with extant studies published within the literature (e.g.
Busenitz, Gomez & Spencer, 2000; Stenholm, Acs & Wuebker, 2013).
This analysis extracts factors with eigenvalues greater than unity (1) in line with
extant studies and the recommendations of Amable (2003) and Hall & Gingerich
(2009). Confirmation that the data are correlated is evaluated using Bartlett’s test
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for sphericity, adopting a significance level of 1 per cent. Goodness of fit is evaluated
using commonalities and total variance explained. As argued by Hair et al (2010), the
desired threshold for sufficient factor loadings depends on the relevant sample size of
the data set. As such, this study takes the absolute value of 0.60 as the threshold for a
sufficient factor loading (Costello & Osborne, 2005). However, where found, variable
loadings below this value can be used for illustrative purposes as chiefly adopted by
Amable (2003).
An additional statistical measure for determining the adequacy of factor loadings
can be through the examination of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling
adequacy and, as highlighted, through the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity. These two
additional tests aid decision-making on the appropriate use of PCA to generate factors.
The KMO index ranges from 0 to 1, with n > 0.50 being considered as a suitable
threshold. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) allows researchers to ensure that their data
has sufficient correlation to justify the applications for factor analysis (Hair et al,
2010). For this study, the techniques were used to test whether or not factor analysis
can be a suitable option. According to Kinnear and Gray (2004), KMO measures
of more than 0.5 should be considered appropriate to proceed with factor analysis,
while measurements above 0.80 are regarded as meritorious and those below 0.50 as
unacceptable. Factors not meeting this 0.50 threshold were not retained and are not
reported in the findings section.
4.4.1.2 Sample & Data Structure
Methodologically, institutions are difficult to quantify and measure (Voigt, 2013).
Indeed, there is no clear-cut definition of the institutional sub-spheres make-up. Studies
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therefore can often leave a methodological void between the ‘concept’ of institutions
and their empirical structure. Put differently, there can be issues of construct validity.
Given institutions are latent constructs, this study makes use of principal components
analysis (PCA) in an attempt to quantify institutional dimensions within each sub-
sphere. However, it then becomes an issue behind ‘which’ variables to select in a bid to
structure said institutions. Authors have the choice behind which (manifest) variables
to select for data treatment, but do not have a direct choice behind any principal
components created, given these are outcome variables of the PCA process. Therefore,
this study selects variables similar to those in leading comparative institutionalism work
(e.g. Amable, 2003; Schneider & Paunescu, 2012). They are similar in the sense that
the variables are used in an attempt to cover certain dimensions of said sub-spheres,
but not always exact variables, as data coverage and scope can preclude this.
Ideally, data would have been collected for all economies covered by main organisa-
tions such as the World Bank and World Economic Forum. However, this would not be
feasible for three reasons. Firstly, given the research intentions to understand the link
between entrepreneurship and institutions, independent variable coverage is confined
to the data availability of dependant entrepreneurship data. As will be introduced,
data for entrepreneurship is taken from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM).
Whilst this database is the key source of global entrepreneurship data, it does not cover
all the 184 economies of the World Bank. Institutional data was therefore initially
collected for those countries covered by GEM data. Secondly, this study takes data
from numerous databases, of which differ in country and longitudinal reporting. The
balance had to be struck between the countries which were chosen and the extensiveness
of variable reach (by using various databases). Thirdly, this study confines the country
sample to just OECD countries. The reason for this is because there is a need to create
a harmonised comparison of countries at an approximate equal level of development.
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This also equates better with the core comparative institutional literature and these
countries tend to have more reliable validated data. Therefore OECD countries and
variable extensiveness become the key frame of reference for the sample.
The final sample includes 30 countries, all of which are OECD members2. Overall,
the OECD coverage is 86%, given the study was unable to collect extensive data for
Iceland, Israel, Latvia, Turkey and Greece (Lithuania gained OECD membership after
the study was conducted)3. However, the study is the first to include a wider basket of
countries with the extensive level of original data. As Witt & Redding (2013) argue,
it remains difficult to maintain the scope of countries when conducting quantitative
based comparative institutionalism research.
4.4.1.3 Manifest Variables
Figures B.1, B.2, B.3 & B.4 give an overview of the 42 manifest (original) institutional
variables which form the structure of the factor analysis. Variables reflect key dimensions
of institutional analysis and raw variables employed in several major studies as discussed
beforehand. More data was collected, yet given they played little use in forming
interpretable components, they were dropped and are not included in the respective
figures. The variables are therefore those that underpin the retained institutional
factors. Where available, data was averaged over the last six years to smooth any
outliers (2010-2015) and were subject to robustness checks in chapter 6. 6-year averaged
2Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom,
United States (Specification of countries with ISO codes are given in Appendix B)
3Greece is a noticeable omission. This was due to a lack of reliable data on its labour market
spending
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data is a common trend in comparative political economy based quantitative research
(e.g. Hall & Gingerich, 2009; Kenworthy, 2006; Avadagic & Salardi, 2013).
4.4.1.4 Cluster Analysis
Cluster analysis of these variables is then employed to provide a descriptive contextual
taxonomy of institutional diversity and specify robust institutional differences. Cluster
analysis is a method of applied statistics that attempts to identify groups in data
such that observations within groups are as similar as possible yet differences between
groups are maximised. The greater the homogeneity within a group and the greater
the difference between groups, the more distinct the categorisation of data is. Cluster
analysis therefore has two objectives. Firstly, it aims to identify cluster structures
and underlying patterns in a set of observations. Secondly, it assigns observations to
clusters in some optimal manner. This is based on establishing the minimal intra-
cluster inertia and the maximum inter-cluster variance. The principle of optimal
characterisation involves considering the distance between the average of one variable
in a cluster and its general cluster. The greater the significance of the distance, the
more optimal the cluster classification. Clustering in comparative institutionalism
subsequently allows researchers to generate country typologies as drawn from statistical
differences and similarities. This offers this study a vehicle to move beyond mapping
diversity chiefly upon theoretical arguments. As argued by Ronen and Shenkar (2013,
p.869), clustering is "more than a methodological device; it is a vital tool for theory
development...setting a foundation for sense-making, reasoning and conceptualisation".
It therefore operates in such a way as to provide illustrative context to institutional
diversity and facilitates discussions on the spectrum of institutional variance. These
modes of capitalism constitute an important benchmark for understanding the effect of
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institutions on entrepreneurship. Identifying and appreciating the impact of institutions
on entrepreneurship requires a better understanding within the varieties of capitalism
and the forms of institutional complementarities within which define them.
Overall there are two approaches to cluster analysis, partitioning and hierarchical
methods. Partitioning methods requires researchers to specify the number of clusters a
priori. Specifying the number of clusters means that observations are moved between
clusters until an optimal reorganisation of variables are met. In hierarchical cluster
analysis, the number of groups is unknown, meaning maximal inter-cluster variance
can be established. As such, it uses statistical procedures based on various partition
observations and distance metrics to establish the optimal level of group variance.
Given hierarchical cluster analysis is most common form of discrimination application
(Ahlquist & Breunig, 2009), this section takes time to consider the intricacies of each
technique.
Hierarchical cluster analysis takes two forms: the agglomerative and the divisive
approach. By regarding each observation on its own, the agglomerative approach
starts with many clusters and proceeds to merge each cluster until there is maximum
within-cluster similarity and between-cluster variance. By using a predetermined
distance interval metric, many clusters are further combined into larger clusters until
all observations are in one cluster. Conversely, the divisive approach proceeds in
the opposite direction, where all observations are in one large group, then processed
through subdivision into smaller cluster groups.
Specifically, this study takes the interval mode of Squared Euclidean distance;
dissimilarity is defined as the Euclidean metric between N cases. This study further
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select the ’Ward’s Method’, a step-by-step aggregation of countries by cluster as so the
intra-cluster inertia has minimal variance.
In a bid to determine the optimal number of clusters, this study used a clustering
validation technique via the Elbow Method (Zhao, 2012). Given this study statistically
defines a cluster such that the total intra-cluster variation is minimised, the Elbow
method looks at the total within-cluster sum of squares as a function of the number of
clusters, as such that the marginal impact of an extra added cluster becomes zero or
negative (i.e. it bends like an elbow), hence optimum number of clusters given. The
Elbow method yields an optimum number of clusters which the study takes forward.
4.4.2 Step 2: Multivariate Panel Analysis
4.4.2.1 Rationale for Panel Analysis
This study estimates the effects of institutions on aggregate entrepreneurship rates
by undertaking two varied econometric approaches to panel data analysis. The aim
is to estimate the relationship between institutional diversity, amongst a backdrop
of macro-based control variables, and entrepreneurship from different countries over
yearly periods of time. This can be handled using methods developed in the context of
panel data models (Greene, 2003). The rationale for using panel analysis over other
forms of econometric treatment is three-fold.
Firstly, one advantage of panel data methods is that it allows this study to multiply
observations. Where the time period (t) is fixed in cross sectional data structures,
panel data multiplies the number of observations (n) by the time series component (t)
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and therefore implies greater variance in explanatory variables. This in turn provides
greater validity within the estimation of key parameters. Secondly, the use of a panel
data approach, rather than a pure cross sectional or time series analysis is justified by
the possibility of controlling for potential individual and temporal heterogeneity of the
data.
Thirdly, a panel data approach allows the identification of effects that are not directly
observable in other data structures. Given the potential endogeneity of variables, panel
data allow distributed lag models that overcome what would otherwise be wide-ranging
assumptions of exogeneity in cross sectional data. Overall, panel data econometric
treatments provide a more robust set of hypothesis estimators.
4.4.2.2 Hypotheses
Despite wide acknowledgement of the importance of the institutional environment for
entrepreneurship, the dominant empirical approach is to test the impact of different
types of institutions on entrepreneurship against one another as to identify the most
relevant institutional form (Estrin et al, 2013). Providing important merits nonetheless,
this empirical approach allows policy-makers a clear set of which institution matters
most, and therefore where reform should take place. As discussed in Chapter 3, a more
complete view of the institutional structure of a country is needed to fully appreciate how
the institutional setting impacts upon entrepreneurship. Taking forward a comparative
institutionalism based approach to institutions supports this agenda. Institutional
diversity built upon coherent forms of institutional complementarities hold an important
framework for appreciating the institutional setting, providing natural context for the
study of entrepreneurship. The concept of institutional complementarity is helpful for
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understanding the internal logic of institutional configurations. It challenges the focus
on effects of single institutions, and redirects the attention to the functional effects of
configurations.
Literature suggests that diversity is defined by the lack of convergence around a
specific form of institutional configuration and theorized notion of complementarity.
Analogous to the themes of the comparative institutionalism literature, it is claimed that
there is not only divergence among institutional practices in different sub-spheres of the
political economy, but that some of these practices can be theoretically complementary
to others. Institutions are said to be complementary when each raises the returns
available from the other (Aoki, 1994; Boyer, 2005). Aggregate rates of economic activity
are theorized to depend on the efficiency of the entire institutional infrastructure (Hall
& Soskice, 2001; Amable, 2003), therefore specific sets of institutions which generate
overall efficiencies will have a contribution towards the entrepreneurial action of
individuals (Ebner, 2005; 2010).
If the institutional context matters then the efficiencies available to entrepreneurs
should be higher in settings where institutional sub-spheres are dominated by coherent
forms of market or egalitarian coordination and these efficiencies should show up in im-
proved aggregate levels of entrepreneurial activity (Ebner, 2010). As suggested by Hall
& Soskice (2001), specific forms of institutional configuration have distributive effects
that increase the returns to economic actors, and therefore returns to entrepreneurs
should be reflected in the aggregate levels of entrepreneurial activity. These implication
yields the following set of hypotheses which account for varied institutional perspectives:
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Institutional Convergence to Explain Entrepreneurship
Present forms of institutional enquiry into explaining the spatial variation have often
taken forward institutional theory that portrays convergence, that is, there is one best
mode of arranging the institutional infrastructure to allow entrepreneurial performance
(Estrin et al, 2013; Ebner, 2010). This ‘one-best-model’ is often seen as a process of
institutional change in the format of liberalization; the more liberal the institution(s),
the more/better the measure of entrepreneurship (e.g. Spencer & Gomez, 2004; Dau
& Cuervo-Cazurra, 2014). This proposition is further enhanced by observing the
complementarities between institutions and not just the singular effects of institutions.
This study assesses this theoretical base within the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 Countries converging on a market led form of institutions should have
higher levels of aggregate entrepreneurial activity than non-market form of institutions,
therefore showing that institutional convergence perspectives can explain the impact of
institutions on entrepreneurship
Institutional Diversity to Explain Entrepreneurship: Functional Equiva-
lence and Equifinality
Whilst the comparative institutionalism literature pays close attention to institutional
complementarity, it also argues that the political economy landscape is defined by di-
versity, which leads to ‘bifurcated convergence’. For many comparative institutionalism
scholars, countries can achieve general efficiencies not just by liberalism, but rather
by institutionalizing strategic forms of coordination. There is not ‘one best way’ but
rather ‘functional equivalents’ through the mechanism of ‘institutional coherence’. This
4.4 Research Design 154
study aims to estimate the effects of varied forms of institutional configuration upon
entrepreneurial activity. Is successful aggregate entrepreneurial performance therefore
a function of institutional coherence? When the political economy coordinated effec-
tively, their performance will be better, and the result will be better overall economic
performance. Hall & Soskice (2001), Hall & Gingerich (2009) and Kenworthy (2006)
assert that institutional coherence, and thus effective coordination can exist in both
coordinated led market economies and liberal market economies. Although each mode
of capitalism is unique, it is not argued that one is superior to another. As Hall &
Soskice (2001) argue, both liberal and coordinated market economies seem capable
of providing satisfactory levels of long-run economic performance. If the actions of
economic agents depend on institutional coherence, then the question to be asked is
‘how coherent are your institutions’?
A political economies institutional configuration is deemed more coherent and
more coordinated to the degree to which (i) its institutions within each sphere are
closer to the polar types of a coordinated mode of capitalism or market based mode
of capitalism. This is in contrast to being ‘in-between’ these two types. Secondly (ii)
its institutions are consistent across all institutional sub-spheres, that is, having no
competing institutional logics. Incoherence is therefore defined at neither matching
closely the two modes of capitalism, or having liberal orientated institutions in some
sub-spheres yet coordinated led institutions in neighbouring sub-spheres. This would
lead to a situation where institutional complementarities cannot be maintained.
There are several precedents in the comparative political economy literature for
the notion that coherence affects national economic performance. Greater institutional
coherence increases the benefits from institutional complementarities, increasing the
agents ability to exploit the benefits yielded by the complementarities (Hopner, 2005).
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Coherence allows firms to coordinate effectively given the complementarities do not
exhibit inconsistencies or contradictions in their institutional logics - the ‘system
integration’ - of the national models of embedded capitalism will be continuously
established, restored, redefined and defended against all sorts of disorganizing forces
(Streeck, 2001).
Institutions that are consistent across all institutional sub-spheres promotes stability
(Amable, 2003), facilitates coherence which structures logical form, conventions and
rules of the game that shape the logics governing economic decision. These established
institutional structures explain the sources and variations of endowments enjoyed by
entrepreneurs (Yueng, 2002). This in turn conditions the types, levels and quality of
endowments from which entrepreneurs can exploit.
Added, a pervasive state which is a hallmark of incoherent models crowds out private
enterprise (Baumol et al, 2007). Those countries which exhibit weak institutional
calibration and institutional voids are those that can be defined as institutionally
incoherent - those in-between types of capitalism which have a contradictory mix of
liberal and coordinated institutions. Here, the state overcomes weak institutional
calibration by providing the correction of coordination failures. This pervasive state
activity is therefore a process of non-market coordination displayed by the course of
large state dependence (Molina & Rhodes, 2007). Mixed state and market interaction
is therefore the dominant form of coordination, with the interaction between freely
contracting actors, such as entrepreneurs proving extremely difficult to build. This
perpetuates long-term inefficient and unstable equilibriums which is in itself not
conducive to general private entrepreneurial activity (Baumol et al, 2007). Baumol et
al (2007) refers to these types of capitalism as "State-guided" and "Oligarchic"; "failing
to create conditions for small-and-medium-sized business to flourish" (Baumol et al,
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2007, pg. 76). Overall, one could hypothesise that institutional (in-)coherence is (bad)
good for entrepreneurship, through two main channels, (1) greater logic provision of
endowments and, (2) a pervasive state directs production, regulation and correction
of coordination failures which derive from the institutional incoherence and their
competing institutional logics.
The following hypothesis aims to test the institutional complementarities, coherence
and functional equivalence perspective:
Hypothesis 2 Rates of aggregate entrepreneurship should be higher in nations where
levels of market led institutional complementarities or egalitarian led institutional
complementarities are high across spheres of the political economy, but lower in nations
where neither type of coordination and complementarity is so well developed, or market
and strategic coordination are combined
4.4.2.3 Variables
Dependant Variable: Total Entrepreneurial Activity
A key outcome of the world-leading GEM (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor) project
is the consistent, widely used and internationally recognised comparable measure of
entrepreneurship, the Total Entrepreneurship Activity (TEA) rates. The TEA rate
measures the proportion of working-age adults in the population who are either involved
in the process of starting-up business or are active owner-managers of enterprises less
than 42 months old (GEM, 2017). Here, entrepreneurship is defined as an "attempt
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at a new business or new venture creation, such as self-employment, a new business
organisation, or the expansion of an existing business" (GEM, 2017).
The TEA measure is based on data collected by method of annual surveys, through
the process of telephone and face-to-face interviews with a minimum of 2000 respon-
dents per nation (Reynolds et al, 2005). It has become the key focal statistic for
entrepreneurship studies measuring the allocation of entrepreneurial activity amongst
countries, allowing the comparative international entrepreneurship sub-discipline to gain
‘significant traction’ (Terjesen et al, 2013). Comparative international entrepreneur-
ship is primarily involved with understanding and explaining the divergent levels of
entrepreneurship between countries; why are some countries more entrepreneurial
than others (Hessels et al, 2008; Oviatt & McDougall, 2005)? GEM data has allowed
entrepreneurial studies to further this research domain. Indeed, TEA based GEM data
is widely acknowledged to be the best source of comparative entrepreneurship data in
the world (Terjesen & Hessels, 2009) and have been applied in studies published in
leading journals (i.e. Bowen & Clercq, 2008; Stenholm et al, 2013; Urbano & Alvarez,
2014; Simon-Moya, 2014).
This study utilises data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor for several
reasons. Firstly, given aggregate based data was developed from a population survey
heightens the richness and validity of the captured information. The key advantage
of the GEM methodology is that the sample is drawn from the whole working age
population in each country sample, and therefore captures both entrepreneurs and
non-entrepreneurs (Aidis et al, 2008). Secondly, GEM data provides a wide scope
of countries over a 20-year period. The key issue for international entrepreneurship
scholars is the accessibility of reliable and ‘complete’ datasets (Tejersen et al, 2013;
Reynolds et al, 2005), and the wide range of available country data provides studies
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with the potential to undertake comparative analysis. Details for the treatment of
missing data is detailed in the data structure section.
As referred to in the conceptualisation narrative of section 3.3, this thesis considers
entrepreneurship to be an aggregate activity of nations, measuring the attempt at a new
business or new venture creation, such as self-employment, a new business organisation,
or the expansion of an existing business at the national scale of resolution. This is
the in view of the numerous different theoretical approaches to the understanding of
entrepreneurship and their related concepts.
Independent Variable: Specifying Institutional Coordination & Comple-
mentarities
The notion of ‘institutional complementarity’ is widely used in comparative institutional
analysis of capitalism to express the idea that certain institutional forms, when jointly
combined, continue to reinforce each other and contribute to improving the functioning,
stability and coherence of specific institutional configurations or ‘models of capitalism.
The existence of institutional complementarities explains how differentiated ‘varieties
of capitalism’ may exist based on different complementarities between institutional
forms (Amable, 2016). Taking account of institutional complementarities is novel for
several reasons. Firstly, the existence of several feasible combinations of complementary
institutions reinforced against the conception that there is an existence of a ‘one best
set’ of combination, and therefore political economies should converge and reform in
such a singular direction. Differently, an acceptance of the concept of complementarity
disregards the search for the ‘best’ growth model and institutional form, but rather
ignites empirical discussion about how efficiencies can be gained from varied forms of
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institutional configuration (e.g. see the literature by Herrmann, 2019; Amable, 2016;
Markus & Mendelski, 2015).
Secondly, institutional complementarity provides important insight into institu-
tional change, and at a finer grained level, structural reform for economic efficiencies.
Structural reform aimed at altering the composition of given institution(s) may cause
incoherence or disequilibria that result in the weakening of the stability of the institu-
tional system which would otherwise offer general efficiencies to micro-agents (Hall &
Gingerich, 2009; Amable, 2016). This has importance implications for public policy
and represents a potential fruitful avenue in current economic policy orthodoxy. For
example, the impact of the European Union ‘Lisbon Agenda’ has been called into
question in reference to its impact on the coherence of non-liberal capitalist models
(Amable, 2016). Combining these views highlights that the stability of differentiated
varieties stems from their economic competitiveness, which can be achieved via the com-
binations of specific institutions. These mechanisms explain the absence of convergence
towards a unique, liberal variant that neoclassical economics views as unavoidable.
Whilst a pivotal theme of comparative institutionalism literature, probing the
empirical setting of institutional complementarities has been under-represented and
confined to a narrow set of studies. This seems surprising given that the varieties
of capitalism literature argue that the nature of institutional complementarities has
important implications for country level outcomes. Nonetheless, applications of the
institutional complementarity hypothesis can be narrowed to two studies; Hall and
Gingerich (2009) and Kenworthy (2006). These two studies offer unique methodological
approaches to ‘quantifying’ (for empirical investigation) the extent of institutional
complementarities within countries. Testing the varieties of capitalism hypothesis
that bifurcated institutional complementarities lead to general efficiencies and superior
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economic growth, Hall and Gingerich (2009) develop measures that attempt to gauge
the degree to which countries rely on non-market economic institutions. Measures are
created via factor analysis of six indicators, each measured as of the early to mid-1990s.
The factor analysis yielded a single factor for each institutional sub-sphere, which was
‘balanced’ to measure the marginal efficiencies amongst the present institutions. This
yielded a methodological approach which was constructed in an objective and deductive
manner providing ‘hard’ indicators (Markus & Mendelski, 2015; Dilli et al, 2018).
An alternative strategy for quantifying the extent of institutional complementarities
could be subjective ‘scoring’ of countries based on primary and secondary sources,
as used by Kenworthy (2006). Taking a ‘softer’ approach, Kenworthy attempts to
create a simple ranked grouping of countries in terms of their nature of institutional
complementarity; are they strongly present, or not present at all. In doing so, the
“reliability of the measure weakens”, but attempts to "heighten its validity" (Kenwor-
thy, 2006). Given the often disagreement in placing countries along the LME-CME
continuum, providing subjective ‘placements’ of countries into ‘ideal types’ based on
present literature could yield inconsistent and incoherent results. For example, there is
much debate over the placements of Japan and France, whilst recent discussion about
the liberal erosion of the Scandinavian models of capitalism.
To measure the nature of institutional complementarity, this study follows an
objective approach to develop a ‘balancing’ term. This study firstly develops a ‘coordi-
nation indices’ for each institutional sub-sphere. Using the latent factors created in
the factor analysis (Step 1), constructing coordination indices allows an insight into
the degree to which a countries institution is market-based through to non-market
modes of coordination. Standardized Rubin-Anderson factor scores produced for each
countries latent factor are normalized and processed into the ‘coordination indices’.
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This allows the study to define the nature of diversity between institutional sub-spheres
and provides a framework to assess the ‘type and degree’ of coordination present.
As comparative institutionalism theory suggests, general efficiencies arise from either
market led coordination or strategic led coordination; these are the coherent forms
of institutions (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Hall & Gingerich, 2009; Amable, 2016). The
coordination indices measuring the balance of market and strategic coordination in
each of the four institutional sub-spheres for country i is equal to:







Where ‘φ’ refers to the institutional sub-spheres (i.e. labour market [LM], product
market [PM], education system [ES], financial system [FS]) for country i, where xj
refers to a latent factor within φ sub-system (j = 1, ..., n). These indices define where
each countries institutional sub-sphere is situated upon a market versus non-market
continuum extended upon the transformations used by Hall & Gingerich (2009). Any
time dimension would be cross-sectional at the constant level of t = 1. Each latent
factor xn is normalized to increase interpretability by the following treatment (it can
be noted that this process transfers the base into an arbitrary control adjusting for the
0 < n < 1 continuum of the data):
(xn − min x)/(max x − min x)
The aim of this variable specification is to measure along a continuum of market
versus non-market forms of coordination which links in to the institutional coherence
literature (Hall & Gingerich, 2009; Markus & Mendelski, 2015; Kenworthy, 2006). For
example, coordination scores which are more akin to those of market-based clusters
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(LMEs) will have lower absolute scores as represented in the latent variables used
to calculate them. Here, there is not one best or most significant factor for each
institutional dimension, allowing an equal balanced contribution of each institutional
dimension within each sub-sphere coordination term. After-all, there is no theoretical
precedent to favour or weight one institutional factor over another, hence why averaging
is a valid transformation technique. This provides a clear and robust assessment on the
nature of the coordination level continuum in each institutional sub-sphere. This is a
similar yet improved extension of the ‘coordination index’ of Hall and Gingerich (2009)
who also do not specify one institutional dimension as more important than an other.
To measure ‘institutional complementarity’ (ICi), this study specifies the following
variable (IC), giving a balance of non market coordination in country i at time t = 1




































Where [· · · ]P refers to the product market score of coordination (PM) for country
i, [· · · ]L refers to the labour market coordination (LM) for country i, [· · · ]E refers to
the education system coordination (ES) score for country i and [· · · ]F refers to the
financial system coordination (FS) score for country i. This measure characterizes both
the format of institutional complementarity, but also the degree of strength/‘tightness’
of the complementarity form. Both weak and strong complementarity forms may
exist within each cluster typology, given that cluster analysis assesses only ‘descriptive
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similarities’ (Boyer, 1987; Hall & Gingerich, 2009), yet the complementary measure
assesses ‘functional complementarity’ (Boyer, 1987; Amable, 2003). Cluster analysis
emphasizes a certain number of key characteristics used in the analytical representation
of actual economies, not to reproduce with the utmost fidelity all the possible details of
existing configurations (Amable, 2016). Thus, any statistical tests aiming to investigate
comparative distributions of categorical variables in the form of varied capitalist
clusters cannot carry forth the hypothesis of ‘strong complementarities present’. This
measure therefore complements the cluster analysis and provides an overlap between
the two forms of data analysis where the ‘strength’ of complementarities can only
be assumed, averaged and estimated. Countries with higher scores will indicate a
continuum away from market based complementarities, specifically in the form of
egalitarian coordination based complementarities.
Coordination as a Crucial ‘Diversity’ Dimension
This analysis is built on the core contention of comparative capitalism: that devel-
oped economies differ from one another according to the extent to which coordination
is determined by market versus non-market (strategic) coordination (Hall & Soskice,
2001). ‘Coordination’ stems from the problematic relationships between transaction
costs and market imperfections to overcome the principal-agent relationships of eco-
nomic actors (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). Where ‘hierarchies’ are used to secure
the cooperation of actors, they may still find themselves with internal frictions and
imperfections (such as moral hazard and adverse selection). In such cases, effective
operation may entail key coordination mechanisms such as contracts. In short, because
capabilities of economic action is determined by relations, actors may encounter many
coordination problems. The political economies success depends substantially on its
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ability to coordinate actors effectively and efficiently. Hall & Soskice (2001) highlight
two guiding coordination mechanisms: market and strategic coordination mechanisms.
Of course, as raised by Hall & Soskice (2001), the nature of coordination is difficult
to measure directly. However the concept of coordination is determined by the type
and nature of institutions available to support it. As outlined, a principal components
analysis designed to identify commonalities that may be latent concepts in themselves
but correlate with a range of observable ‘manifest’ variables provides an appropriate
technique for identifying the character of coordination and therefore the diversity
between political economies. By performing factor analysis on a set of institutional
measures that are commonly associated with one type of coordination or another,
and by aggregating these variables through Equation 4.1, this study can assess the
dimensions of market and non-market coordination posited as a key dimension in
comparative institutionalism. To determine the efficacy and construct validity of such
diversity dimension, three threshold statements are used to validate this hypothesis:
1) The character of coordination constitutes a key dimension stretching across
institutional sub-spheres of the political economy
This is validated given this studies latent variables statistically account for observed
covariance between sets of indicators representing institutional conditions associated
with different types of coordination in these sub-spheres. This is further specified
by descriptions of the underlying manifest variables (i.e. wage coordination, low
loadings equate to decentralised market coordination, high loadings equate to centralised
strategic coordination).
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2) The underlying latent variables within each institutional sub-sphere reflects variation
along a spectrum running from market to non-market coordination, representative of
the key hypotheses generated in a prior comparative capitalism literature/typologies
This is validated given there is large consistencies in the factor loadings produced
by both principal components analysis and cluster analysis. Latent and aggregated
coordination measures of institutional sub-spheres in support of market coordination
loads negatively (positively) onto a given latent variable, other indicators of support for
market coordination should also show other negative (positive) factor loadings in other
latent variables. This is opposite for non-market strategic coordination. Where there
is some inconsistencies, these are played out in the cluster analysis where they have
incoherent logics, that is they do not anchor to clusters represented by for example the
UK (market) or Germany (strategic), the well established countries portraying such
coordination dimensions.
3) It is possible to identify a distinctive set of market based economies (akin close to
LME features) and another set of coordinated economies (akin to CME features where
applicable), which descriptively make use of market coordination and strategic
coordination respectively
Cluster analysis using construct scores of latent variables should echo, if correct, a
division between market led countries (with some core similarities in terms of country
membership and features) which are defined towards the market end of the coordination
dimensions for each sub-sphere, and vice-versa for coordinated market.
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4.4.2.4 Control Variables
GDP per capita
Prior research has identified a statistical relationship between a countries level of
entrepreneurship and its level of economic development, as measured by GDP per
capita (e.g. Wennekers et al, 2005; Acs et al, 2008; Van Stel et al, 2005). Some
studies suggest a positive effect of economic development on entrepreneurship (Wong
et al, 2005); other studies specify a negative relationship (Urbano & Alvarez, 2014;
McMullen et al, 2008; Bjornskov & Foss, 2008), whilst some argue there is no direct
effect (Ovaska & Sobel, 2005). Irrespective of the disputes in statistical direction, it is
widely acknowledged that the level of economic development as measured by GDP per
capita has significant influence over the rates of entrepreneurial activity. Therefore, the
effect of GDP per capita was used to control for the ‘natural rate’ of entrepreneurship
in economic development (Wennekers et al, 2005). To do so, a measure of GDP per
capita in constant 2005 US dollars for the 6-year period was included in the analysis.
Data for this measure was obtained from the World Bank database, a reputable source
of macroeconomic data. Similar to De Clercq et al (2013) and Urbano & Alvarez
(2014), the natural logarithm of GDP per capita was taken.
Unemployment
The rate of entrepreneurial activity is said to be influenced by the level of unemployment
in nations. Studies have tended to take two ‘tracks’ on the effect of unemployment.
Firstly, it has been suggested that compared to employed people, the opportunity
cost of engaging in new business formation is less for unemployed people, thus unem-
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ployment maybe a driver of entrepreneurship (Noorderhaven et al, 2004). Secondly,
unemployment rates may be due to a lack of derived demand for labour, linked to a
drop in the economies activity. Fewer options to find a job in these periods may force
people by circumstance to create new companies (Spencer & Gomez, 2004; Verheul et al,
2002). Unemployment affects the type of entrepreneurship in varied ways, thus filtering
into the aggregate levels of entrepreneurial activities. To control for unemployment, a
measure of the unemployment rate for the period of 2010 to 2015 was included in this
study. This was based on data collected from the World Bank database, who defines
the unemployment rate is a given year as the ‘percentage of the active population out
of work, but seeking employment and available to perform a job’.
Stock of Inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) relative to GDP
Accounting for Verheul’s et al (2002) ‘eclectic approach to entrepreneurship’, the
presence of foreign-owned enterprises within a country can be characterised as a
‘demand-side’ factor likely to influence a countries level of entrepreneurship (Bowen &
Clerq, 2008). To capture the presence of foreign-owned enterprises within a country,
this study uses the stock of inward foreign direct investment relative to a country’s
GDP. It is acknowledged that there are varied approaches to accounting for FDI within
countries. This study utilises the stock of FDI rather than the flow of FDI measure for
two reasons. Firstly, FDI flows are a function of time thus volatile, and secondly, FDI
flow measurements were more likely to be correlated with other macro-level variables
included in this analysis (GDP per capita). Data on the stock of FDI relative to GDP
were taken from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
database, a reputable source for national statistics on balance of payments matters.
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Dependency Ratio
Dependency ratios capture variations in the proportions of children, elderly people,
and working-age people in the population that imply the dependency burden that
the working-age population bears in relation to children and the elderly. Patterns
of development in a country are partly determined by the age composition of the
population; different age groups have varying impacts on labour pressures, resource
use and taxation policy (World Bank, 2017). The age composition of societies is said
to influence the propensity to be entrepreneurial (Watkins-Mathys, 2012). Government
responses in the form of emphasising education and supporting new enterprise have
been attributed to the socioeconomic pressures placed on societies by a dependant
workforce (Bloom & Canning, 2004). At an individual level, changes in taxation policy
and pension provision in response to high dependency rates may result in the incentive
of people to seek a ‘long term’ solution in the form of deferring retirement or considering
self-employment (Bloom et al, 2010). Public policy approaches of Government therefore
alter the opportunity cost attached to self-employment and this should be accounted
for. To control for the age composition of societies, a measure of the dependency ratio
for the period of 2010 to 2015 was taken from the World Bank.
Population Density
Population density has been linked with greater new business formation rates. It is
argued that highly dense countries allow for more local market opportunities related
to product markets and necessary inputs (Wagner & Sternberg, 2004; Capelleras et al,
2015; 2018) than less dense countries (Armington & Acs, 2002). This in turn facilitates
the entry of new firms (Todtling & Wanzenbock, 2003; Stam et al, 2012). Densely pop-
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ulated countries (and regions) are often defined by population diversity; greater scope
for complementary products or services and varieties in demand, which Bosma et al
(2008) argues stimulates the creation of new business enterprise. Nascent entrepreneurs
are supported by closer proximities to consumer markets, established infrastructure
and the availability of necessary skilled labour. Networking and collaboration potential
with customers, suppliers and governmental organisations further extends the survival
potential of new business enterprise as supported by the population density (Kibler et
al, 2014). As empirical work suggests, higher population density positively impacts
the creation of new business. However, these countries and regions can also under-
mine entrepreneurial activities, particularly in the form of increased competition, the
finite nature of resource allocation and higher barriers to entry (Bosma et al, 2008).
Nevertheless, it is apparent that the nature of population densities has a statistically
significant impact upon the rates of entrepreneurship and therefore should be accounted
for within estimation models. Data on population density for each country was taken
from the World Bank over a six-year period; 2010 to 2015. Table 4.4 summarises the
applied variables.
4.4.2.5 Data Structure
Data for the dependant and explanatory control variables were collected across a
six-year period between 2010 and 2015. For these variables, data was collected for 29
countries, down from the 30 countries for which Chapter 5 is built upon. Given the
lack of GEM entrepreneurial data for New Zealand, this country was dropped for the
panel analysis. Furthermore, GEM data was occasionally missing for certain years
and thus was estimated using an unbalanced panel methodology in the form of linear
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Table 4.4 Overview of Panel Data Variables
Variable Definition Source Application in Key Studies
Dependant Variable
Total Early Stage En-
trepreneurial Activity (TEA)
TEA measures represent early-
stage activity, including the
number of people currently set-
ting up a business (nascent)
and owning/managing a busi-
ness existing up to 3.5 years rel-
ative to the adult population
18-64 years in a country (%)
GEM (2017) Bowen & De Clercq, 2008;
Stenholm, et al., 2013; Urbano
& Alvarez, 2014; Simon-Moya,




The level of non-market coor-







The level of non-market coor-







The level of non-market coordi-







The level of non-market coordi-







The aggregate level of non-







LnGDP per capita Natural Log of GDP per capita
in constant US dollars
World Bank
(2017)
Spencer & Gomez (2004), De
Clercq et al (2013), Urbano &
Alvarez (2014), Dheer (2016),
Wennekers et al (2005), Acs et
al (2008), Van Stel et al (2005)
Unemployment Rate % of the active population out
of work, but seeking employ-




Staber & Bogenhold (1993),
Bergmann & Sternberg (2007),
Horisch et al (2016), Noorder-
haven et al (2004)




Bowen & De Clercq (2008),
Wach & Wojciechowski (2016),
Barbosa & Eiriz (2009), Gorg
& Strobl (2002)
Dependency Ratio Ratio of dependents–people
younger than 15 or older
than 64–to the working-age
population–those ages 15-64.
Data are shown as the pro-





Zhang (2008), Bloom & Can-
ning (2004), Bloom et al
(2010)
Population Density Population divided by land
area in square kilometres
World Bank
(2017)
Armington & Acs (2002),
Todtling & Wazenbrock
(2003), Wagner & Sternberg
(2004), Reynolds et al (1994),
Audretsch & Fritsch (1994),
Bosma et al (2008), Kibler et
al (2014)
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interpolation (Maximum Likelihood Estimation) under the assumptions of Missing
Completely at Random (MCAR).
Where the control variables and dependant variables are time-variant (t), the
institutional based complementarity term is constant over time. Although time-variant
institutional variables would be preferable, the difficulties of measuring coordination
and data limitations preclude them. However, it is believed that the inclusion of these
institutional complementarity terms are appropriate because they capture institutional
diversity widely seen as ‘stable over time’ (Hall & Gingerich, 2009).
The final sample comprises 145 observations. It is considered that a slightly reduced
sample size is a worthwhile tradeoff to be able to capture a wider range of condition
(Thai & Turkina, 2013). We thus consider our sample within an acceptable range of
sample size limitations, and larger than similar comparative empirical studies using
smaller samples (e.g. Sobel, 2008; Verheul et al, 2006; Krasniqi & Desai, 2016; Bowen
& De Clercq, 2008).
4.4.2.6 Model Specification & Estimation Strategy
The baseline equation underlying the estimation takes general form of the following
‘linear unobserved effects model’:
yit = αt + ziβ + xitγ + ci + uit, t = 1, . . . , T ; i = 1, . . . , N
where αt are the time period dummy intercepts treated as parameters to be
estimated, xit is a 1 × K row vector which specifies control variables which change
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across i and t, zi is a set of explanatory variables which change across units, and the
dependent variable yit is a vector of dimension N × T that contains observations of
individual countries (i) in year (t). Composite errors at time t take the form of:
vit = ci + uit
where ci is the unobserved individual heterogeneity and uit are the idiosyncratic
errors/disturbances.
There are several possible estimators for the parameters of interest (β, γ). Two
estimation strategies are employed for each model of interest as a process of comparison
and comparative observation. As utilised in the literature, it is a useful strategy to
compare the coefficients of varied estimation methods to increase the confidence and
consistency in parameter estimates. Estimations may yield consistent results, yet may
not be efficient. Providing two varied estimation methods allows us to observe the
general efficiencies by comparative observation. The two estimation strategies employed
were pooled ordinary least squares with panel-corrected standard errors (POLS) and the
generalised least squares random effects estimator (GLS-RE) for the key multiplicative
models of interest4. Both estimators take the form of distributed lag models which
allows us to move beyond ‘contemporaneous exogeneity’ merely being an ‘assumption’.
Pooled OLS estimations group cross-sections across time under the assumption of
observable individual heterogeneity. This technique produces robust standard errors in
4Random effects estimator is based on a matrix-weighted average of a fixed effects estimator which
is generated by performing GLS on variables that have been multiplied by an idempotent matrix which
transforms them into differences from their means, and a between-estimator generated by performing
GLS on variables that have been transformed into ones reflecting the difference between panel means
and the variable mean. The random effects estimator converges to the GLS estimator as the efficient
estimate of the between-group variance component goes to zero, and to the fixed-effect estimator
as the between-group variances towards infinity. The model treats panel-specific effects as random
disturbances, as they would be if the panel represent a random sample from a larger population. That
is, errors are assumed to vary stochastically over units and time.
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the presence of an error term that is heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated
across countries. Random effects generalised least squares (GLS-RE) model assumes
existing individual heterogeneity are uncorrelated with explanatory variables, thus
produces consistent coefficient estimates and standard errors in the presence of a
composite error term that consists of a time invariant, country-specific idiosyncratic
error and a traditional country-year disturbance (Hsiao, 1986). It is acknowledged that
there are several other estimation approaches to our unobserved effects model, namely
fixed effects (FE) and first differencing (FD). Given that both estimators measure the
difference between the ratio of the squared sum of residuals over time, summed over
all panels, to the sum of the squared errors, any time-invariant explanatories are then
removed from the equation. Therefore, it is argued that POLS and GLS-RE provide
better estimators for the parameters of interest, given that ziβ is time invariant.
The estimation strategy comprises of four steps, which are based upon the flow of
the hypothesis structure. Step 1 is estimating a baseline model by adding the country-
level macro controls to the model equation. The baseline model is specified by equation
1 below, which estimates the relationship between total early-stage entrepreneurial
activity (TEA) and macro level variables.
At step 2, there is the inclusion of an additional set of institutional based equations
to further explain entrepreneurial activity. They are tasked with testing the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Countries converging on a market led form of institutions should have
higher levels of aggregate entrepreneurial activity than non-market form of institutions,
therefore showing that institutional convergence perspectives can explain the impact of
institutions on entrepreneurship
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If correct, there should be a statistically insignificant non-linear relationship between
institutional spheres and TEA, but rather a significant negative linear relationship.
Differently, converging on a liberal institutional format will have an estimated positive
impact on entrepreneurship, and therefore provide support for economic liberalization as
a form of entrepreneurship public policy. Estimation of the effect of liberal institutional
forms on aggregate entrepreneurial performance is tested using regression models of
the following terms:
TEARateit = αt + β1LnGDPit−1 + β2PDit−1 + β3Unit−1
+ β4DepRit−1 + β5FDIit−1 + ci + uit
(4.3)
TEARateit = αt + β1LMi + β2LM2i + β3LnGDPit−1 + β4PDit−1
+ β5Unit−1 + β6DepRit−1 + β7FDIit−1 + ci + uit
(4.4)
TEARateit = αt + β1PMi + β2PM2i + β3LnGDPit−1 + β4PDit−1
+ β5Unit−1 + β6DepRit−1 + β7FDIit−1 + ci + uit
(4.5)
TEARateit = αt + β1ESi + β2ES2i + β3LnGDPit−1 + β4PDit−1
+ β5Unit−1 + β6DepRit−1 + β7FDIit−1 + ci + uit
(4.6)
TEARateit = αt + β1FSi + β2FS2i + β3LnGDPit−1 + β4PDit−1
+ β5Unit−1 + β6DepRit−1 + β7FDIit−1 + ci + uit
(4.7)
The first regression model (Equation 4.3) is a first order base model with control
variables only. This study employs a range of macro-level control variable which have
been used in previous studies: LnGDPit−1 is the log of gross domestic product per
capita for country i, between 2010 and 2015. PDit−1 represents population density,
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following the works of Sobel (2008) who argues that densely populated countries can
benefit from agglomeration economies (Capelleras et al, 2018). Unit−1 represents the
average unemployment rate, where the level of unemployment is seen to influence
entrepreneurial activity (Staber & Bogenhold, 1993; Bergmann & Sternberg, 2007;
Horisch et al, 2017). DepRit−1 accounts for the dependency ratio of the country
measured as the share of the population below the age of 15 or above the age of 65.
A higher proportion of dependents is expected to influence entrepreneurial activity
(Autio & Fu, 2015) and indirectly through the expected lower rates of economic growth
(Hall & Gingerich, 2009). The final control variable, FDIit−1, measures the FDI
inward stock relative to GDP, a usual proxy for foreign firm presence (Bowen & De
Clercq, 2008). Time dummies are included as represented by αt to control for potential
random aggregate shocks in entrepreneurial rates over time (e.g. aggregate demand,
real business cycles).
The second order regression models (Equations 4.4 to 4.7) apply the single coor-
dination effects to estimate aggregate entrepreneurial performance, where β1 and β2
are parameters of interest in models 2(a)-2(d) using the coordination indices for each
sub-sphere specified in equation 4.1. These parameters measure an array of institu-
tional based variables. Firstly, LMi specifies the level of non-market coordination in a
countries labour market, as measured from 0 to 1. Low values of LMi infers a liberal,
flexible and decentralised labour market, akin to the characteristics of market based
political economies. Increasing values represent a movement away from a market based
labour market, with high values representative of a more interventionist market, with
sizeable magnitudes akin to those of coordinated market economies. These coordination
indices are based on the aggregation of equally weighted factor variables developed
through the principal components analysis of Step 1. The additive models all utilise
squared polynomial terms to test non-linearity in principle. An acceptance of these
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statistical relationships would ex-post imply itself as the null hypothesis to the first
hypothesis, which in turn would suggest there is no convergence on a ‘best set’, but
rather non-linear functional equivalents and equifinality.
Model 3 provides a linear regression model where the equation accounts for institu-
tional complementarity (Equation 4.2). Here, β̂1 is of interest. The inclusion of the ICi
terms tests one of two tenants of the comparative institutionalism literature namely in-
stitutional complementarities; the functional relationships between institutions provides
more statistical power than testing institutions in isolation. However, at this stage,
the models are designed to test institutional convergence, hence hypothesised linear
relationship. This contrasts with the central theme within comparative institutionalism
of institutional diversity.
TEARateit = αt + β1ICi + β2LnGDPit−1 + β3PDit−1 + β4Unit−1
+ β5DepRit−1 + β6FDIit−1 + ci + uit
(4.8)
At step 4, the model introduces a squared institutional complementarity term (IC2i ).
Model 4 aims to test non-linearity and statistically evaluates the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 Rates of aggregate entrepreneurship should be higher in nations where
levels of market led institutional complementarities or egalitarian led institutional
complementarities are high across spheres of the political economy, but lower in
nations where neither type of coordination and complementarity is so well developed,
or market and strategic coordination are combined
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If correct, there should be a significant quadratic non-linear effect of the ICi
terms on TEA. More importantly, the coefficients should be inverse and of sizeable
proportions representing the significance of diversity and power of dual yet varied
complementarity sets. This would highlight that varied forms of complementarities leads
to higher aggregate performance versus those countries that do not conform to either,
or show weaker forms of complementarities. Another way, it implies that aggregate
entrepreneurship performance should be higher in nations whose institutionalized
practices correspond more closely to relatively pure forms of market and non-market
coordination types (hence the most coherent). Institutional diversity is therefore a
useful perspective to explain the variance of aggregate entrepreneurship, that is, there
is not ‘one-best-set’ of institutions. Using a non-parametric estimation technique allows
the functional form of a fit to data to be obtained in the absence of any guiding ‘linear’
treatment. Estimation of the effect of institutional diversity and complementarity is
tested using the sample regression function of the following terms:
TEARateit = αt + β1ICi + β2IC2i + β3LnGDPit−1 + β4PDit−1
+ β5Unit−1 + β6DepRit−1 + β7FDIit−1 + ci + uit
(4.9)
Specifically, for the institutional diversity perspective to hold, β1 must be both
significant and negative, whilst β2 must be significant and positive, where β̂i are
parameters to be estimated in Equation 4.9. This would outline that the quadratic effect
has significant statistical power, and highlights a ‘U’ shape relationship between varied
forms of complementarities and aggregate entrepreneurial performance. Aggregate rates
of entrepreneurship are higher the degree to which there is institutional complementarity
strength; the more complementarities are built upon market or strategic coordination,
the higher the estimated rates of entrepreneurship. Weaker forms of complementarity
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lend to reduced rates of entrepreneurial activity. Institutional complementarity term
values nearing either 0 or 1 would therefore have relative higher aggregate rates of
entrepreneurship than intermediate values of increasing values from 0 < n < 1.
4.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter outlined the overarching research approach and justified the methodology
that was employed to achieve the study aims and objectives. It was emphasised that
the study adopts a two-pronged quantitative approach based on principal components
analysis followed by a multivariate panel analysis. The chapter also explained and
justified how data was collected, processed and transformed. Having explained the
overarching research and methodological approaches, the study now turns to the next
chapter, which is the first of two empirical findings chapters, by outlining and addresses
the first research objective: To ascertain whether capitalist institutional diversity exists,





This thesis is led by two subsequent channels of methodological enquiry. Firstly, this
study undertakes factor analysis to create latent variables which measures the nature
of institutional sub-spheres. These factors are then clustered by discriminant cluster
analysis to highlight contextually the specific models of capitalism and institutional
diversities. Secondly, the institutional factors created are then applied to a panel
analysis context in an attempt to understand the relationship between institutional
diversity and aggregate entrepreneurial performance.
The purpose of this chapter, which is the first empirical results chapter, is to
present and taxonomise the empirical findings from the principal components analysis.
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The chapter then documents the results of the subsequent cluster analysis. The first
objective of this chapter is to ascertain the underlying linear relationships between
manifest institutional variables within each institutional sub-sphere, as guided by
the Governance approach theory (Amable, 2003). The chapter then follows with an
overview of the institutional variables and reflects against present attempts to measure
institutions within the literature.
This follows through into the cluster analysis. The data provided by the factor
analysis is used to identify statistical similarities and dissimilarities using cluster
analysis. This study highlights fruitful and novel diversity amongst the data sample,
identifying several ‘models of capitalism’. This provides the study with an objective
contextual taxonomy of institutions and ‘diversities of institutional systems’. This gives
a descriptive contextual tool to identify and specify robust institutional differences.
The chapter then leads through to a discussion of each of the models of capitalism, with
focus on the underlying complementarity structures between institutional sub-spheres.
The chapter is drawn to a close by reflecting upon the coherence of such institutional
models of capitalism. Overall, this current chapter addresses the following research
question:
Research Objective 1:
To ascertain whether capitalist institutional diversity exists, and if so, how can
diversities be characterised between political economies.
This research question seeks to fulfil the aim and objective of this study by exploring
empirically the institutional diversity of political economies, with the creation of novel
factors, descriptive cluster classifications and crucial diversity dimensions.
5.2 Principal Components Analysis 181
5.2 Principal Components Analysis
Along the four institutional spheres adopted from the ‘Governance approach’ to
comparative institutionalism (Product Markets, Financial System, Labour Market
& Education System), the principal components analysis provided 13 meaningful
institutional factors as developed from 42 manifest indicators. In terms of the present
comparative institutionalism literature, the development of numerous quantitative
indicators has generally been lacking, especially whilst assessing institutional logics and
spheres which were previously evaluated qualitatively or absent (e.g. Product Markets).
Therefore, this study contributes to the comparative institutionalism literature with a
more objective perspective to the variance between institutional capitalist configurations.
Principal components analysis was conducted separately for each institutional sphere,
resulting in numerous uncorrelated components, which were then assessed qualitatively
to gauge the underlying ‘meaning’ of each factor and their respective factor loadings.
All components were ‘Varimax’ rotated to facilitate interpretation (Abdi & Williams,
2010). Some factor loadings mirrored the factors created in other studies (i.e. stock
market capitalization - market based financial system), several provided a fresh angle to
institutional measurement, whilst various components provided quantitative indicators
for previous rough qualitative assessment (asset specificity in the education system).
Again, these results meet the threshold statements of section 4.4.2.3. Each factor is
labelled in a bid to best present the underlying variables within it. The following
sections outline the findings of the principal components analysis for each institutional
sub-sphere. This is set against an explanation of each derived factor component.
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5.2.1 Product Markets
The most fundamental dimension separating the heterogeneity of product markets is
that of the intensity of competition, which is a natural by-product of the erosion of
‘blanket’ regulation. The configuration of the varieties of product markets can therefore
primarily be based on the according type of competition prevailing within such market.
However, given intensity of competition remains the key defining dimension of market
heterogeneity, the latency of such dimension leads to the difficulty in measurement
through the use of simple indicators. This is overcome via addressing certain steps.
Firstly, given this study is concerned with national institutional variance, the
measurement of product market variety can be born from a concentrated look at the
aggregate national level as opposed to disaggregate, industry levels. It is possible to
find data on competition only within a few sectors, usually in the form of concentration
indices, which is often an established perspective when observing banking and financial
system competition. Secondly, while the state of competition characterises the product
market structure well, it fails to represent the underlying institutional foundation. Put
differently, competition can be characterised as an ‘output’ variable, whereas we are
primarily concerned in understanding the ’input’ (institutional) variables, which in this
case would be the determinants of competition. In short, institutional perspectives need
to provide a lens which leads to such ‘symptoms’ as competition. Therefore, a wide
collection of product market regulation indicators have been chosen to underpin product
market variance. These indicators, when subjected to factor analysis, provide a good
perspective to assess the composition and structure of product market competition, and
therefore the diversity within and between such markets. This consequently provides
an institutional perspective defining the state of product market competition.
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Product market regulation (PMR) data has been collected from the OECD PMR
database, the most widely used source by studies undertaking research in such area.
This data, as developed from qualitative data on laws and regulations of the economy-
wide, covers general regulatory issues such as price controls, administration barriers
to enterprise and barriers to FDI to name a select few. Based on expert scoring, the
qualitative data is turned into quantitative measures, both detailed and synthetic
indicators of PMR.
Table 5.1 presents the results of the principal components analysis for the product
market. Principal components analysis yields 3 components from an overall 13 indicators
taken from the OECD’s product market regulation (PMR) database (see Koske et al,
2015; Figure B.2). Given the intricacies and specificities of product market regulation
data, three separate PCAs were undertaken to improve the interpretation of outputs as
suggested by Nicoletti & Scarpetta (2005). With high loadings of specific governance
based indicators, the first factor is labelled ‘governance of internal product markets’.
This component seemingly represents an axis of increasing regulatory and governance
led pressure on domestic product markets, one can consider that countries with intense
product market competition will situate themselves low (left hand side) on this axis.
The second factor component is composed of variables representing public and
government led involvement in the product market functioning. Scope of state-owned
enterprises, government control over enterprises and prevalence of government led price
controls load suggestively high with one another. This axis represents the control
exerted by the public sector (via government intervention); this factor is labelled
‘public involvement in domestic product markets’. The third component is one of
explicit protection against foreign competition, with high loadings of barriers to trade,
FDI and trade facilitation. Being concerned with the treatment of foreign trade and
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Administration Burden for Corporations 0.855
Administration Burden for Sole Proprietor
Firms
0.835
Communication & Simplification of Rule
& Regulations
0.703
Barriers to Network Sector 0.682
Legal Barriers to Entry 0.411
Scope of State Owned Enterprises 0.869
Govt. Involvement in Network Sector 0.667
Govt. Control over Private Enterprises 0.647
Govt. use of Price Controls 0.577
Govt. use of Command & Control Regula-
tions
0.477
Barriers to FDI 0.702
Barriers to Trade (Trade Barriers) 0.851
Barriers to Trade Facilitation 0.712
Eigenvalue 2.786 2.284 1.724
Variance Explained (%) 35% 38% 57%
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling
Adequacy (KMO)
0.603 0.610 0.573
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity1(x2) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
1p < 0.001 ∗ ∗∗; Extraction method: Principal Components Analysis
(PCA); Rotation Method: Orthogonal Varimax
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capital inflows, this component is labelled ‘explicit protection of foreign competition’.
Components 1 and 2 represent inward protection measures and component 3 represents
external based protection.
5.2.2 Labour Markets
There are several dimensions to labour market institutions, of which this thesis dis-
tinguishes three important ‘prongs’ to the diversity of labour markets. Firstly, this
study differentiates labour markets along the prevalence of employment policy, which
characterises the extent to which countries are committed to intervening in labour
markets. The second aspect of labour market institutions concerns the structure of
employment protection. This observes whether there is flexibility over hiring and
firing decisions, versus the protection of labour, hence labour rigidity. Labour market
flexibility has become a flagship structural adjustment policy (SAP), which involves the
increasing use of temporary contracts, unrestricted dismissal rights, short notice periods
and the shrinking use of regular contracts. Much work has been conducted around the
effect of labour market flexibility, particularly in relation to its positive effects on high
growth firms (Acs et al, 2008; Bassanini & Ernst, 2002) and foreign direct investment
(e.g. Javorcik & Spatareanu, 2005). As the neoclassical view goes, labour market
flexibility increases the economy’s ability to make short-term adjustments achieved
through changes in the structural composition of sectors. Regulation of labour is
therefore seen as a block on dynamic adjustments, creating lower growth and higher
unemployment (Hancke, 2013).
Thirdly, labour market institutions can be characterised by their system of wage
bargaining and industrial relations. This assesses the degree to which there is existence
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of corporatism amongst the relationship between firms and workers, and to whether
common wage moderation is possible. Industrial relations systems can be characterised
along a spectrum of centralisation versus decentralised systems, with the latter often
the hallmark of the 1980’s liberal movements in the UK and USA, the so-called erosion
of workers political influence through the decline of trade union powers (Brown &
Walsh, 1991). Systems are often characterised as centralised when the wage bargaining
process is coordinated among employees hereby trade unions, which have collective
bargaining powers, set a uniform band of wages (Bassanini & Ernst, 2002). The type of
industrial relations has often been considered crucial in relation to the macroeconomic
performance of countries (i.e. Hancke et al, 2007; Hancke, 2013).
Given the ‘three prongs’ of labour market institutions, principal components anal-
ysis was conducted separately for employment policy. Thus, 2 separate PCAs were
undertaken. These are presented within Table 5.2. Overall, 3 factors were created
from 9 manifest variables, representing employment protection, industrial relations
and employment policy respectively. The first factor, expressive to the employment
protection dimension of labour markets denotes ‘labour market flexibility’. With an
eigenvalue of 1.616, indicators such as ‘regulation on temporary employment’ and
‘protection of workers against individual dismissal’ load highly together, therefore
naturally representing the dichotomy between "flexible" and "rigid" labour markets
(Golpe et al, 2008). For example, the factor represents the intensity of restrictions on
labour, both through the use of regular and temporary contracts. It is quite widely
acknowledged that the most important aspects of labour market flexibility include the
ease of use of temporary contracts and the ease of dismissal (Berg, 2015; Darcillon,
2015).
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Protection of Workers against Collective
Dismissal
0.847
Protection of Workers against Individual
Dismissal
0.846
Regulation on Temporary Employment 0.836
Union Density 0.869
Wage Coordination 0.855
Flexibility of Wage Determination -0.842
Public Expen. on Public Employment Ser-
vices
0.852
Public Expen. on Training 0.780
Public Expen. on Sheltered & Supported
Employment & Rehabilitation
0.762
Eigenvalue 1.616 3.101 2.354
Variance Explained (%) 78% 2 47%
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling
Adequacy (KMO)
0.758 2 0.586
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity1(x2) 0.000*** 2 0.000***
1p < 0.001 ∗ ∗∗; 2 Components 1 & 2 were from the same PCA iteration therefore share the
same variance explained, KMO and x2; Extraction method: Principal Components Analysis
(PCA); Rotation Method: Orthogonal Varimax
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The second factor, representative of the industrial relations system is that of the
‘wage bargaining system’. Single indicators of ‘union density’ and ‘wage bargaining
coordination’ (positive pole) contrasts ‘flexibility of wage determination’ (negative pole),
with increasing factor values symbolic of increasing levels of corporatism, union density
and wage centralisation. The lower values along this axis therefore depict increasing
decentralization and wage-making flexibility, with wage setting determined at the firm
level. Using this principal component, we can assess the level of centralized/corporatist
versus decentralisation of varied industrial relations institutions. The third factor
characterises the extent to which there is an active prevalence of labour market policy,
with high public expenditures of a range of labour market areas on the positive
pole. Therefore, the factor is named ‘labour market policy’, with higher factor scores
representing the extent to which countries are committed to intervening in domestic
labour markets (as averaged over the past 5 years). Again, institutional diversity with
respect to labour markets can be assessed by their factor scores along the factorial
planes defined by the 3 components above.
5.2.3 Education System
The principal components analysis derived 3 factors from a total of 9 manifest indicators
as shown by Table 5.3. The first factor, with high loadings of expenditures on R&D and
the percentage of tertiary educated labour, arguably represents ‘government support
for research and formal education’. The structure of educational expenditures is,
particularly in relation to R&D, a commonly used measure to gauge the depth of
institutional educational support. The second factor symbolises the institutionalised
skill regime; high or low human asset specificity, general or specialised skill profiles.
Again, this follows other studies by measuring the institutional support for vocational
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Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D 0.921
Publicly Financed R&D 0.916
% of Labour Force with Tertiary Level as
Highest Level of Education
0.629
Expenditure on Primary Education as a %
of Government Expenditure on Education
0.884
Expenditure on Secondary Education as a
% of Government Expenditure on Educa-
tion
-0.807
Share of Population by Education Attain-
ment: Upper Secondary & Post-Secondary
non-tertiary – General Education
0.690
Share of Population by Education Attain-
ment: Upper Secondary & Post-Secondary
non-tertiary – Vocational Training
-0.445 0.776
% of Labour Force with Secondary Educa-
tion as Highest Level of Education
0.880
Unemployment Rates by Educational At-
tainment – Upper Secondary & Post-
Secondary non-tertiary Education
-0.577
Eigenvalue 3.081 2.207 1.212
Variance Explained (%) 2 72% 2
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling
Adequacy (KMO)
2 0.576 2
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity1(x2) 2 0.000*** 2
1p < 0.001 ∗ ∗∗; 2 All components were from the same PCA iteration therefore share the same
variance explained, KMO and x2; Extraction method: Principal Components Analysis (PCA);
Rotation Method: Orthogonal Varimax
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or general (tertiary) education. However, this study provides a varied method of
measurement through the use of factor analysis contrasting the common single indicator
approach. Expenditures on secondary education and share of population with vocational
secondary training (negative pole) contrast indicators of high share of population with
general education and expenditures on primary level education (positive pole). This
suggests a spectrum from the institutionalisation of vocational (specific asset specificity)
training to the institutionalisation of general (low asset specificity) education. High asset
specificity countries such as Germany and Austria face general asset specificity countries
of the USA and Canada. The third factor provides a unique institutional perspective
highlighting the ‘absorption of secondary educated labour’. High unemployment rates in
labour with upper secondary and post-secondary education as their highest educational
attainment (negative pole) contrasts indicators of ‘share of population with upper
secondary and post-secondary vocational training as highest attainment’ and % of
labour force with secondary education as highest attainment level’ (positive pole).
Higher values would suggest lower unemployment in secondary educated labour and
high levels of vocationally trained citizens. This dichotomy provides a perspective on
the relative importance and absorption of secondary educated (vocational) labour into
the industrial base of the economy, and is an interesting indicator to assess the skill
profile required by domestic labour markets. The composition of education systems
can therefore be assessed by their factorial projection along these three components.
5.2.4 Financial System
Principal components analysis from 11 indicators develops 4 meaningful financial system
factors with eigenvalues above 1. Table 5.4 documents the principal components results.
The first factor can be understood as representing the ‘availability of varied forms of
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Table 5.4 PCA Component Matrix: Financial System
Component














Ease of Access to Loans 0.961
Availability of Financial Services 0.877 0.330
Venture Capital Availability 0.896
Financing through Local Equity
Market
0.838 0.349
Five Bank Concentration 0.958
Bank Concentration 0.951
Pension Fund Assets to GDP 0.811
Stock Market Capitalisation 0.482 0.724




Lerner Index -0.521 0.554
Eigenvalue 4.565 2.462 1.252 1.027
Variance Explained (%) 84% 2 2 2
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of
Sampling Adequacy (KMO)
0.756 2 2 2
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity1 0.000*** 2 2 2
1p < 0.001 ∗ ∗∗; 2 All components were from the same PCA iteration therefore share the same
variance explained, KMO and x2; Extraction method: Principal Components Analysis (PCA);
Rotation Method: Orthogonal Varimax
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capital’ with high loadings of ease of access to loans (EOSL), availability of financial
services (AVFS) to name two. This reflects the use of such indicators within the PCA
work of Allen et al (2017). The second factor can be seen to measure the ‘concentration
of the banking system’, with increasing concentration of such system on the positive
pole. This dimension has never been included in comparative institutional work hereby
providing oversight to the composition of banking systems. The third factor has stock
market capitalisation, stock market total value trade to GDP, and pension fund assets
to GDP on the positive side. This shows the relative importance of pension funds and
stock markets, with the provision of capital and corporate control determined to a larger
extent by market coordination. Therefore, following similar lines of various studies
(e.g. Schneider & Paunescu, 2012; Schneider et al, 2010; Hall & Gingerich, 2009), one
can describe this factor as representing the ‘type of financial system’, that is whether
the system is market or bank-based, centralised or decentralised. The fourth factor
displays opposition between the H-statistic (negative pole) and Lerner Index (positive
pole) which are widely used measures to assess the degree of competition/market power
in the banking system. The higher the Lerner index illustrates increasing market
power in the banking system and therefore transitioning towards a monopoly based
industry structure. In contrast, higher scores of the H-statistic demonstrate increasing
competition, hereby moving more towards perfect competition market structures. The
inverse loading of these two similar indicators suggests that the factor represents the
‘competition of the banking system’. How countries differ with respect to financial
system institutions can be assessed by their factor score projections on the four planes
defined by the principal components above.
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Table 5.5 Overview of Factors
Institutional Sub-Sphere Factor Component
Labour Markets Labour Market Flexibility
Wage Bargaining System
Labour Market Policy
Product Markets Governance of Internal Product Market
Public Involvement in Domestic Product Market
Explicit Protection against Foreign Competition
Education System Govt. Support for Research & Formal Education
Institutionalised Skill Regime*
Absorption of Secondary Educated Labour
Financial System Availability of Varied Forms of Capital*
Concentration of Banking System
Type of Financial System*
Competition in Banking System
*Factors were reversed to represent the correct axis of coordination
5.3 Overview of Institutional Factors
Overall, this study has developed 13 institutional factors, underpinned by 42 manifest
variables. Specifically, three factors are developed for the labour market, product
market and education system, whilst four factors for the financial system. An overview
of the institutional factors is given by Table 5.5.
These institutional factors form the basis of the cluster analysis and form the
‘measures’ that capture institutional diversity amongst the county sample. Factor
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components marked by ‘∗’ were reversed for purposes of interpretability (so they convey
the balance between market and non-market coordination represented by other factors).
Then through mathematical treatment highlighted by Equation 4.1, these factors are
converted into coordination indices for country i which both increases interpretability
and supports the study in measuring the format of ‘institutional complementarity’.
These indices are then carried forward to specify several panel models and robustness
checks in Step 2 of the research design.
5.4 Diversity of Economic Models
The following sections will outline and specify the results of the cluster analysis. It
begins with an descriptive illustration of the cluster analysis, leading through into
the empirical results, which are then explained and framed accordingly. The aim of
this section is to underpin an objective contextual taxonomy of institutions and the
pertaining diversities of institutional systems. It therefore operates in such a way
as to provide illustrative context to institutional diversity and facilitates discussions
on the spectrum of institutional variance. These modes of capitalism constitute an
important benchmark for understanding the effect of institutions on entrepreneurship.
Identifying and appreciating the impact of institutions on entrepreneurship requires a
better understanding within the varieties of capitalism and the forms of institutional
complementarities within which define them. After-all, clustering is "more than a
methodological device; it is a vital tool for theory development... setting a foundation
for sense-making, reasoning, and conceptualisation" (Ronen & Shenkar, 2013, p. 869).
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5.4.1 Cluster Analysis Descriptives
In order the classify countries along each of the institutional components, this study
uses the Anderson-Rubin method to produce standardised composite factor scores
for each country. This ‘marks’ each country along the plane of a given institutional
components. It is the variance along each of the 13 components that provides the
basis for comparing countries with one another, allowing typologies to be created
through analysing the variance within and between countries institutional projections.
Classifications of countries are established using hierarchically ascending classification
techniques (hierarchical cluster analysis). The rationale behind hierarchical cluster
analysis is to group similar countries as measured by their Anderson-Rubin factor scores
along each component. As such, cluster analysis is performed based on the previous
principal components analysis. This allows the study to capture institutional diversity
amongst the country sample by assessing institutional similarities and dissimilarities
simultaneously. Specifically, this study takes the interval mode of Squared Euclidean
distance; dissimilarity is defined as the Euclidean metric between N cases. The ‘Ward’s
Method’, a step-by-step aggregation of countries by cluster is employed as so that the
intra-cluster inertia has minimal variance.
However, hierarchical cluster analysis is primarily an exploratory rather than
confirmatory or inferential activity. There are many attributes on which to measure
similarity and difference across objects, and numerous algorithms for identifying clusters
given some set of attributes. There is no statistical basis on which to prefer a particular
clustering solution over another and no possibility of evaluating the uncertainty around
a particular observation’s assignment to a given cluster. The choice of both the number
of clusters to focus on and the substantive interpretations assigned to them is solely
the responsibility of the researcher (Ahlquist & Breunig, 2016). Referring to the
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traditional clustering methods, Venables and Ripley (2002) argue that “there are
many different clustering methods, often giving different answers, and so the danger
of over-interpretation is high”. As argued by Ahlquist & Breunig (2016), it is up to
the researcher to identify, justify, and interpret a given cluster solution. As argued
by in Obinger & Wagcshal (2001) and Saint-Arnaud & Bernard (2003) who relied on
hierarchical clustering, their dendrogram can plausibly yield a two-, five- or six-cluster
solution and as such it is within the researchers remit to interpret and identify ’where
to cut the dendrogram’.
However, this said, it is necessary to assess the clustering tendency and robustness
to validate the quality of results after the hierarchical cluster analysis. A variety
of measures has been proposed for evaluating clustering results, through clustering
validation techniques. The term clustering validation is used to design the procedure of
evaluating the results of a clustering algorithm, evaluating the clustering structure by
varying different parameter values for the same algorithm (Theodoridis & Koutroubas,
2008).
In a bid to determine the optimal number of clusters, this study used a clustering
validation technique via the Elbow Method (Zhao, 2012). Given this study statistically
defines a cluster such that the total intra-cluster variation is minimised, the Elbow
method looks at the total within-cluster sum of squares as a function of the number of
clusters, as such that the marginal impact of an extra added cluster becomes zero or
negative (i.e. it bends like an elbow), hence optimum number of clusters given. The
Elbow method yields an optimum number of clusters which the study takes forward.
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Figure 5.1 and Table 5.6 represent the results of the hierarchical cluster analysis
(Figure B.5 - Proximity Matrix). Figure 5.1 shows the clusters through the use of
a dendogram or ‘hierarchical tree’. Figure 5.1 provides a useful tool to qualitatively
assess potential cluster memberships where increasing dissimilarity of clusters (Y-Axis)
provides natural ‘splits’ between countries and clusters. The lengths of the vertical lines
linking clusters show how dissimilar the merged clusters are, and therefore lengthier
lines show greater dissimilarity.
5.4.2 Four Modes & Nine Intra-Modes of Capitalism
When applying Ward’s Method hierarchical cluster analysis which in turn is validated by
the Elbow method, optimally, 4 clusters emerge from the sample of 30 countries. These
are formalised and depicted within the dendogram of Figure 5.1. The results show wide
variance of cluster classification, representative of the present capitalist institutional
diversity posed by the current landscape of political economies. Whilst some country
clusters echo the standard dichotomy of liberal market economies (LMEs) versus
coordinated market economies (CMEs), various interesting cases prevail, particularly in
relation to the inclusion of countries that had largely been ignored in previous studies.
Descriptively, the results show two varied ‘tiers of diversity’, that display ‘clusters
within clusters’, or ‘diversities within diversity’. Firstly, there is diversity amongst
countries in terms of their coordination mechanism (4 clusters), and secondly yet
descriptively, diversity within each mechanism of coordination (9 clusters). The former
can be argued to depict the ‘mode of capitalism’, and the latter displaying the ‘intra-
modes of capitalism’. These will be outlined as follows.
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Table 5.6 Cluster Classifications
Tier Cluster Country
Mode of Capitalism: Market Based Capitalism




Emergent Market Capitalism Estonia
New Zealand
Asian Market Capitalism South Korea
Japan
Mode of Capitalism: Coordination Based Capitalism









Mode of Capitalism: Peripheral Capitalism





Mode of Capitalism: Developmental Capitalism
Intra-Mode of Capitalism: South American Variant Chile
Mexico
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First, natural ‘splits’ and ‘divisions’ emerge from a qualitative assessment of the
dendogram (Figure 5.1). Specifically, the results demonstrate 4 higher order di-
visions/clusters of countries to which can be described as representing the varied
coordination mechanisms within capitalist regimes, that is, how actors are coordi-
nated and informational problems are overcome (Hall & Soskice, 2001). These include
market-based coordination (hereafter market based capitalism), coordination based
capitalism (based on strategic coordination) and two variants of state-led coordination,
which highlight two varying degrees of statist influence. Through observation of the
dendogram (Figure 5.1) these are represented by ‘long isolated branches’, namely
high scores of rescaled Ward’s distance scores and thus cluster dissimilarity. The
first (coordinated capitalism) can be identified from Austria to Denmark), with the
market based capitalist regimes starting from Estonia to USA. Furthermore, of the two
variants of state-led coordination regimes, the first starts from France to Ireland and
the rest thereafter. As such, these can be described as tiers of comparative assessment
as representing the ‘inter-variance’ between capitalism(s) as it embodies the diversity
of coordination regimes between countries. Overall, these results suggest ‘diversities of
the mode of capitalism’; market, strategically coordinated or state-led regimes.
Yet within each ‘inter-mode of capitalism’, diversity still remains. In fact, further
divisions of countries emerge within each coordination regime to what can be under-
stood to represent ‘intra-variance of capitalism’. Not all countries within a given mode
of capitalism are the same, displaying unique internal variance inside each coordination
regime. For example, within market based capitalism, large variance still remains
between clusters on a basis of the composition of their financial system; some systems
were characterised by dominant short-term capital vis-à-vis other long-termism regimes.
Taxonomising the intra-variance tier of comparative analysis, 9 clusters can be inferred.
Specifically, 3 variants of market based capitalism, 2 variants of coordination-based
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capitalism, 2 variants of peripheral (state-led) capitalism, and 2 variants of developmen-
talist (state-led) capitalism. The naming of these clusters are indented to best represent
the nature of diversity (particularly in relation to their coordination characteristics)
and the geographic nature of the pertaining countries. These again are formalised by
Table 5.6.
In sum, two tiers of capitalist diversity can be highlighted. Firstly, institutional
diversity remains in terms of countries coordination mechanisms named ‘mode of
capitalism’, which is the optimal number of clusters. The results suggest four variants.
The second tier embodies ’intra-variance’ within each capitalist regime, demonstrating
internal variance within each mode of capitalism. The results show nine variants of
capitalism. At a general level, these results reflect the reality that within national
boundaries, institutions tend to ‘hang together’ as coherent entities or gestalts. The
specific descriptives and characteristics of each mode of capitalism and their respective
variants will be discussed below.
5.4.3 Institutional Cluster Descriptive Statistics
This section outlines objectively the descriptive statistics of the four cluster, highlighting
where the diversity between the clusters and their institutional dimensions. Table 5.7
presents the mean Anderson-Rubin Factor score for each factor component grouped
within each of the clusters. Descriptive statistics also document details on the variance
and the significant differences between means, with respect to significant t-test values
where compared vis-a-vis the market based capitalism cluster.
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Inferentially, Table 5.7 echoes previous studies such as Dilli et al (2018) in that
market and coordination based capitalism show high absolute loadings on their re-
spective negative-positive poles, as to be expected. Peripheral and developmental
capitalism clusters rarely have greater extreme values than market and coordination
based clusters. The market based capitalism cluster stands out for extreme negative
loadings. For example, this shows extremely liberal product markets, labour markets
and financial systems. High degrees of labour market flexibility, a decentralised wage
bargaining system and inactive labour market policies define the clusters liberal nature.
The institutional characteristics of coordination based capitalism are more egalitarian.
In particular, high positive means in terms of centralised wage bargaining and active
labour market policy represents the coordination complementarity sets referred to by
Hall & Soskice (2001) for example. Meanwhile, the peripheral and developmentalist
capitalism clusters are generally mixed and hybrid in the sense they do not tend to one
extreme of the negative-positive axis poles (µ≈ 0). They have neither, on average, purer
movement to the market based or coordination based complementarities. They have
partial decentralised wage bargaining institutions yet rigid labour market flexibility.
Couple this with high regulation in product markets, neither a market or stakeholder
type of financial system and constraining capital lines yields two clusters of capitalism
that, according to the criteria of Kenworthy (2006), would be incoherent in nature.
The next section will further discuss the features of the clusters and how fundamentally
these clusters display architectural diversity.
5.4.4 Institutional Cluster Configurations & Features
This section outlines descriptively the configurational features of each mode of capitalism
and those intra-modes of capitalism within. These descriptions are born from a
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Govt. of Internal PM 0.23 -1.36 -0.04 0.32
Pub. Involv. in Domestic PM 0.25 -1.52 -0.23 0.47
Protection against Foreign Comp 0.12 -1.02 -0.02 0.14
Labour Market Flexibility 0.92 -1.24 0.12 0.42
Wage Bargaining System -0.48 -0.56 1.23 -0.46
Labour Market Policy 0.31 -0.52 1.36 -0.63
Support of Research & Formal
Education
-0.09 0.51 0.98 -1.01
Institutionalised Skill Regime 0.43 -0.64 1.01 0.01
Absorption of Secondary Educ
Labour
-1.21 0.02 0.98 1.12
Availability of Varied Capital
Forms
0.12 -0.59 0.04 0.61
Concentration of Banking System -0.41 -0.52 0.62 -0.09
Type of Financial System 0.01 -0.65 0.24 0.14
Competition in Banking System 0.13 -0.74 0.45 0.42
Mean 0.025 -0.68 0.59 0.112
Median 0.12 -0.64 0.45 0.14
Standard Deviation 0.512 0.546 0.542 0.564
Kurtosis 2.30 0.816 -1.55 0.34
Skewness -0.93 0.55 0.203 -0.48
Sum 0.33 -8.83 6.74 1.46
t-Test1 -2.70*** -10.29*** -3.08***
ICi 0.51 0.12 0.94 0.6
Anderson-Rub Factor score means are presented for each component (row) within each cluster
(column) before normalisation; ICi mean given after transformation via Equation 4.2; Factor score
means after the reversal of axis outlined in Table 5.5; 1 ’t-stat’ presented at p<0.001***, comparison
against the market based capitalism mean.
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quantitative assessment (Table 5.7) of where each cluster average ‘sits’ along their
institutional planes.
Market Based Coordination: Neo-Liberal, Emergent Market & Asian Cap-
italism
Overall, market based capitalism is based on market relations, defined by a largely
liberal agenda towards the allocation of actors via market relation. This is akin to the
liberal market economies (LMEs) as characterised by the seminal work of Hall & Soskice
(2001). This studies results show uniformly that these institutional configurations
are branded by decentralised wage bargaining systems, high labour flexibility and
low labour market spending. Furthermore, the education systems institutionalise
general skill profiles hereby weak asset specificities, coupled with weak governance
measures for domestic product markets. Financial systems are generally competitive
in structure, and Governments provide relative support formal education and research.
However, as 3 clusters emerge within such market-based system, internal diversity
subtly remains. This can be underpinned by further exploration of each market cluster
namely, neo-liberal, emergent market and Asian capitalism.
Neo-liberal capitalist variant is the most extreme version of market-based capitalism
signifying pure forms of individualist and liberal ideologies. This cluster is represented
by the USA, UK, Canada and Australia, countries signifying the Anglo-Saxon unfettered
principles. Whilst still embodying the characteristics above, this cluster is significantly
dominated by their financial systems; heterogeneity is most apparent within such
institutional sphere. There remains a relative high degree of pension funds and
stock market activity that underpins the allocation of (short-term) capital. That
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is, market relations fundamentally determine issues of finance and corporate control.
These systems can thus be characterised as portfolio orientated systems (Berglof, 1997),
outsider systems (Franks & Mayer, 1997) and ultimately market-based financial systems.
Neo-liberal capitalists also tend to display low levels of banking system concentration
and high levels of capital availability relative to its neighbouring market clusters.
Emergent market based capitalists, as represented by Estonia and New Zealand,
displays similar structural patterns as neo-liberals, especially in terms of the system
of industrial relations and employment protection. This could be seen to symbolize
countries in transition towards pure neo-liberals. There is growing acknowledgement
that Estonia has undertaken a transitional path symbolised by marketisation and
liberalisation, a concerted attempt to emulate the institutional architecture of the
UK and USA (Feldmann, 2006; 2013). Again, heterogeneity remains particularly in
relation to the financial systems. Whereas neo-liberal financial systems are based on
short-term market capital, our results suggest emergent liberals pose a financial system
based on patient capital and insider ’bank’ relationships. This could represent the
underdevelopment of capital markets in such economies and the high concentration
of banks relative to neo-liberal models. Furthermore, emergent liberal Governments
provide less public support for research and formal education.
Asian market capitalism as named after the geographic proximity of the two clustered
countries, South Korea and Japan, whilst true to the liberal market core, provides
variety on several fronts. Asian market capitalism can be characterised by a similar
financial system architecture to neo-liberal capitalism with short-termism market based
behaviours and relative low concentration of the banking system. However, such model
can be characterised by higher levels of external orientated regulation on product
markets, barriers to trade and FDI vis-à-vis those of neo-liberal and emergent market
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clusters. According to this taxonomy, Asian market capitalists tend to provide more
Government support for research and formal education whilst still prevailing with the
institutionalisation of general skill profiles.
Coordination Based Capitalism: the Scandinavian & the Continental Vari-
ant
Coordinated markets provide a direct contrast to the institutional configuration of
market based capitalist countries. Agents are allocated via non-market relationships and
collaborative strategic interactions between firms and other market actors, analogous
to the coordinated market economy (CMEs) classification of Hall & Soskice (2001).
Coordination is secured by strategic interaction with institutions constructed to allow
such mechanism to lessen uncertainty. The principal supporting institutions allowing
strategic coordination is that of the labour market, assembled around the prevalent
role of corporatism and unionisation. The industrial relations system is centralised
allowing for the ‘perverse benefits’ of wage moderation (Hancke, 2013; Calmors &
Driffill, 1988; Carlin, 2012) parallel to a relatively rigid labour markets that nurtures
the industrial base of said countries. This is supported by the institutionalisation of
high human skill asset specificity as developed by the prevalence of ‘on-the-job’ and
vocational training underpinned by a bank based financial system providing ‘patient
long term capital’. Consistent with market based systems, domestic product markets
are de-regulated and free of Government distortions. The results suggest two variants
of coordination based systems, the Continental model and Scandinavian model. Whilst
consistent in institutions logics characterising strategic coordination, these two models
have subtle variety.
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The Scandinavian variant focussed on Denmark, Sweden and Norway, whilst con-
sistent with the traditional characteristics above, also displays significant variety from
its neighbouring cluster on the basis of its banking system market power. Whilst
both financial systems are based around an ‘insider system’, the results suggest that
the Scandinavian model of the banking system is far less competitive as measured
by the principal component (Financial System - Component 4, Table 5.4). There is
significantly higher market power within such system, suggesting the nearness towards
a monopoly based banking structure. This contrasts the Continental variant, again
named after the geographic proximity of the clustered countries, which is symbolised
by high levels of competition. One can denote that this system is nearing a perfect
competition structure.
Peripheral Capitalism: Franco-Lux & EMU peripherals
Peripheral capitalism, comprising of two variants, is largely defined by a relative degree
of state influence. Where market and strategic coordination underpin the allocation
of actors in former cases, it is the state that overcomes weak institutional calibration
by providing the correction of coordination failures. Such state activity is therefore a
process of non-market coordination displayed by the course of large state dependence
(Molina & Rhodes, 2007). The mixed, state and market interaction is thus the dominant
form of coordination, with a higher impact of regulation and state mediation, which
has been argued to perpetuate long-term inefficient equilibriums given the outcome of
coordination between freely contracting actors will prove extremely difficult to build
(Crouch, 2005b; Molina & Rhodes, 2007).
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State activity is dominant within domestic product markets. The results suggest
that product markets within this mode of capitalism are defined by high levels of
governance measures and public involvement as expressed by our factor components.
This has significant negative impact for accumulative adjustment under the EMU
(Pelkmans et al, 2008). However, these countries are also characterised by low external
protection against foreign investment, perhaps emblematic of the membership of the
European Single Market. There remains very high levels of labour protection hereby
acknowledged as rigid markets, coupled with intermediate forms of wage-bargaining
throughout each intra-variant of capitalism. Again, this has significant repercussions for
the competitiveness and shock absorption within such countries (Hancke & Herrmann,
2007). Intermediate forms of active labour market policy and the institutionalisation of
high asset skill specificity are complemented by a ‘patient capital’ bank based financial
system. But again, multiplicity remains between the two intra-variants.
Franco-Lux, as named from the inclusion of France and Luxembourg is characterised
by higher average spending on R&D and formal education versus the EMU-peripheral
model, alongside relatively higher rates of secondary educated labour absorption. The
EMU variant, labelled by the commonalities between countries, is symbolised by
extremely low levels of secondary educated absorption, arguably led by the significant
fall in aggregate derived demand within each economy (Rhodes, 2014). Low levels of
capital availability contrasts high degrees of capital provision within the Franco-Lux
model, feasibly representative of the collapse in the financial systems as buttressed by
the present dysfunctional nature of the Eurozone (Nolke, 2016).
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Developmentalist Capitalism: the South American & the Eastern Euro-
pean Variant
Similar to the peripheral mode of capitalism, the mixed interaction of state and market
is the dominant form of coordination in light of the weak ‘coherence’ of institutions
(Kenworthy, 2006; Hall & Gingerich, 2009). We name this cluster developmentalist
capitalism to capture the perceived ‘nurturing’ element of state influences within
developing countries (except Italy). With two variants of capitalism, South American
and Eastern European, sharing of common institutional logics remains. Labour markets
are characterised by high levels of labour protection, inactive labour market policy
and decentralised systems of industrial relations. Low concentration and competition
of the banking systems coupled with more bank based financial relations is perhaps
reprehension of underdeveloped financial systems; low levels of capital availability are
identified. This has been argued to be the case in Central and Eastern European states
(Nolke & Vliegenthart, 2009; Lane & Myant, 2007). Furthermore, high absorption of
secondary educated labour and low levels of R&D/formal education funding combine
with high product market governance measures, which is consistent with historical
developmentalist trajectories of other countries (Deeg & Jackson, 2015; Pelkmans,
2010).
Variance between the South American and Eastern European variants remains on
several fronts. The South American variant contrasts its neighbouring cluster with
the high institutionalisation of general skill profiles (weak asset specificity) versus
the Eastern European focus of high skill asset specificity. Coupled with low external
product market protection, the Eastern European model arguably has institutional
configurations permissible to the creation of industrial ‘legacies’ (Mykhnenko, 2007).
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5.4.5 Institutional Complementarities
According to Amable (2016), the existence of institutional complementarities explains
how varied institutional models of capitalist may exist. From these institutional
complementarities perspective, if varied combinations of institutions yield equally
efficient growth and welfare, then it is plausible that more than one model of capitalism
will exist. Indeed, each variety of capitalism is built upon a unique institutional logic
as developed from the nature of institutional complementarities.
As per the Hall & Soskice theories of varieties of capitalism, institutional comple-
mentarities explains the reinforcing mechanism that leads to the emergence of two
differentiated coordination regimes, namely liberal market economies (LMEs) and
coordinated market economies (CME). It is argued here that the results partially
mirror the binary classification of these specific capitalist systems. Building on such
work as Hall & Soskice (2001) and Amable (2003), this studies market based cluster
and coordinated market cluster posit theoretically ‘coherent’ models of capitalism.
Hall & Soskice (2001), Hall & Gingerich (2009) and Kenworthy (2006) assert that
institutional coherence, and thus effective coordination can exist in both coordinated
led market economies and liberal market economies. This is due to the underlying
institutional complementarities providing equally efficient economic returns and ef-
fective coordination of agents. As such, this section lends particular attention to the
underlying forms of complementarity within these modes of capitalism.
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Tables 5.8 & 5.9 outlines the theorised interaction between institutional sub-spheres
in the market based and coordinated based capitalism clusters. Both liberal market
based models and coordinated market based models are seen to be theoretically coherent
and stable forms of capitalism (Hall & Gingerich, 2009) and as such it is important to
outline the underlying structures forming these capitalism models. This is based on the
assessment of the average factor scores of each cluster and dimensions of such analysis.
In the market based mode of capitalism, low product-market regulation exposes
firms to increasing competition, making them more sensitive to adverse market shocks.
Flexible labour markets and decentralised wage bargaining systems allow firms to
both alter their prices, but also adjust their quantity of labour in the event of adverse
changes in the market dynamics. Liberal product markets are therefore complemented
by a labour market which provides the ease of flexible adjustment. This has been
empirically validated by Amable (2016). In addition, financial systems dominated by
short term capital aimed at seeking immediate financial returns make firms adjust
their strategies accordingly. Firms are exposed to a pure profit maximisation motive,
which is supported by allowing managers to control costs, particularly through labour
market adjustment. This economic model consequently favours fast adjustment, rapid
structural change and entails a high degree of risk for the investment in specific skills.
For this reason, the education system complements its neighbouring institutions by
investing in general skills. This is complementarity for two reasons. Firstly, general
skill profiles dampen economic downturns as they support firms in adapting to a new
market paradigm. Secondly, individuals with general skills have reduced bargaining
power relative to specific skill profiles, which underpins the control of firm based costs
(Soskice, 1990; Estevez-Abe, Iversen & Soskice, 2001).
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The coordinated mode of capitalism is organised per a different set of comple-
mentarities. Semi-governed and protected product markets implies some flexibility of
the productive system, which is not only achieved through labour market shedding
and market adjustments as exercised in the market based model. Instead, retraining
of a highly skilled workforce in a market reinforcing manner plays an imperative
role in the adaptability of firms to competitive pressures. Training labour with the
institutionalisation of specific skills is supported by a combination of high employment
protection, centralised wage bargaining and active labour market policies. This array
of ‘insurance’ based institutions complements the investment and sunk costs towards
the creation of skill specific assets. The financial system further complements the rest
of the production regime by providing patient led capital. This enables firms to develop
long-term strategies in the absence of being exposed to short-term profit constraints.
These modes of capitalism constitute an important benchmark for understand-
ing the effect of institutions on entrepreneurship. Identifying and appreciating the
impact of institutions on entrepreneurship requires a better understanding within
the varieties of capitalism and the forms of institutional complementarities within
which define them. Research into the effect of institutions should take note of the
overall mode of institutional configuration and move beyond institutional research
based on single institutions in isolation (Stephan et al, 2015; Syliowicz & Galvin, 2010).
The institutional environment, dominated by a matrix of complementing institutional
sub-spheres, give rise to specific forms of incentive and entrepreneurial endowments. It
is a result of this that entrepreneurs are provided with unique forms of institutional
logic under varied models of capitalism. Institutional diversities, institutional coher-
ence and institutional complementarities, key theoretical tenants of the comparative
institutionalism literature, can provide fruitful insight for the study of international
comparative entrepreneurship.
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5.4.6 Coherent & Incoherent Models of Capitalism
A political economies institutional configuration is deemed more coherent and more
coordinated to the degree to which (i) its institutions within each sphere are closer
to the polar types of a coordinated mode of capitalism or market based mode of
capitalism. This is in contrast to being ‘in-between’ these two types. Secondly (ii)
its institutions are consistent across all institutional sub-spheres, that is, having no
competing institutional logics. Incoherence is therefore defined at neither matching
closely the two modes of capitalism, or having liberal orientated institutions in some
sub-spheres yet coordinated led institutions in neighbouring sub-spheres. This would
lead to a situation where institutional complementarities cannot be maintained.
Table 5.10 contains a schematic presentation of the differences in institutional logics
and complementarities between this works coherent and incoherent models. It further
demonstrates the link between the institutional coherence hypothesis, the modes of
capitalism illustrated by this research and how this matches with the current body of
work in comparative institutionalism.
As discussed beforehand, there are several precedents in the comparative po-
litical economy literature for the notion that coherence affects national economic
performance. Greater institutional coherence increases the benefits from institutional
complementarities, increasing the agents ability to exploit the benefits yielded by the
complementarities (Hopner, 2005). Coherence allows firms to coordinate effectively
given the complementarities do not exhibit inconsistencies or contradictions in their
institutional logics - the ‘system integration’ - of the national models of embedded
capitalism will be continuously established, restored, redefined and defended against
all sorts of disorganizing forces (Streeck, 2001).
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Table 5.10 Coherent versus Incoherent Models
Coherent Models; High Institutional Calibration Incoherent Cases
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Institutions that are consistent across all institutional sub-spheres promotes stability
(Amable, 2003), facilitates coherence which structures logical form, conventions and
rules of the game that shape the logics governing economic decision. These established
institutional structures explain the sources and variations of endowments enjoyed by
entrepreneurs (Yueng, 2002). This in turn conditions the types, levels and quality of
endowments from which entrepreneurs can exploit.
Added, a pervasive state which is a hallmark of incoherent models crowds out private
enterprise (Baumol et al, 2007). Those countries which exhibit weak institutional
calibration and institutional voids are those that can be defined as institutionally
incoherent - those in-between types of capitalism which have a contradictory mix of
liberal and coordinated institutions. Here, the state overcomes weak institutional
calibration by providing the correction of coordination failures. This pervasive state
activity is therefore a process of non-market coordination displayed by the course of
large state dependence (Molina & Rhodes, 2007). Mixed state and market interaction
is therefore the dominant form of coordination, with the interaction between freely
contracting actors, such as entrepreneurs proving extremely difficult to build. This
perpetuates long-term inefficient and unstable equilibriums which is in itself not
conducive to general private entrepreneurial activity (Baumol et al, 2007). Baumol et
al (2007) refers to these types of capitalism as "State-guided" and "Oligarchic"; "failing
to create conditions for small-and-medium-sized business to flourish" (Baumol et al,
2007, pg. 76). Overall, one could hypothesise that institutional (in-)coherence is (bad)
good for entrepreneurship, through two main channels, (1) greater logic provision of
endowments and, (2) a pervasive state directs production, regulation and correction
of coordination failures which derive from the institutional incoherence and their
competing institutional logics.
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5.5 Chapter Summary
The analyses performed in this chapter have led us to identify the main factors of
differentiation of modern capitalist economies and the partitions they imply. Since
systematic analyses are seldom performed for a larger basket of countries, the results
presented in this chapter have shed some new light on the usual classifications of
countries found in the literature. One could summarize the main findings in the
following way. Most of the analyses lead us to refine the division of modern capitalism
into CMEs and LMEs. Even when the picture seems relatively clear-cut, as is the case
for product- and labour-market regulation, for instance, the existence of a relatively
well-defined group of market-based economies does not imply that the economies of








Building upon the results of Chapter 5, this chapter presents the detailed empirical
findings in relation to the research objectives. To introduce institutional diversity per-
spectives, this chapter provides quantitative results of the specified models accounting
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for unique institutional diversity. This was done by specifying models with institutional
complementarity terms which are analysed through multivariate panel analysis. This
chapter starts with a recap of the hypotheses and subsequent econometric models.
Lending from this, descriptive statistics are outlined followed by a set of diagnostic
tests. Where estimation techniques are reinforced to control for certain econometric
effects, the following section documents the estimation results. Given these results
may depend on the inclusion of certain data sets and variables, the model estimates
are then subjected to a range of robustness checks to further cross-validate the original
panel findings. The chapter is then brought to a close by reflecting on the statistical
significance of the hypotheses. This chapter addresses the following research questions:
Research Objective 2:
To ascertain the effects of institutional diversity on aggregate entrepreneurship.
Research Objective 3:
To ascertain whether perspectives from comparative institutionalism can explain the
divergent nature of entrepreneurial activity across nations.
6.2 Hypothesis & Model Specification Summary
In total nine models are tested, consisting of four different specifications of the indepen-
dent variables across two forms of estimation methods. For purposes of clarity, each
model is outlined textually, where the algebraic expressions are given in Chapter 4.
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Again, these are aiming to ascertain research objective two and three. The summary is
given as:
Model 1 Overview: Baseline Model
Model 1a: Equation 1 with control variables only.
Model 2 Overview: Quadratic form (x2) of singular institutional sub-spheres (ICi)
Model 2a: Equation 2a with quadratic form (x2) of PMi coordination estimated
through Pooled OLS
Model 2b: Equation 2b with quadratic form (x2) of LMi coordination estimated
through Pooled OLS
Model 2c: Equation 2c with quadratic form (x2) of ESi coordination estimated
through Pooled OLS
Model 2d: Equation 2d with quadratic form (x2) of FSi coordination estimated
through Pooled OLS
Model 3 Overview: Linear parametric form of ‘Institutional Complementarity’ term
intended to assess Hypothesis 1
Model 3a: Equation 3 with linear form of ICi term estimated through Pooled OLS
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Model 3b: Equation 3 with linear form of ICi term estimated through GLS Random
Effects
Model 4 Overview: Quadratic form (x2) of ’Institutional Complementarity’ term
intended to assess Hypothesis 2
Model 4a: Equation 4 with quadratic form (x2) of ICi term estimated through Pooled
OLS
Model 4b: Equation 4 with quadratic form (x2) of ICi term estimated through GLS
Random Effects
6.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 6.1 presents descriptive statistics for all variables, including the mean, standard
deviation, minimum and maximum values. Variables were standardised, and institu-
tional variables were further normalised to eliminate distortions from differences in
numerical magnitudes. This has been the common treatment of variables in extant
studies (e.g. Witt et al, 2018; Hall & Gingerich, 2009; Kenworthy, 2006).
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6.4 Validating the ‘Institutional Complementarity’
(ICi) Measure
As outlined in Chapter 4, this study creates a weighted term ICi to account for
the functional (Boyer, 2005) ‘institutional complementarities’ of the institutions sub-
spheres (Equation 4.2). This institutional complementarity term measures the balance
of market and strategic coordination in the political economy for country i. The term




































Where [· · · ]P is the product market coordination of country i, [· · · ]L is the labour
market coordination of country i, [· · · ]E is education system coordination of country i
and [· · · ]F is the financial system coordination of country i specified by Equation 4.1.
To validate this measure of ‘institutional complementarity’, bivariate correlation is
employed against the two measures developed and deployed by Hall & Gingerich (2009).
Measuring the nature of institutional complementarity to estimate the relationship
between varied forms of institutional coordination (market and strategic coordination
based) and rates of economic growth, Hall & Gingerich (2009) provide a scholarly
breakthrough in terms of measuring complementarity and the varieties of capitalism
hypothesis. As such, a sizeable and significant correlation with the Hall and Gingerich
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measures of institutional complementarities provides substantial validation to the
claims that we are measuring a similar concept. This study employs a two-tailed
bivariate correlation between this studies measure of complementarity and those of Hall
& Gingerich (2009). Likewise, with this studies rationale, higher scores of coordination
portray movement towards strategic coordination modes, and therefore one should
expect to see a positive correlation. The results are given by Table 6.2.
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These results suggest that this studies measure has validated statistical power. This
provides this study the credibility and reliability to carry forward the ‘institutional
complementarity’ hypothesis. The results also suggest that there is little institutional
change over time, given that Hall and Gingerich (2009) capture their cross-sectional
snapshot of institutions in the early 1990’s. The institutional formats of countries
are largely similar, and the countries situation on their coordination planes suggests
countries have changed little. It also shows that the dichotomy between varied forms
of coordination still provides meaningful interpretation in-line with the acceptance of
comparative institutionalism scholarship.
6.5 Diagnostic Analysis
This study employs a range of diagnostic tests to ensure there remain no violation
of assumptions within the model specification, whilst increasing the efficiencies and
consistencies of parameter estimations. Firstly, the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation
in the panel data confirms the presence of first order autocorrelation (AR1)1. Secondly,
the Cook & Weisberg test2 for heteroskedasticity suggests there is non-constant variance
in the residuals and therefore the data structure is heteroskedastic. As a result, this
study follows Wooldridge (2013, p. 511) in adjusting the standard errors to account
for both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. These results consequently operate
at a higher statistical margin with the use of robust standard errors. A Wald chi
squared test is further employed to test whether all year coefficients are jointly equal
to 0, which indicates whether the inclusion of year dummies is required. The null
hypothesis is rejected which indicates that the models should account for time fixed
1Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation: H0 - No first order autocorrelation, F test - 5.473
2Cook & Weisberg test: H0 - Constant variance, x2 = 75.89∗∗∗
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effects3. Further, the Pesaran test for contemporaneous correlation indicates that
the residuals are uncorrelated which suggests cross-section independence4 (no spatial
correlation within the data).
The main assumption sufficient for consistent estimation is that the regressors are
either exogenous, or the potential endogeneity is accounted for. Endogeneity occurs
when a regressor is not entirely exogenous but depends on some unmodeled causes
that drive other variables in the model. The error term in a regression model captures
the effect of these causes. Thus, researchers detect endogeneity when the explanatory
variables correlate highly with the error term where:
corr(x, u) ̸= 0
Upon performing bivariate correlations, there remains no significant correlation
between the error term and individual regressors, which indicates independence of
explanatory variables. Nonetheless, presence of theorised or statistical endogeneity can
be treated in two ways (Blanchflower & Oswald, 1998). Firstly, one may instrument for
the effect, hereby creating a proxy based ‘instrumental‘ variable which accounts for the
endogenous relation. Alternatively, lags can be applied in which case one uses values
of explanatory measured some time before the dependant variable. In the interests of
inference robust to all assumptions, this study applies a precautionary ‘distributed lag
model‘ following Stephan et al (2015) amongst others. All time variant independent
variables are lagged by one year to reduce any potential endogeneity between the
hypothesised antecedents and the regressed variable. These models therefore operate
3Wald x2 = 0.005∗∗∗
4Pesaran CD test is non-significant with a mean P value of 0.437 across all models
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amongst a stronger and restrictive set of assumptions to which further extends the
robustness of the parameter estimates.
6.6 Estimation Results
Model parameters for additive Models 1 and 2 were estimated using the Pooled OLS
(POLS) method in principal. Models 3 and 4 however extend Pooled OLS analysis
with the complementary addition of using Random Effect panel estimators. Applying
the Lagrange Multiplier test developed by Breusch & Pagan (1980), suggests that
there are significant differences across units when extending beyond additive models,
therefore this study performs a complementary set of regression estimators. However,
the pooled OLS and random effects regressions give similar results, as such there is a
documentation of both parameter estimates to gauge the robustness of results. Overall,
models were tested to ensure correct functional form and robust standard errors were
used to mitigate the issues of heteroskedasticity. Estimated results for Models 1 and 2
are provided in Table 6.3.
6.6.1 Main Estimation Results
In the first step, only control variables were included in the regression equation
(Model 1a) to which acts as the base model. Overall, the regression model was
highly significant (R2 = 0.443, F = 6.07, p < 0.001). As previous theory and empirical
evidence suggests, all control variables were statistically significant at the 99 % level and
of sizeable magnitudes. Unemployment presents a negative and significant coefficient,
thus confirming that a higher rate of unemployment is associated with a lower level
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of aggregate entrepreneurial activity. The prevalence of foreign firm activity as a
proxy for by FDI Stock is positively associated with the dependant variable, suggesting
that there are genuine positive externalities produced for new firm creation by the
average presence of foreign investment. Akin to previous empirical evidence, LnGDP ,
population density and dependency ratios all attain a negative relationship with
aggregate rates of entrepreneurship.
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The next step called for examining the main effects of individual institutions on the
dependant variable. Here there is the inclusion of individual coordination indices for
each institutional sub-sphere for country i. In principle, quadratic terms are introduced
to firstly examine potential non-linearity. A statistical acceptance of these results will
ex-post reject the hypothesis that institutions converging on more ‘liberal‘ orientated
directions will tend to increase aggregate entrepreneurial performance. This would be
akin to the institutional convergence perspective, which argues that the institutional
mould of a given sub-sphere will be significant and influential in one linear direction,
i.e. the most liberal direction.
Overall, all dimensions of Model 2 (a − d) were statistically significant with a
substantial change in R2 over the base model. Firstly, all control variables are broadly
stable and attain their baseline coefficient weights and statistical direction. Secondly,
for product market coordination, labour market coordination and education system
coordination, the results all commonly suggest a polynomial ‘U’ shaped relationship
(Models 2a, 2b & 2c respectively). The more market based (0) or strategically coordi-
nated (1) these institutions are the higher estimated rates of entrepreneurial activity.
This contrasts the common hypothesis that institutions solely converging upon common
liberal and market led dynamic produce positive marginal returns to entrepreneurship.
In fact, diversity along institutional sub-spheres provides functional equivalence; the
more institutions are liberal, or the more institutions are strategically coordinated
vis-a-vis an incoherent mix, the higher marginal returns to entrepreneurial activity.
However, there is no significant statistical polynomial relationship between the financial
system and aggregate entrepreneurial rates (Model 2d). Removing the squared term
from the regression then returns a significant negative relationship5, suggesting that on
5Regressing a model excluding the squared term yields an estimate of the following: β = −5.442, t =
−4.87∗∗∗. All control variables were stable akin to the baseline regression model.
6.6 Estimation Results 234
average more liberal orientated financial systems increase the returns to entrepreneur-
ship. These results go some way to rejecting hypothesis one; alternatively accepting
the null hypothesis.
To further characterise the theory of comparative institutionalism, Model 3 includes
the institutional complementarity term (ICi). As suggested and operationalised by Hall
& Gingerich (2009), the inclusion of a balanced term assesses the nature of institutional
complementarities. Specifically, it tests the strength and absolute direction of country
i’s complementarity set, and therefore the degree to which it is non-market based.
Here both Pooled OLS and Random Effects estimators are applied and the results
as both documented (Model ′a′ – Pooled OLS, Model ′b′ – Random Effects). These
are shown by Table 6.4. Overall, both regression equations are highly significant
across both estimators. Models 3a and 3b test linearity, assuming that countries which
converge on a specific direction of institutional complementarity will have statistically
higher impact on the rate of entrepreneurial activity (hence linear relationship). Again,
this is partially akin to the institutional convergence perspectives that there is one
best set of institutions for entrepreneurship. The ICi term is statistically significant
with an estimated negative coefficient, showing that countries with an institutional
complementarity set nearing a strong market/liberal based logic, will have higher rates
of entrepreneurial activity. The functional relationship between institutions provides
more statistical power than testing institutions in isolation.
Where the previous models are tested with a linear treatment, specifying a functional
form, the next step is to examine any potential non-linear relationships between unique
sets of institutional complementarities and the dependant variable. To test non-
linear relationships, this model includes a quadratic ICi term represented by the
parameter of β2. This allows the model to estimate for any potential non-linear
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relationships. Overall, the regression equations of Models 4a and 4b are highly
significant with a sizeable positive increase in R2 from respective Models 3a and 3b.
Both the ICi terms are highly significant and of inverse signs, representing a non-
linear polynomial relationship between the format of the institutional complementary
set and the aggregate levels of entrepreneurial activity. Both estimators provide
broadly equivalent and stable results which imply general robustness to the estimated
coefficients. Therefore, the hypothesis carried forth by the institutional diversity
perspective holds substantial weight (Hypothesis Two). The significance and inverse
signs of the coefficients on the ICi terms indicated that the relationship between the
format of institutional complementarity and TEA is best estimated by non-linearity.
The estimated relationship between the regressors and DV when the control variables
are at their means is best described as U-shaped. Where the institutional structure
of the political economy allows for higher levels of market coordination (0) or higher
levels of strategic coordination (1), estimated entrepreneurship rates are higher than
they are when there is more variation in the types of institutional complementarity
present in the political economy.
These results suggests that the institutional diversity and complementarities per-
spective of the comparative institutionalism literature, built on the distinction between
coherent and incoherent sets of political economies (Hall & Gingerich, 2009; Amable,
2009; 2016) has genuine merit. When complementary institutions are present across
spheres of the political economy, aggregate rates of entrepreneurship are higher; both
liberal and strategically coordinated political economies appear to offer general efficien-
cies to economic actors, a theme parallel to the arguments of Hall & Soskice. These
results demonstrate that joint institutional configurations of institutional sub-spheres
offer more explanatory power than examinations of their individual effects. Using Model
4b for the simulation, Figure 6.1 shows the estimated relationship between institutional
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coordination and total aggregate entrepreneurship when the control variables are held
at their means. Figure 6.2 shows where the means and variance of ICi situate against
the estimated relationship. The U-shaped ‘functional equivalents‘ relationship is clearly
apparent.









































































































































6.6 Estimation Results 238
Following estimations, checks for multicollinearity were performed by examining
the variance inflation factor (VIF) values, an accepted assessment of potential mul-
ticollinearity issues (Hair et al, 2006). It is largely assumed that VIF values higher
than 10.0 highlight issues of multicollinearity amongst regressors. This study therefore
treats 10.0 as the cut-off point. To avoid issues with multicollinearity, the ICi terms
and polynomial term were mean-centered before inclusion within the regression esti-
mation models, as suggested by Aiken et al (1991). All VIF values were well below
the threshold of 10.0 with an overall mean of 2.67, which shows there is no issues of
multicollinearity present.
In sum, based on the regression models with the inclusion of numerous macro-level
control variables and in which include varied sets of institutional variables simultane-
ously, these results show that aggregate entrepreneurial performance across countries
is best predicted by the institutional diversity hypotheses. Countries with institutions
closer to coherent complementarity sets of either market based capitalism or coordi-
nated based capitalist, will have a higher estimated rates of entrepreneurial activity
than countries defined by weak complementarity sets and an incoherent mix of market
and coordination based logics. These results show a U-shaped relationship between
the institutional forms of capitalism and total entrepreneurial activity. Aggregated
entrepreneurial levels are higher where the values or closer to 0 (market based) or 1
(coordination based). The coherence of the institutional configuration has a significant
effect on estimated rates of total entrepreneurial activity, amongst a set of well-defined
control variables. Rather than there being a one best set of institutions, but rather
‘two best ways’.








































































































































































































































































6.6 Estimation Results 240
At a more general level, Models 2, 3 and 4 indicate the overall support that the
institutional context matters where entrepreneurs allocate their efforts. Specifically, the
joint contribution of the four institutional sub-spheres and polynomial terms provides
evidence that the allocation of entrepreneurial activity is partially determined by the
coherence of the institutional environment. This is evidenced by superior performance
of Model 4 relative to Models 2 and 3, particularly in relation to the F score and sizeable
difference in variance explained. The institutional diversity perspective explains more
unique variance of the diverse nature of comparative entrepreneurship rates. Institutions
matter, but how they matter remains the key research question for institutional based
international entrepreneurship scholarship.
6.6.2 Institutional Coherence: Linearisation, Estimation &
Related Comparative Performance of Coherent Com-
plementarities
For purposes of interpretation, since the results yield a quadratic function where
models of capitalism represent institutional coherence the more their institutional
complementarity index is equal to 0 or 1, the results of Model 4 are linearised to
create a single linear measure of ‘institutional coherence’. Linearisation of institutional
complementarity of country i is transformed through the following statistical treatment:
(abs(minima − xi))/minima
where the global minima is given where the marginal rate of change of x is:




Where y is TEA and x is the ‘institutional complementarity’ term. Therefore the
‘institutional coherence’ (IHi) measure of country i is given as:
IHi = (abs[f ′(x) − (ICi)])/[f ′(x)]
where...
f ′(x) = ∂y
∂x
= 0 = 15.75027.636 = x
To formally illustrate the responsiveness of changes in institutional coherence (IHi)
on TEA, the following model specification is estimated through the same estimation
strategies of Model 4b:
TEARateit = αt + IHiβ1 + xitγ + ci + uit (6.2)
where IHi is the linearised institutional coherence index of country i and xit is the
same control variable row vector which change across i and t specified in Chapter 6.
Again, αt is the time dummy intercepts and the composite errors at time t is equal
to ci + uit. Where the marginal returns and potential returns to system-reinforcing





= β̂1 > 1: Increasing Returns to Increasing Institutional Coherence





= β̂1 < 1: Diminishing Returns to Increasing Institutional Coherence
Model estimation yield estimates of the following form:
̂TEARateit = 5.48 + 4.226 · IHi + γ̄ · x̄it (6.3)
Whilst these results are expected given Model 4b is significant, the results for-
mally present that there a positive returns to increasing institutional coherence
(β̂1 = 4.226∗∗∗)6. The greater the degree of institutional coherence of the politi-
cal economy, the higher the estimated rates of Total Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA).
Differently, the closer the institutional complementarity set is market based (akin to
LME) or coordinated based (akin to CME), the greater the marginal returns of TEA.
The linearised estimation is modelled below:
6The control variables all attain their respective signs, approximate magnitudes and significance of
Model 4b. R2 is equal to 0.523 with Wald x2 is 54.61∗∗∗




These results help interpret the notion of institutional coherence from the main
results, concluding that aggregate entrepreneurial activity is a function of institutional
coherence.
6.6.3 Robustness Analysis
The comparison of the two main panel data estimation methods provides a natural
point of robustness analysis. However, a number of additional sensitivity robustness
checks were undertaken to further confirm the validity of the main results. This was
conducted in two ways. Firstly, several institutional variables were removed on a basis
of specific characteristics. Secondly, the study ran a cross-sectional OLS regression
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estimation acting as a stationary test for the main panel model. Overall, the results
obtained through these new tests are consistent with and reinforce the original findings.
The models were robust and applicable diagnostics analysis were performed.
Exclusion of Specified Variables
To further test the robustness of the original findings, this study moves forward by
removing certain factors from the calculations of institutional coordination and com-
plementarity terms. Removal of variables was based on two characteristics. Firstly, if
variables are relatively new to comparative institutionalism, they have been removed
to avoid potential bias. Secondly, variables are removed which vary with the level of
aggregate spending. Whilst these types of measures have been used before, short run
variation in the level of spending may distort the institutional measurement (yet measur-
ing institutional phenomena), and therefore have been removed to test the robustness
and sensitivities of variables. The removed variables from the institutional coordination
indices calculations are reported by Table 6.6. The institutional complementarity terms
have been normalized and mean centered following the same treatment of the original
model specifications. Table 6.5 presents the results of these re-estimations.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6.6 Estimation Results 247
Table 6.6 depicts the coefficients on the institutional complementarity term and
the polynomial IC term for each combination of excluded cases. These are undertaken
against the backdrop of the distributed lag control variable strategy employed within
the main results. Both estimates clearly suggest that our results do not depend on the
inclusion of any one of these variables as model three attains statistical significance;
there is a polynomial non-linear ‘U’ shaped relationship representative of the original
results. The findings are remarkably robust to the exclusion of variables, and therefore
do not pose serious threat to the reliability of the original findings.
Time Invariant Modelling
To further examine the robustness of the panel model results, the study also ran a
cross-sectional ordinary least square regression estimator whilst maintaining the same
model and data specification. As a result, both dependant and explanatory control
variables of the following specification become time invariant (t = 1):
TEARatei =β0 + β1ICi + β2LnGDPi + β3PDi
+ β4Uni + β5DepRi + β6FDIi + εi
(6.4)
TEARatei =β0 + β1ICi + β2IC2i + β3LnGDPi+
β4PDi + β5Uni + β6DepRi + β7FDIi + εi
(6.5)
By averaging the time invariant variables across the six year period, the data
structure is transformed into a cross-sectional static configuration. This allows us to
validate the original panel findings by estimating across one period. It is a useful
method of assessing whether the panel data specifications were bias towards potential
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over-estimation and general measurement error (Biorn, 1992; Griliches & Hausman,
1986). This form of robustness analysis therefore acts as a stationary test of the main
panel model. Where TEA data was missing for a specific year, we used the TEA data
from the previous available year to facilitate data processing. Table 6.7 presents the
OLS regression estimates.
These results show robustness of the original results in several ways. The parameters
of interest in each model are broadly stable and representative of the original panel
estimates. The polynomial and additive models are highly significant, of inverse
signs and of similar magnitude to the varied forms of econometric estimation. Again,
these models which do not vary with time do not show significantly different results
to the original panel model estimators, which further validate the original findings.
Overall, these results suggest that the findings concerning the effect of institutional
complementarities and coordination are robust.
6.7 Summary of Support for Hypotheses
Table 6.8 summarises the study’s results in terms of hypotheses support. In general,
the results of the panel analysis offer the general understanding that the institutional
environment is a driver of entrepreneurial activity. Specifically, these results show
that institutional diversity, as defined by the varied institutional configurations of
countries, explains the nature of aggregate entrepreneurship performance. Countries
which posit coherent forms of institutional complementarities; market or coordination
based institutions provide genuine efficiencies in terms of aggregate entrepreneurial
activity. This contrasts with countries which are identified as having a mix of the two
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Table 6.7 Robustness Estimates of Stationary Cross-Sectional Equations
Regression Equations; DV: TEA
OLS OLS OLS











































R 0.707 0.822 0.889
R2 0.499 0.676 0.790
F stat 4.389*** 7.638*** 11.258***
Standard errors in parentheses; (i) denotes time-invariant explanatory variable;
***p<0.010, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.
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institutional forms, or weaker forms of complementarities. These results show that
aggregate entrepreneurial performance is a function of the coherence of the institutional
system. Countries which have higher levels of institutional coherence posit higher rates
of aggregate entrepreneurship than those with lower levels of coherence. As such, these
results show support for H2 whilst broadly rejecting H1.

































































































































































































































































































































































































6.8 Chapter Summary 252
6.8 Chapter Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to present and partially comment on the empirical
data concerning the second and third research objective of this study. These objectives
and research questions were addressed through the specification of four panel models,
estimated through two strategies: (1) Pooled OLS and (2) GLS Random Effects
estimators. This section then went on to testing the robustness of the findings, by
methods of variable exclusion and time invariant modelling. In general, the results of
the panel analysis offer a general understanding that the institutional environment is
a driver of entrepreneurial activity. Specifically, these results show that institutional
diversity, as defined by the varied institutional configurations of countries, help explain
the nature of aggregate entrepreneurship performance. Countries which posit coherent
forms of institutional complementarities; market or coordination based institutions
provide genuine efficiencies in terms of aggregate entrepreneurial activity. Discussion
of these key findings, with links to the relevant literature and appropriate theoretical




This chapter aims to: (a) further analyse and contextualise the main research findings
presented in Chapters 5 and 6; and (b) explain how these new findings contribute to
existing knowledge. The implications of research findings and the contributions of the
study to other relevant literatures will then be outlined in the concluding sections. This
arrangement allows the present chapter to focus on the wide ranging discussion of what
the results show and how the novel research findings make a theoretical, empirical and
public policy contribution. This is considered appropriate, in view of the fact that this
study has been informed by both the theoretical and empirical gaps in the literature.
This thesis has been guided by three specific research questions outlined in Chapter
3, with Chapter 5 presenting results for Research Question 1, and Chapter 6 presenting
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results for Research Questions 2 & 3. These Chapters are used to structure the current
discussion through the use of ‘headline findings’.
7.2 Overview of Findings
The first of the results chapters was concerned with understanding and taxonomising
institutional diversity (Chapter 5; Research Question 1), which leads through into
understanding the impact of institutions, their diversity, on aggregate entrepreneurship
(Chapter 6; Research Questions 2 & 3). The empirical evidence of Chapter 5 yields the
following ‘headline finding’:
There remains rich institutional diversity between political economies, identified by
four clusters of capitalism, defined by complementary variants across institutional
sub-spheres
The empirical evidence of Chapter 5 illustrates the wide basis of institutional
diversity and variety between the sample of political economies. More importantly,
these institutional varieties were carried forth when attempting to understand the
effect of institutional diversity on aggregate entrepreneurship. As a result, Chapter 6
yields the following headline finding:
Institutions affect aggregate levels of entrepreneurship. When complementary
institutions are present across the sub-spheres of the political economy, rates of Total
Entrepreneurial Activity are higher. Institutional diversity identified by this
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specification appear to offer unique explanations of cross-national levels of
entrepreneurship
The main finding with regards the second research question is that institutions
have a decisive impact on the prevalence and nature of entrepreneurship. That is,
institutions and institutional diversity can help explain the cross-national variances in
aggregate levels of entrepreneurship. More explicitly, it was found that perspectives
from comparative institutionalism provide a powerful analytical tool as suggested by
the following headline finding:
Institutional diversity is a key driver of varied aggregate entrepreneurial rates.
Specifically, the level of entrepreneurial rates is driven by the degree of institutional
coherence of the political economy. This implies that aggregate economic performance
is estimated to be higher in nations whose institutionalised practices correspond more
closely to the coherent types of market-based and strategic coordination models of
capitalism
These findings draw attention to arguments concerning the degree to which countries
institutional frameworks need to closely complementary and institutionally coherent to
allow for greater firm and entrepreneurial activity. In this regard, institutions function
differently in different national contexts, and consequently their influence with the
presence of potential competing institutional logics. The mechanisms through which
the influence of institutions is manifested have been found to be similar across the
sample; that is, by determining transaction costs through the nature of coordination;
through the function of institutional complementarities, and thus influencing the state
of economic inputs for entrepreneurial general efficiencies.
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7.2.1 Institutional Capitalist Diversity
The empirical evidence of Chapter 5 illustrates the wide basis of institutional diversity
and variety between the sample of political economies. Exploiting the plurality of
institutional approaches to build on the classifications of the Governance Approach to
comparative institutionalism, these findings define a wide continuum of institutional
dimensions/factors which underpin differences between the sample of OECD countries.
These help illuminate responses to the first research question. Indeed, capitalist
institutional diversity does exist at a rich level, and depending on the level of resolution,
institutional coordination can provide natural splits between countries. In particular,
four ‘modes of capitalism’ are illustrated, with a specific division between market and
non-market coordination. The weight of the evidence suggests that the varieties in
economic models captures important difference among political economies. These
facilitate context and define robust institutional difference which gives legitimacy to
the efficacy of this study’s approach. At its general level, these results indicate the
importance of diversity. Countries do not cluster around a specific variety of capitalism
or an economic model. This overall finding has different dimensions which is covered
under the following sub-headings.
Variety of Approaches, Variety of Empirical Configuration
Firstly, these results illustrate that the dichotomy between market based coordination
and coordination based capitalism is still an important hallmark of institutional
diversity. It is found that some but not complete support for the VoC approach.
Echoing earlier studies, this study detects more than two empirical types of capitalism
(Esping-Anderson, 1990; Amable, 2003; Boyer, 2004; Schneider & Paunescu, 2012).
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Bold: Economies discussed as CMEs by Hall & Soskice; Italics: economies
discussed as LMEs by Hall & Soskice; Neither bold nor italic: Not included in
Hall & Soskice classification of VoC; Classifications within clusters are defined
by the cluster analysis of Chapter 5
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In addition to the CME and the LME clusters, the results delineate a cluster of
developmental economies, a cluster of economies that resemble the pure LMEs and
a cluster consisting of heterogeneous hybrid economies. But in line with the VoC
approach, it is found that a core of economies conform to the LME and CME ideal
types. The institutional configurations of these economies demonstrate the patterns
predicted by Hall and Soskice, with Table 7.1 illustrating where this study’s findings
reflect against the VoC approach. The clustering of institutions indicates that the
LME–CME distinction is meaningful, albeit only for a limited number of economies and
not as an exclusive dichotomy for developed economies. Furthermore, these findings
demonstrate that whilst there is variety in institutional approaches, consisting of varied
methodologies and definitions, the core typologies closely track and resemble those of
the VoC approach. For example, where Schneider & Paunescu (2012) operationalise
different variables for their empirical work, they find some support for the VoC
assessments. Likewise, where this thesis has taken inspiration from the Governance
Approach (Amable, 2003) to comparative institutionalism, the core dichotomy between
market and non-market clusters are still valid. This shows validity in the core variety
dimension and that institutional change is apparent, but gradual.
Varieties of Capitalism and Comparative (Dis)advantages
Also consistent with the VoC approach, these results show, ex-post objective 1, that this
studies institutional configurations pertinent to those akin to Hall & Soskice’s (2001)
LME and CME classifications afford substantial comparative advantage, compared
with the relative comparative disadvantage of those configurations not marked by the
market/non-market dichotomy. Economies that do not conform to either the LME or the
CME models, do not show comparative advantages in terms of aggregate entrepreneurial
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performance. This lends direct support to the implication that models of capitalism are
marked by either consistency (LME, CME), or inconsistency - those models "that may
get stuck in the middle" (Schneider & Paunescu, 2012, p. 747). Despite considerable
pressure for convergence and approaches to methodological conclusion, an important
link between institutions, their complementaries and certain comparative advantages
claimed by the founding scholars of comparative institutionalism is largely discernible.
This echoes similar claims defined by the work of Allen et al (2006), Schneider &
Paunescu (2012) and Akkermans et al (2009) who find support for the comparative
advantage/disadvantage functional claims of varieties in capitalism. In sum, these
findings imply that comparative institutionalism approaches to ‘diversity’ phenomena
present an appropriate methodological framework in which international comparisons
of innovative and aggregate activity can take place.
Persistence of Cross-National Divergence
Thirdly, the weight of this thesis evidence suggests that comparative institutionalism
captures important differences among political economies. The concepts of market-
orientated and strategic coordination do seem to reflect an underlying dimension
distinguishing practices across countries in the sub-spheres proposed. Persistent
cross-national differences in institutional practices in the face of intense convergence
pressures suggests that, despite some liberalisation in coordinated market economies
(in the face of European Union pressures for example), the distinctions central to
comparative institutionalism studies are likely to be of continued value and thus worthy
of continued discussion on institutional change and reform. This thesis obtains support
for stability or the non-convergence hypothesis of VoC. Most continental European
countries remained different from American capitalism or they did not converge to the
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Anglo-Saxon type of capitalism. These countries tend to maintain their capitalism
types and institutional characteristics over time despite recent structural changes,
globalization, and rising inequality worldwide. This pattern may have been caused by
the relatively strong institutional complementarity and path dependency associated
with the long history of capitalism in these European countries.
Tiers in Capitalist Diversity
Furthermore, this research provides the post-VoC narrative urged by several scholars
(Beiling, 2014; Hancke, 2009). This research is the first to validate and highlight
varied ‘tiers of capitalist diversity’, where the dominant theme within the comparative
capitalism literature is to emphasise varied modes of coordination (Hall & Soskice, 2001;
Crouch, 2005b) rather than the rich intra-diversity within them. In sum, two tiers of
capitalist diversity can be highlighted. Firstly, institutional diversity remains in terms of
countries coordination mechanisms named ‘mode of capitalism’. Four variants are found.
The second tier embodies ‘intra-variance’ within each capitalist regime, demonstrating
internal variance within each mode of capitalism. These results show nine variants
of capitalism. The weight of the evidence suggests that the varieties in economic
models captures important difference among political economies. The concepts of
market-orientated and strategic coordination do seem to reflect an underlying dimension
practices across countries. The contention that institutional complementarities operate
across political economies is borne out by the evidence. Persistent cross-national
differences in institutional practices in face of convergence liberal pressures, suggests
that, the distinctions build upon coordination are likely to be of continuing value.
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7.2.2 Institutional Diversity, Functional Equivalence & Ag-
gregate Entrepreneurship
Most importantly, these novel classifications of institutional diversity has important
implications for comparative international entrepreneurship. Chapter 6 was interested
in understanding the effects of the empirically validated institutional diversity on
aggregate entrepreneurship. As such, it was found that:
Institutions affect aggregate levels of entrepreneurship. When complementary
institutions are present across the sub-spheres of the political economy, rates of Total
Entrepreneurial Activity are higher. Institutional diversity identified by this
specification appear to offer unique explanations of cross-national levels of
entrepreneurship
The main finding with regards to Chapter 6 is that institutions have a significant
impact on the prevalence and nature of entrepreneurship. That is, institutions and
institutional diversity can help explain the cross-national variances in aggregate levels
of entrepreneurship. Explanations of the effect can be best seen where complementary
institutions are present across the sub-spheres of the political economy. Institutional
diversity from the regard that it can be explained from the variance of institutional
complementarities highlighted in the foregoing discussion appear to offer unique expla-
nations of cross-national levels of entrepreneurship. The mechanisms through which
the influence of institutions is manifested were found to be similar in all countries; that
is, by the coherence of the institutional complementarities. These findings again can
be broken down into subsequent discussions.
7.2 Overview of Findings 262
A Configurational Approach to Institutions
It is demonstrated that joint institutional configurations of institutional sub-spheres offer
more explanatory power than examinations of their individual effect. The configuration
perspective enables greater integration of research on ‘specified’ institutional sub-
spheres, or the New Institutional Economics mix of formal and informal institutions, and
thus transcends the theoretical debate on whether one institutional sub-spheres is more
important, or whether formal or informal institutions are more important for certain
outcomes. Despite wide acknowledgement of the importance of the institutional setting
for entrepreneurship, the commonly used approach in empirical literature is to test the
impact of different types of institutional characteristics on entrepreneurship against one
another to identify the most relevant institutions. The findings therefore offer a wider
perspective by demonstrating that institutional sub-spheres can also have additive
and mutually reinforcing effects through the interdependence of complementarities, as
called for by Herrmann (2019).
From this regard, these results compliment previous work underscoring the impor-
tant relationship between institutions and entrepreneurship. This study has been able
to extend and deepen the understanding of this relationship by demonstrating that
these institutional arrangements have varying influence on the rate of entrepreneurial
activity, testing and confirming the original conjecture of Baumol (1990) who advanced
that institutions are likely to affect the allocation of entrepreneurial activity in varied
ways. In addition, this study also compliments the emerging body of work employing
institutional theory as a fruitful parsimonious theoretical frame from which to examine
the nature of social and economic action.
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Through the Lens of Policy
Again, both policy-makers and scholars have considerable interest in understanding
the variance in entrepreneurship within and between countries. This study advances a
multidimensional measure of country level institutional environments and investigates
its relationship within the rates of entrepreneurial activity. Here, the results underscore
the variance between various institutional arrangements and the aggregate rates of
entrepreneurial activity. From the perspective of policy, this illuminates novel and
interesting policy discussion. If policy-makers are keen to merely increase the rate of
entrepreneurial activity in a country, these findings suggest that their emphasis should
be on establishing the ‘right’ institutions and ‘right’ institutional mix. The multidi-
mensional measure of country-level institutions reveal a more nuanced relationship
between institutions and entrepreneurship, especially where institutional constellation
are commensurate to increasingly dynamic and coherent institutional complementari-
ties. That is, policy measures designed to enhance entrepreneurial ventures started in a
country would be well served to focus efforts on understanding the current institutional
form, how they interact to underpin a complementarity matrix, and then how policy
can reinforce the functional interactions between those institutions. This adds further
context to the claims that well-functioning national institutional frameworks underpin
rates of entrepreneurship (Stenholm et al, 2013).
Differently, a fuller picture of the institutional structure of a country is needed for
reform agendas to be successful. These findings argue that policies aimed at altering a
particular institutional constraint are unlikely to be sustainable in the long run because
such approaches neglect complementarities and functional interdependencies among
institutions. Thus, if other institutions are not supportive of a newly implemented
institution, such an institution will be more difficult to maintain. As such, the findings
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illustrate the necessity of identifying entrepreneurship policies that correspond to
the diversity of institutional structures. Those seeking to understand the economic
impact of institutions should pay careful attention to the potential for institutional
complementarities across sub-spheres of the political economy. Common wisdom has
been to propose reforms based on empirical evidence about the effects of reform that
consider data only for the sub-sphere being reformed.
Chapter 6 was also, in parallel, concerned with understanding whether perspectives
from comparative institutionalism explain the divergent nature of entrepreneurial
activity across nations. It was found that:
Institutional diversity is a key driver of varied aggregate entrepreneurial rates.
Specifically, the level of entrepreneurial rates is driven by the degree of institutional
coherence of the political economy. This implies that aggregate economic performance is
estimated be higher in nations whose institutionalised practices correspond more closely
to the coherent types of market-based and strategic coordination models of capitalism
These findings draw attention to arguments concerning the degree to which countries
institutional frameworks need to closely complementary and institutionally coherent to
allow for greater firm and entrepreneurial activity. In particular, these results show the
higher aggregate entrepreneurial performance of a country is positively linked to the
overall coherence of the institutional environment. The closer individual institutions
are complementary to one another, hereby providing a coherent model of capitalism,
the higher the rates of entrepreneurial activity. This provides a novel contribution to
explaining divergent rates of entrepreneurial activity through an institutional based
perspective. Where current studies have tended to emphasise the influence of individual
institutions regardless of how they mould and link with other institutions to provide the
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institutional environment, these results show that accounting for the interconnectedness
of institutions matters. This overall finding can be broken down into discussions of
coordination and the synthesis between coherence and performance.
Coordination & Complementarity as a Determinant Function for Aggre-
gate Entrepreneurial Performance
The institutional perspective adopted in this study provides important theoretical
insights to explain how institutions matter. This explanation is rooted in one of the
key contentions of comparative institutionalism, that the presence of institutional
complementarities appear to offer general efficiencies to economic agents. It is from
this context that institutions become influential in organising economic activities
and regulating economic exchange. This dichotomy is the basis for the consideration
of one fundamental dimension separating the different national production systems,
namely coordination. Such analysis is built on the core contention of comparative
institutionalism, that developed countries differ from one another according to the
degree and composition of their market/non-market coordination.
The concept of institutional ‘coordination’ stems from the competing relationships
between the need to overcome principal-agent relationships and market imperfections
to coordination economic agents in an equitable and efficient manner. This degree of
coordination is underpinned by the concept of institutional complementaries, where
these results infer specific constellations of coordination patterns, underlining the
importance of institutional diversity. It is from this departure that these findings make
novel and informative contributions.
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Suggestions that liberal economies marked by a high degree of market coordination
offer the ‘best’ national institutional setting for entrepreneurial and innovation activities
(i.e. Mair, 2010; Shaw & de Bruin, 2013) are not supported by these results given the
headline finding of:
When complementary institutions are present across the sub-spheres of the political
economy, rates of Total Entrepreneurial Activity are higher. Institutional coherence
identified by this perspective appear to offer general efficiencies
This study highlights that the rates of entrepreneurship is not only determined by
‘institutions’ as is commonly suggest in existing comparative international entrepreneur-
ship literature, but the degree to which various institutions interact to underpin the
overall coherence is a driving force of aggregate economic performance. The greater
degree of institutional coherence as defined by the closer complementarity sets of
market and non-market coordination, the greater the aggregate levels of entrepreneurial
activity across the panel set. In this regard, it can be suggested that institutions
function differently in different national contexts, therefore infer equifinality, and con-
sequently their influence with the presence of potential competing institutional logics.
The mechanisms through which the influence of institutions is manifested have been
found to be similar across the sample; that is, by determining transaction costs through
the nature of coordination; through the function and strengthening of institutional
complementarities (Hopner, 2005), and thus influencing the state of economic inputs for
entrepreneurial general efficiencies. However the outcome of institutions were shown to
vary with respect to the national institutional context, given the institutional make-up
of varied models of ‘diverse but coherent’ capitalist models. Variation between said
country’s institutions may have a significant impact on a country’s ability to outperform
its peers.
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In particular, purer coherent models will be better for entrepreneurship compared
to hybrid models for several suggested reasons. In particular, greater institutional
coherence promotes spillovers to further increase the benefits from institutional com-
plementarities, increasing the agents ability to exploit the benefits yielded by the
coherent complementarities (Hopner, 2005). Incoherence through the hybrid models
creates frictions which allow effective coordination, given the complementarities exhibit
inconsistencies and contradictions in their institutional logics. For example, develop-
mentalist and peripheral models have some coordination features in the form of rigid
labour markets, yet coupled with decentralised wage bargaining systems. The system
integration is process of overlapping market and non-market logics, making institutional
complementarities difficult to build, promoting weakened allocative efficiencies and
instability (Amable, 2009).
Further, hybrid models revolve around states overcoming the weak institutional
calibration by providing the correction of coordination failures brought about by
competing institutional logics and incoherence. A pervasive state is therefore a process
of non-market coordination. With a mix of state and market interaction resulting in
a dominant form of coordination means that interaction between entrepreneurs and
the market becomes weakened (Baumol et al, 2007; Molina & Rhodes, 2007). This
perpetuates longer term unstable and inefficient equilibriums, making it less conducive
for the private sector, the context of the entrepreneur, to develop and grow.
Empirical validation of institutional diversity, complementaries and as such the
dynamic intricacies between coherent functional equivalents can render further adapta-
tion of the theoretical and empirical framework proposed in Section 3.7. As argued by
Yeung (2002), variations in institutional structures and political economies significantly
explain the sources and variation of resource and capability endowments leveraged
7.2 Overview of Findings 268
by entrepreneurs. The structure of institutions produce distinctive forms of economic
organisation. This is modelled in the ‘institutional configurational’ framework of Figure
3.1 (Section 3.1), where the key emphasis has been to empirically gauge the ‘diversity
in structures’ within the political economy. Given this models the ‘supply-side’ of the
political economy, the impact of institutions runs through its impact on entrepreneurial
endowments. The nature of this study’s findings illuminates the mechanism from
which the configuration of institutions leverage’s general efficiencies for aggregate
entrepreneurship. Figure 7.1 defines how the objectives research findings informs the
theoretical framework.
Overall, one can argue that coherent models are better for entrepreneurship than
incoherent, hybrid models because of (1) greater efficiencies from institutional comple-
mentarities and therefore greater logical provision of endowments, and (2) a pervasive
state directions production, regulation and correction of coordination failures, which is
less conducive for private enterprise. This in turn would show on the aggregate scale.
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7.3 Contributions to Theory
"Principally, all management scholars aspiring a theoretical contribution should be
concerned about context"
(Meyer, 2015, p. 369)
This study contributes to theoretical contributions. As such, the following sub-
sections will divide out and explain the theoretical contributions in (1) comparative
international entrepreneurship, involved with trying to understand environmental
antecedents and the cross-national variance of entrepreneurial rates; (2) the literature
on national institutional systems and general macroeconomic performance; (3) debates
around the significance of institutional coherence; and (4) the field of comparative
institutionalism/capitalism, largely involved with highlighting intricacies between varied
political economies.
With reference to the contributions to comparative international entrepreneurship,
present entrepreneurship literature has yet to truly approach institutional analysis
from beyond the attention of new institutional economics with fresh perspectives from
socioeconomics. Furthermore, present institutional analysis often takes institutions
as ‘outcome variables’ rather than observing the institutions as configurations and
constructs themselves (Estrin et al, 2013; Glaeser et al, 2004). As such, this study
intended to mirror the thoughts of Jackson & Deeg (2008) and Lim et al (2010) by
bringing ‘political economy into the study of international entrepreneurship’ with
insight from the comparative institutionalism literature, specifically Amable’s (2003)
‘Governance approach’. Hereby, this study introduces a fresh theoretical perspective,
namely an ‘institutional configuration’ approach, enabling greater integration of research
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on institutional singularity and thus transcends the present theoretical debate on
whether formal or informal institutions are more important for certain outcomes within
international entrepreneurship and business research. Theorizing and testing effects of
institutional configurations is an established practice in other disciplines (e.g. business
strategy), but has received little attention in comparative entrepreneurship research.
These findings contribute in the sense they demonstrate that joint institutional con-
figurations of institutional sub-spheres offer more explanatory power than examinations
of their individual effects. The configuration perspective enables greater integration of
research on institutions and their complementarities, thus transcending the theoretical
debate on whether certain institutions are more important for certain outcomes in
comparative international entrepreneurship research. Theorizing and testing the effect
of configurations is an established practice in such disciplines such as psychology
(Short et al, 2008), but has received little attention in institutional theory (Scott,
2005; Amable, 2003), particularly in its application to comparative entrepreneurship
research (Bruton et al, 2010; Stephan et al, 2015; Jones et al, 2011). In this vein,
comparative international entrepreneurship research has executed empirical models
with a parametric linearised specification, which by definition, assumes there maybe
a ‘one-best-way’ for institutions. This research has empirically validated quadratic
models which builds on present international entrepreneurship research to justify the
functional equivalence of institutions in and for entrepreneurship.
The configurational logic considers the bundle of attributes in institutional domains,
as opposed to the isolated effects of those attributes on codes features. Institutional
domains capture the ‘structural’ variations across countries in how the ‘agents’ they
represent interact with one another (Giddens, 1984), and within the studies context, in
decision-making over the features of codes. Thus, the mechanism of complementarity
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draws on the notion of ‘systemic fit’ (Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985) where attributes
of the various institutional domains can complement one another in the way they
interact and relate to an outcome. The concept of institutional complementarity
refers to situations in which the impact of an institutional form is conditioned by
other institutions (Crouch et al, 2005). This has clear implications for the study of
comparative studies of international entrepreneurship.
This study’s configurational approach also reveals that a given economic outcome
can be reached via different combinations of institutional domains. This highlights the
distinction between the adoption of a best entrepreneurial policies and the achieve-
ment of a desired economic outcome, stressing the context-dependent contingency of
diffusion of activity around the world. Indeed, the fact that the study demonstrates
empirical evidence for equifinality in economic outcomes shows that the comparative
international entrepreneurship literature’s focus on the singularity of institutional effect
may underestimate that different countries can reach the same result through the
combination of different institutional structures. This equifinality speaks to debates
on convergence across national institutional systems (Rasheed & Yoshikawa, 2012;
Haxhi & Aguilera, 2017), since the possibility of multiple paths to the same outcome
might facilitate divergence, generated by the presence of alternative, non-competing
configurations. Such insight offers a novel critical view of the institutional literature on
cross-national entrepreneurial literature, which currently does not explicitly distinguish
between ‘different mechanisms’ to reach a given outcome (Herrmann, 2019). Similar to
the arguments of Bruton et al (2010) and Lee et al (2007), the heterogeneity among the
decision sets available to entrepreneurs in different countries goes a long way towards
explaining their contingent behaviour and subsequent economic outcomes.
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Building on the comparative institutionalism approach, these findings help to
advance the theoretical basis for entrepreneurship research on institutional comple-
mentarity, suggesting that entrepreneurship is high when the coordination of both
market based activities and strategic coordination are driven by dominant institutional
coherent logics.
With reference to national institutional systems, configurations and aggregate
economic performance, this study’s contribution helps illuminate "research linking
institutional differences to specific economic outcomes" which "has remained surpris-
ingly underdeveloped" (Witt & Jackson, 2016, p. 780). This thesis contributes to
the literature on country level performance by structuring, testing and validating a
comprehensive taxonomy of institutional systems and demonstrate that the configura-
tions provide an independent and statistically significant explanation of the variation
in economic performance across countries. Thus, this research shows that these con-
figurations matter in explanations of economic performance (as measured by TEA)
and thereby contribute to this parallel line of research by addressing the concerns of
scholars that research has given more attention to the task of critiquing institutional
typologies rather than testing the frameworks (Peck & Zhang, 2013; Carney et al, 2018;
Jackson & Deeg, 2019).
Secondly, this research sheds light on the kinds of institutional arrangements that
will support better economic performance. With its portrayal of path-dependant
institutional change, the comparative institutionalism literature has emphasised insti-
tutional continuity and the persistence in the variety of capitalist structures (Hall &
Thelen, 2009; Jackson & Deeg, 2008). With economic performance central, through
a entrepreneur-centered approach such as this research, can inform debates about
the evolution of institutional systems and the "incremental institutional adjustments
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and potential hybridization" (Jackson & Deeg, 2008) that may emerge over time.
Nonetheless, these results are commensurate with Amable (2003) who argues that
"institutions define incentives and constraints that will lead agents to invest in certain
assets, acquire certain skills, cooperate, or be opportunistic. These individual decisions
will affect the macroeconomic performance". Where Amable’s (2003) conclusions were
not based on empirical evidence, this studies results do go some way to validate his
initial causality links.
The study’s results also illuminate these debates by suggesting a range of distinctive
trajectories of institutional change and economic performance. These results point
to two relatively high-performing configurations, versus relatively poorer perform-
ing institutional systems. This characterises the developmental trajectories of both
configurations in dynamic terms where relatively highly coherent political economies
are proactive in building further/tighter complementarities to address institutional
contradictions, seeking to further maximise their institutional coordination coherence
(market and non-market coordination). As argued by Sinkovics et al (2014), in the
settings where markets and other selection mechanisms are intensified and domestic
firms are incentivised to adapt and improve their strategies, higher levels of perfor-
mance can be achieved. Indeed these results validate such theory, given that incoherent
models of capitalist are characterised by institutional voids and inconsistencies for
which incentivises firms/entrepreneurs to bypass formal structures.
This leads to a third contribution in the form of validating the work of Schneider
(2009) and Wood & Frynas (2005) whom identify economic systems characterised by
institutional inertia and therefore failure. It has been argued that these institutional set-
tings may have become permanently settled into their foundations with the preservation
of institutional contradictions and non-complementarity. This studies results identify
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two under-performing configurations, stylised by low institutional coherence. These
are theoretically economic systems with weak states that lack the capacities and/or
willingness to furnish resources or otherwise overcome institutional voids. As borne out
in these results, these countries are very unlikely to achieve coherent complementarities
and thus relative levels of aggregate performance. Put differently, echoing the work of
Hall and Gingerich (2005), the absence of institutional ‘complementarities’ identified
by this work fail to appear to offer general efficiencies relative to their presence.
Thus, accounting for institutional configurations regarding aggregate economic
activity suggests evidence of both institutional convergence and persistence, alongside
pointing to the possibility of hybridized forms of capitalism failing to promise equal
or improved levels of entrepreneurial and macroeconomic performance. From this
perspective, these results contribute to the questions of institutional ‘equifinality’ and
functional equivalence, confirming the hypothesis that activities in different institu-
tional configurations (and thus coherence) will operate with varied levels of economic
performance.
In turn, with reference to institutional coherence, this research raises the dichotomy
that for economic performance outcomes, the decisive question for national economies
is not ‘Which cluster of economic model are you in?’ but rather ‘How coherent are
your institutions?’. The notion of institutional coherence (Kenworthy, 2006) refers to
complementarities, order and consistencies between the earlier noted four institutional
sub-systems of political economies. As argued, institutional complementarities refer
to functioning wherein "the presence (or efficiency) of one institution increases the
returns from (or efficiency of) the other" (Hall & Soskice, 2001, p. 17). Above all, the
institutional coherence between those elements provide comparative advantage to the
economy (Kenworthy, 2005; Hall & Soskice, 2001).
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Yet intellectual tension exists between those who see national institutional incoher-
ence as a comparative disadvantage to said economies (Allen, 2013; Hall & Gingerich,
2009; Schneider & Paunescu, 2012) and those who refute institutional coherence as a
necessary or sufficient condition for comparative advantage of said economy (Kenworthy,
2006; Witt & Jackson, 2016; Lane & Wood, 2009; Malik, 2017). The core issue in
this divide is whether institutional coherence is a driver in comparative advantage and
propensity of economic action.
One side finds institutional coherence crucial for economic performance. The
institutional coherence of, to borrow the typologies of Hall & Soskice (2001), the LME
is seen as favourable for radical innovation, whereas coordinated market economies
(CME) has the institutional coherence required to support incremental innovation.
This is supported by a small pool of empirical studies of national performance regarding
export performance (Allen et al, 2006; Schneider et al, 2010), patents (Akkermans et
al, 2009) and GDP growth (Hall & Gingerich, 2009).
The opposing arguments suggests that institutional coherence is neither necessary
nor sufficient. External shocks and internal sector-level diversity can reduce the insti-
tutional coherence of political economies. Some studies show that national economies
achieve comparative innovation performance without conforming to the institutional
coherence hypothesis (Walker et al, 2014; Nolke & Vliegenthart, 2009; Witt & Jackson,
2016; Malik, 2017). At a disaggregated level, Allen et al (2006) and Mudambi (2008)
find that some firms in LMEs are producing incremental innovation and some firms in
CMEs are conducting radical innovation. This evidence reduces the support for the
central role of institutional coherence in political economies.
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These views argue against the role played by institutional coherence in supporting
specific economic logics. However, this debate has left several voids unanswered. The
institutional coherence debate is largely a new and underdeveloped pool of literature.
There is underdevelopment in terms of empirical methodologies employed, ways in
which economic performance is measured and the focus of fixed categories of capitalism
(i.e LME, CME, MME) based on data from 19 (Hall & Soskice, 2001), 22 (Akkermans
et al, 2009; Allen et al, 2006) or 26 OECD countries (Schneider & Paunescu, 2010).
Studies often treat these as binary classification rather than the ‘spectrum’ between
political economies within and between capitalisms. As Becker (2009, p. 8) powerfully
argues a similar point with respect to the OECD-based critiques of VoC: "The confusion
produced by the typological discussion is remarkable... It stems from the conflation of
ideal types and classifications as well as of types and cases (given political economies)".
Hence, the question in comparative capitalism literature should research the agenda
of ‘to what extent’ a given economy exhibits features approximate to ideal types. As
Hall & Gingerich (2009) argue, "it is the variation along a spectrum running from
coordination to coordination" that should be examined, and not merely the pursuit
of political economic ‘templates’. This has important implications for the empirical
identification of economic models and their pertaining comparative advantages reflected
in their aggregate economic performance.
This research provides fresh contributions to this growing debate. It can be seen that,
between the spectrum of economies represented by their institutional configurations,
institutional coherence is an important driver of aggregate performance, measured in
terms of TEA. Methodologically, this study represents a more comprehensive approach
than previous studies given, (1) A larger amalgamation of institutional factors, (2) The
use of panel methods to validate across time and control for various specifications, (3) A
spectrum approach to institutional economies models and institutional coherence, vis-a-
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vis a binary approach of some studies, (4) measurement of ‘functional complementarities
over ‘descriptive similarities’, (5) an attempt to move beyond the VoC ‘envy’, yet still
anchored to the institutional coherence debates of set complementarity configurations
and (6) a focus on variation in degree rather in kind across economies.
These results do indeed raise the issue of rather than merely analysing ‘which’
model of capitalism are you, but rather ‘how’ coherent are your institutions?
Alongside contributions along the avenues of comparative international entrepreneur-
ship, national economic performance and institutional coherence, this study contributes
in relation to comparative institutionalism & political economy. This research has
developed a quantitative assessment of capitalist diversity with the inclusion of orig-
inal factor components and the addition of new countries yet to be included in the
comparative capitalism literature (therefore of interest for comparative international
entrepreneurship research). These results find that from the 13 factor components
developed, 4 clusters of ‘inter-variance’ of capitalism (the coordination mode) and
9 ‘intra-variants’ of capitalism (intra-modes) are present. The principal components
analysis (PCA) extends across four institutional spheres as distinguished by the un-
derutilised ‘third prong’ of the comparative capitalism literature, the Governance
Approach (Amable, 2003; Boyer, 1986). This provides the post-VoC narrative urged by
several scholars (Beiling, 2014; Hancke, 2009). This research is the first to validate and
highlight varied ’tiers of capitalist diversity’, where the dominant theme within the
comparative capitalism literature is to emphasise varied modes of coordination (Hall &
Soskice, 2001, Crouch, 2005b) rather than the rich intra-diversity within them. It is
also the first to include wider measures of the product market and education system.
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The results find some but not complete support for the VoC approach. Echoing
earlier studies, our results detected more than two empirical types of capitalism (i.e.
Amable, 2003; Witt et al, 2018; Schneider & Paunescu, 2012). In addition, it is found
that the qualitative assessment provided by Hall & Soskice (2001) are largely accurate,
the dichotomy between liberal (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs)
remains given our established ‘inter-variance’ of capitalism. Nonetheless, there is
convincing internal variance within each coordination mode of capitalism that provides
‘institutional complementarity’ logics contrasting atypical LME-CME complementarity
architectures. For example, internal variance within the market based coordination
mechanism is chiefly dictated by diversities between financial systems. While the neo-
liberal cluster (UK, USA, Canada, Australia) provides the predicted ‘short-termism’
capital akin to the LMEs theory, the emergent liberal model and to a lesser the Asian
model is characterised by more ‘patient-led capital’ systems analogous to the CME
theory. However, the clustering of institutions indicates that the VoC LME-CME
dichotomy is still meaningful, albeit limited to a number of economies and not as an
exclusive capitalist diversity framework for comparative research such as comparative
international entrepreneurship.
More importantly, this study establishes additional institutional measures. Much
of the quantitative focus of comparative institutionalism literature has been made
around the use of single indicators to measure underlying institutional structures.
This provides a ‘rough’ estimate of a given institution, especially given the perceived
latency of such institutional logics. The factor and cluster analysis provides a ‘thicker’
analytical approach underdeveloped to date. The depth of institutional measurement
is a concerning weakness in previous studies, with this study contributing to the
quantitative rigour of the literature. As such, one is able to portray institutional
configurations with a richer and purer objective foundation.
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In sum, this thesis builds up nuances and extends previous work on Comparative
Capitalism (Amable, 2003; Boyer, 1997; Jackson & Deeg, 2006; Whitely, 1992), by
going beyond the VoC (Hall & Soskice, 2001) dichotomous one-dimensional view and
advocating an institutional complementarity approach. Specifically, these findings
extend on Amable’s (2003) research along three main dimensions. First, in addition to
identifying institutional complementarities, it is shown that different configurations of
institutions stemming from different institutional complementarities generate similar
outcomes with respect to the cross-national diversity in economic activity. Thus, unlike
Amable’s perspective, which starts from mechanisms that lead to different types of
Capitalism (i.e., multifinality), this studies approach shows that the same outcome (i.e.,
Type of Capitalism) might emerge from different configurations of mechanisms (i.e.,
equifinality & functional equivalence). Secondly, focusing on institutions rather than
on the way institutions contextually interact with each other, as Amable (2003) takes,
leads to the conclusion that an institution will always impact the considered outcome.
The hypotheses show that the same institutions can impact an outcome differently,
depending on its interactions and configuration with the other institutional sub-spheres.
Third, Amable (2003), by focusing on one mechanism for each type of institution and
idealisation of types, makes the implicit assumption that the non-salient features of
models simply disappears from any rich contextualisation and definition of economic
models.
Methodologically, it is challenging to study cross-national empirical governance
research due to the complex configurational, institutional relationships and functional
overlaps within a relatively small set of comparable countries. By developing and
testing an institutional configurational approach, this study further contributes to
a significant insight for empirical configurational research. Whilst an ‘institutional
configuration’ can provide novel insights into explaining cross-national diversities in
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economic activities and performance, "the progress of empirical research has been less
than satisfying" (Fiss, 2007, p. 1180; Haxhi & Aguilera, 2017). This study employs
a rigorous empirical methodology to test the configurational perspective, which is
attractive conceptually but more difficult to test empirically. In doing so, the factor,
panel analysis and complementarity term’ approach generates important insights for
both the comparative institutionalism and international entrepreneurship literature, as
it draws on data from over 28 countries, thus contrasting with typical studies that are
based on a significantly smaller sample of countries. This again moves the comparative
institutionalism literature on from the preoccupation with ‘ideal types’ to a broader and
more fruitful lens of ‘to what extent’ a given economy exhibits. Differently, neglecting
the conceptualisation of complementarities as a spectrum, the literature forecloses
the opportunity to examine the most pertinent question, namely, does the variety of
institutions influence a given economies performance (or other output variables)? A
way to forward this agenda would be to generate comparative ‘distance’ measure that
are comparable across economies, of which is at the heart of this thesis. This has also
been echoed by the latest work of Jackson & Deeg (2019).
By examining the effect of different institutional attributes, this study generates a
number of important policy implications from the perspective of political economy. The
empirical analysis also shows the continued importance of countries as a grounding unit
of analysis, despite wide transnational regulatory pressures (Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson,
2006). There is evidence that EU harmonization efforts towards a transnational code
and an overall EU governance policy have not yet succeeded (Amable, 2009). This might
be in part due to the diversity of institutional domains and that their complementarities
are context-specific, as we have demonstrated with institutional attributes forming
different configurations.
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Finally, while national institutions typically change at a slow rate, research has
shown that institutional change does occur (Gingrich, 2015; Taras et al, 2012). As
such, older typologies can become outdated as the institutional system shifts over time,
largely due to external sources (Hotho, 2014). By drawing on current data coupled
with a broader consideration of institutional context and theory, this study is able to
refine and extend prior typologies and begin to consider a more deductive approach
to comparative capitalism. According to Hotho (2014), such a taxonomical approach
may stimulate the conceptual refinement of existing typologies and classifications. The
transitory nature of world economies entails that snapshot taxonomies and typologies
require suitable revisiting and updating. Whilst these results do not render key ‘older’
frameworks redundant (but rather support them), the work here does highlight the
finer grained rich variety of certain political economies.
In sum, this research contributes to the key themes of comparative institutionalism,
where such literature shows how countries differ (Hotho, 2014), where these support the
view that varieties in institutional settings lead to different kinds, levels and advantages
to economic actors (Allen & Whitley, 2012).
7.4 Contributions to Public Policy
In many countries, creating institutional framework conditions that are conducive to en-
trepreneurship are a well-established objective of the policy agenda. A main motivation
behind the attempts of creating a more entrepreneurial society and entrepreneurship
friendly institutions is the recognition that entrepreneurship is an important driver of
economic growth. It is therefore imperative that the implications for public policy are
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discussed. In particular, this section extends upon the core results to illustrate impor-
tant contributions in light of institutional coherence and the dynamics of institutional
change/structural reform of highly calibrated institutional configurations.
On one hand, institutional complementarities explain the emerge and persistence of
different varieties of capitalism and multiple equilibria. On the other hand, they partially
condition the available possibilities for institutional change, as some institutions
interlock with others and affect the costs of transiting in and out of a particular
institutional landscape. As such, the nature of institutional complementarities and the
coherence they exhibit underlines important implications for public policy involving
institutional adaptation and change.
7.4.1 Structural Reform and the (in)coherence of institutions:
Implications for ‘How Governments Should Reform’
Contradictions in the institutional complementaries can pose considerable frictions and
inefficiencies for economic actors by undermining the coherence of the political
economy. This has implications for how governments should go about adjusting the
structures of their institutions in order to support entrepreneurship.
Despite wide acknowledgement that the institutional setting is important for
entrepreneurship, the commonly used public policy approach is identify the most
relevant institutional area to ‘reform’ in a liberal direction. However, this approach
ignores the ‘fuller picture’ of the institutional structure of a county. This research
suggests that entrepreneurship policies aimed at altering an institutional constraint are
unlikely to be a sustainable public policy in the long term. This is because such approach
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neglects the complementarities among institutions and the ultimate configuration of
institution which underpins the specific logic of a political economy. As such, any
neighbouring institutions not supportive of a newly reformed institution will reduce
the effectiveness and efficiency of reforms. These empirical results are illustrative to
the fact that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to create an entrepreneurial ‘society’
and proposes policy implications for how governments should go about adjusting the
structure of their institutions in order to stimulate entrepreneurship.
The underlying complementarities among the sub-systems of political economies
pose insightful perspectives when designing adequate entrepreneurship policies, given
they need to be incentive compatible with these forms of functional complementarities.
Given entrepreneurship is to be viewed as an institutionally embedded, historically
specific phenomenon, thus requires policies that account for these specificities and
systemic features of the institutional environment. Differently, first-best economic
principles—such as the protection of property and contract enforcement—do not map
onto unique policy packages; there is no unique correspondence between well-functioning
institutions and the form that such institutions take (Berkowitz et al, 2003; Djankov
et al, 2003; Evans, 2004; Mukand & Rodrik, 2005; Dixit, 2007; Rodrik, 2007a).
Dynamic Reformation, Restructure & Complementarities of Formal Insti-
tutions: Structural Reforms and the Coherence of Institutions
Political economies with particular types of institutions in one sub-sphere tend to have
particular types of institutions in other sub-spheres. Therefore reforming a particular
institution in a uni-direction should account for the interactions and functionalities
between other institutional sub-spheres commensurate to the mode of capitalism.
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The broader lesson is that those seeking to understand the effects of institutional
change should pay careful attention to the potential for institutional complementarities
across sub-spheres of the political economy. Most proposals to reform institutional
sub-spheres, whether that be for entrepreneurship or general structural reform, are
based on estimates of the effects of such reforms that consider data only for the sub-
sphere being reformed. If the distribution of institutions across political economies were
random, estimates generated from data of this sort might produce ‘accurate’ results.
But the evidence generated in this thesis indicates that this distribution is far from
random - political economies with particular types of institutions in one sub-sphere
tend to have particular types of institutions in other sub-spheres. As a results, models
that do not take interaction effects across institutional sub-spheres into account may
attribute to one set of institutions effects that are actually generated by interaction
with other sub-spheres of the political economy.
In short, because institutions in developed political economies are interrelated
through a complex network of complementarities, institutional change (to increase the
marginal returns to economic activity) has consequences beyond the area concerned in
reform. This also implies that there are complementarity effects in structural reforms
themselves (Amable, 2013). A consideration and challenge of reform programmes
is, therefore, to achieve and/or strengthen the types of complementaries between
institutions. The general orientation of structural and economic reform has been
a move towards liberalisation in the direction of market-based coordination. This
has been the norm for entrepreneurial reform, particularly in relation to literature
discussion around ‘building an entrepreneurial society’ (Dilli et al, 2018). However, the
empirical tests do not wholly support such reforms.
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Firstly, reform in one institution will have impact on other interrelated institutions,
thus reform such take a holistic political economy approach, and not just removing
‘frictions’ in an identified institution/area. In this way, ‘monocropping’ and supplanting
institutions which may be empirically validated to produce returns, may fail to produce
returns in the absence of considering the functional interactions with other institutions.
Reforms in a few institutional sub-spheres cannot lead to a functionally coherent system
because of the interdependence between institutions and its consequences for agents
strategies.
Secondly, the implementation of some market-based structural reforms, even in
conjunction with one another, may not be enough to transform political economies
based on different principles into liberal market economies. Given the rich diversity
between OECD economies, and the empirical suggestion of functional equivalents,
forwards the rationale that reform can be against the grain of liberalisation towards
market based political economies. Economic returns are increased by institutional
coherence, for which means solidifying the complementarity set between institutions,
for which can be in the direction of strategic (non-market) coordination. Without
being too functionalist, the impression is that such a large set of inconsistencies is
suggested to affect performance.
Table 7.2 and 7.3 presents the expected complementarities associated with ongoing
structural reforms. This gives an illustration of the consequences of some structural
reforms on the institutional coherence of political economies. These are specified in
two forms for ‘institutional coherence’. Firstly to maximise coherence through market
reform and secondly, reform to maximise the coherence of strategically coordinated
models. Dynamic change therefore takes direction of a ‘system-reinforcing’ (Pagano,
2011) trajectory. Reforms implemented in some institutional areas (rows) will have
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consequences for other institutional areas (columns). For instance, a decrease in
employment protection (labour market reform) will incite workers to invest less in
assets defined by high specificities, which will most likely modify the conditions under
which a certain quality level can be achieved and hence product markets. As can be seen
from the Tables, reforms with a particular political economic trend for reinforcing the
mode of capitalism/coordination have potential implications for many other institutions,
hereby defining the complementarity sets and the overall coherence of the economy,
a key driver in economic performance and efficiency. It can be acknowledged that
any narrative on reform for entrepreneurial societies is accounted by static rather
than dynamic interdependent interpretations. The directions of the dynamic reforms
(Tables 7.2 & 7.3) matches the bifurcation of returns for institutional coherence and
thus economic efficiency. This infers the potential implications and destabilising effect
of neoliberal structural reforms for non-liberal modes of capitalism/coordination.
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Institutional Coherence: Related Comparative Performance of Coherent
Complementarities
The linearisation and estimation of ‘institutional coherence’ of Section 6.6.2 yield
important implications for policy. The positive first order partial derivative infers that
the increasing returns to institutional coherence is underpinned by the mathematical
supermodular function of institutional complementarities (Topkis, 1998). As argued by
Hopner (2005a), illustrations of the functional returns of institutional complementarities
and their configurational effects are best illustrated through simple utility analysis.
This is formally illustrated by the setting with institutional domains, A and B, and sets
of agents, C and D with a hypothetical function of ui = u(i ∈ C) defined by choices of
the complementarities between An and Bn. Where An and Bn are given by specific
sets/configuration of [ICi]. The differential definition is derived from the standard
meaning of complementarity in economics. The marginal ‘efficiency’ of a certain
institution is positively related to the presence or intensity of another institution in
another area. Consider an aggregate ‘performance’ function u(., .) and two institutional
domains A and B (labour market and financial system, for instance), respectively
associated with specific institutional forms A and B. Given these are continuous
variables, and u is differentiable given the polynomial function, the common definition






For instance, an institutional complementarity between deregulated labour markets
and deregulated product markets will mean that less regulation in the labour market
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increases the marginal gain to deregulation in product markets. Therefore as the
hypothesis goes:
u(A1; B1) − u(A2; B1) ≥ u(A1; B2) − u(A2; B2)
u(B2; A2) − u(B1; A2) ≥ u(B2; A1) − u(B1; A1)
The first condition implies that the “incremental” benefit for the agents in A from
choosing A1 rather than A2 increases as their institutional environment in B is B1
rather than B2 . The second condition implies that the incremental benefit for agents
in B from choosing B2 rather than B1 increases if their institutional environment in
A is A2 rather than A1. Differently, in order to make a meaningful comparison of
institutional configurations it is necessary to have a multiplicity of viable cases. In
this case, institutional complementarity would call for a situation where a multiplicity
of ‘equilibriums’ is a priori possible. If it is considered that (A1, B1) and (A2, B2)
are the two institutional equilibria, the comparative performance definition of ‘strong’
institutional complementarity would also demand that:
u(A1, B1) ≥ u(A1, B2),
u(A1, B1) ≥ u(A2, B1),
u(A2, B2) ≥ u(A1, B2),
u(A2, B2) ≥ u(A2, B1)
In this notion of institutional complementarity, the overall performance declines
when one changes one institution, leaving the other unchanged. This introduces
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another definition of institutional complementarity, related to comparative performance
(Amable et al, 2005). Therefore, this infers that reform for institutional coherence will
maximise the yield between:
u(A1; B1) − u(A2; B1) − u(A1; B2) + u(A2; B2) > 1
u(B2; A2) − u(B1; A2) − u(B2; A1) + u(B1; A1) > 1
The dynamic definition of institutional complementarity, as illustrated, therefore
suggests that the presence of one institutional form in one area leads to the adoption
of an institutional form in another area (Amable et al, 2005). These dynamic con-
siderations raise the question of factors behind institutional change and institutional
reform, as per the nature of the following sections on the dynamism of change and
institutional stability.
7.4.2 Dynamic Bifurcation, Aggregate Entrepreneurship &
Reform for Institutional Efficiencies: Marginal Produc-
tivity of Institutional Change
To empirically illustrate the marginal returns to reform for institutional coherence, one
can take the marginal derivative of the polynomial function estimated in Model 4b:
Differentiate where y is a non-linear function of x:
y = f(x)
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∂y
∂x
= a + γ · x2




(ᾱ − 15.750x + 13.818x2)
∂y
∂x
= f ′(x) = 27.636x − 15.750 (7.1)
Where y is total entrepreneurial activity and the institutional complementarity
term is represented by x. These results show that the higher the rates of institutional
strength and coherence, the greater the impact on aggregate rates of entrepreneurship
given the increasing marginal rate. Indeed the impact is most elastic the higher the
rates of institutional coherence (hence why the second derivative is positive and of
sizeable magnitude). There is diminishing returns involved where reductions in the
overall institutional coherence (1 > n < 0). Therefore, as argued, entrepreneurial
policy should be orientated in such a way as to maximise the overall coherence and
complementarities of the political economy. Figure 7.2 plots the marginal derivative
(red line) alongside the quadratic estimation of Model 4b (black line).
These results also show that the marginal rate of change is higher for liberal reform than
non-liberal reform, reflecting the potential relative difficulty within institutionalising
strategic modes of coordination. Liberal reform provides higher levels of marginal return
and suggests that institutionalised liberal reform estimates higher returns to aggregate
entrepreneurship. It also suggests a ‘J’ curve effect of transitioning institutional sets
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Fig. 7.2 Quadratic Estimation Marginal Partial Derivative: Marginal Productivity of
Institutional Coherence
Simulation based on Model 4b where control variables are held at their means. Red line plots the first order partial
derivative of Model 4b
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from non-liberal to liberal; weakening the institutional set in liberal countries provides
an estimated sizeable shift in aggregate rates, and perhaps explains the dominant social
blocs demand to sustain and maintain the institutional set in a particular direction
(Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Amable, 2016; Hall & Thelen, 2009). Estimated countries
near the global minima (stationary point), when reforms are enacted, will have a
slower impact on aggregate entrepreneurship, suggesting a policy lag and the political
economy of structural reform. In other words, benefits would appear at best in the
long-run but short-term effects would be negative or yielding little marginal returns.
This aspect would involve political economy problems for reforms. The positive second
derivative also shows that there is an increase in aggregate entrepreneurial activity at
an additional rate above movements away from global minima. Overall, qualitative
annotation of these empirical illustrations suggests that there are both increasing
marginal returns to strengthening the coherence of the complementarity set, both in
the direction of liberalisation and institutionalising non-liberal structural reform.
Functional Equivalence, Bifurcated Convergence & Equifinality: Stability
of Institutional Equilibria
Dynamic stability, institutional evolution and bifurcated convergence of ‘modes of
capitalism’ stems from the economic competitiveness of their institutional
configurations, which can be achieved via the combinations of institutions which in
turn yield functional equivalent outcomes.
The quadratic nature of the findings has important wider public policy illustrations
with respect to both the functional equivalence and estimated dynamic stability of
institutional equilibria. Importantly, estimations of the marginal derivative infers
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implications for the rate of change of aggregate activity against the function of the rate
of change of institutional coherence, for which this studies results support. As such we
illustrate the panel analysis in dynamic form (with respect to Yit of i across t). Again:











= f(IHi) > 1 (7.3)











= f ′′(x) > 0 (7.5)
Thus dynamically we can deduce that growth infers..






































where n gives us, where positively elastic (n > 1), the growth rate of returns to
coherent reform in continuous time. The particular solution of the differential equations
gives, through the ‘time elimination’ method:




and so the general solution of the differential equation yields..





2 + cn (7.12)
˙TEAt =
∫












and the function of the rate of change of TEA is the general solution of the
differential equation and c is the arbitrary constant. Again, n gives us the dynamic




= f ′(x) = m (7.15)
where m < 1 suggests potential for convergence towards stable equilibria of coherent
institutional logics. This has implications for dynamic reform (as highlighted before-
hand) and stability of equilibria where ˙TEA is greatest where ˙IH yields n > 1 and
m < 1, all else equal. Given Institutional Coherence (IH) is built upon institutional
complementarities which are stylised by internal stability, infers dynamic stability
of both institutional configurations (bifurcated convergence) and economic output
(equifinality and functional equivalence) assuming ceteris paribus (that is where control
variables are held at their means). Likewise, optimisation of n and subsequently m
would be maximised the greater the sub-sphere reform yields:






That is, the marginal ‘efficiency’ of a certain institutions is positively related to the
presence or intensity of another institution in another area. As such, two points are
worthy of elaboration.
Firstly, as illustrated beforehand, these results are consistent with equifinality and
functional equivalence, whereby different systems produce similar economic outcomes
(Judge et al, 2014). The concept of equifinality refers to a situation where “a system
can reach the same final state, from different initial attributes and by a variety of
different paths” (Katz & Kahn 1978, p. 30). An earlier example of this type of debate
arose in the 1920s over whether socialist states could design an economic system that
would match the capitalist system. At its heart was the question of whether two
fundamentally different economic systems could perform equally well; that is, whether
there could be equifinality of economic outcomes in respect to institutional context.
The tenor of the studies results supports the idea of equifinality. These finding, which
is similar in spirit to Boyer’s (2004) result, is important for comparative institutional
analysis because it demonstrates equifinality in specialisation and output outcomes.
In other words, the outcome suggests that different institutional complementarities
and configurations may produce similar comparative institutional advantages. This
contrasts the recent hypotheses put forward by Witt & Jackson (2016) who develop an
alternative view that is based on conflictual logics of action, rather than coherence.
Certain combinations of liberal and coordinated logics across two or more institutional
sub-spheres may enable institutional advantage (equifinality) by compensating for
institutional weaknesses ‘inherent’ in "pure" configurations.
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Secondly, where the rate of growth of TEA is an increasing function of ˙IH where
n > 1, brings important implications for the dynamic stability of institutional con-
figurations through returns to economic outputs. Stability stems from the economic
competitiveness of institutional configurations (Streeck & Thelen, 2009; Hall & Thelen,
2009), which can be achieved via the combination of institutions built on either co-
ordinated or market coordinated economic logics. Given the concept of institutional
complementarity can be used to illustrate why institutions are resistant to change and
why introducing new institutions into a system often leads to unintended, sometimes
suboptimal, consequences yields the discussion of the stability of institutional equilibria.
Differently, institutional entrepreneurs do not have interest in institutional change but
would press for an intensification of the specific nature of variety which yields economic
returns (Amable, 2016). As such, economic competitiveness built upon coherent sets
of institutional complementarities renders change limited to one that would increase
the whole fit of institutions. This bifurcated convergence further increases differences
between political economies, and potentially the types of activities pertaining to each
economic logic. Therefore, coherent political economies can be argued to posit a stabil-
ising equilibria, whereas incoherent political economies render an unstable equilibria
delimiting the potential for improved economic outcomes/general efficiencies. This
sheds light on the depiction of path-dependant institutional change which emphasises
continuity and the persistence of variety in capitalist structures (Jackson & Deeg, 2008;
Hall & Thelen, 2009).
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The dynamic model inference and deduction of system inefficiencies is stylised by
Figure 7.3, whereby coherent coordination yields an improving equilibria and TEA
levels. Phase diagrams are a tool that one can use to determine and illustrate the
type of equilibration process, solution and general pattern of variables over space
and time. Given the rate of change of TEA and IC is above positive parity (given
the positive marginal derivative is greater than 1), infers that equilibria defined by
coherent institutions will help sustain future stable equilibria, given stability stems
from the economic competitiveness of institutional configurations (law of unintended
consequences) (Aoki, 1994; Hall & Thelen, 2009). As such, deduction can hypothesise
the following endogeneity:
△IHit = f(TEAit, TEAit−1, IHit−1)
Reform aimed at moving the political economies complementarity set from the
area of Figure 7.3 where the rate of change of TEA tends towards zero when the
institutional complementarity marginal change tends to its stationary point (the
dynamic area between the two black curves), is a means to create a stable equilibria
in coherent typologies. The placement of the hypothesised black curves is plotted
with the estimate of where coherence meets incoherence, where the rates of change are
considerably tending towards zero. As such, the links between the above functional
endogeneity is either equal to zero or negative.
These illustrations may have important implications. In terms of public policy of
reform, the economic performance of comparative institutional configurations may be
most adequately explored in the conceptual terms of evolutionary considerations (Hodg-
son, 1996). That is, taking account formally of the dynamics and thus endogeneity of
institutional change stemming from functional equivalence yield important implications
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for institutional bifurcated convergence. Increasing returns and positive feedback are
helpful in understanding institutional resiliency and institutional change (Thelen, 2004).
Whilst empirical estimation of the theoretical model is outside the remit of this thesis,
reinterpretations of the panel analysis estimations and super-modularity of institutional
complementarities mathematically infers a general patterns of institutional change in
the face of TEA being a positive function of the institutional coherence of the political
economy. This extends the original findings, which allows a finer grained, functional
and dynamic lens of institutional change and structural reform.
Furthermore, such contributions can infer the wider role that states can take in their
approach to institutional reform. Identifying the equifinality of different coordination
mechanisms is important for the question of ’what kinds of reforms’ (and especially in
which areas) may undermine the capacities for coherent coordination (as elaborated
beforehand). Especially, couple with discussion of the (in)stabilities of (in)coherent
varieties of coordination, illuminates a greater discussion of how stabilities can be
increased in incoherent models. Differently, any analysis of how institutions change
should begin from a conception of how institutions are sustained during periods when
they may remain stable (Hall & Thelen, 2009). The lack of self-reinforcement in light of
incomplete calibration and complementarities means that states are actively pervasive
in the direct production, regulation and correction of coordination failures (Molina
& Rhodes, 2007). Institutional stability in these systems can quickly degenerate into
sclerosis producing durable ‘non-complementarities’ within the production regime
and across the political system. State regulation will tend to reinforce long term
inefficiencies because the collective action (i.e. prisoner dilemma) problems that ensue
and subsequent institutional inertia. In the absence of mechanisms for collective
goods provision, or a state independent and powerful enough to resist vested interest
demands, actors will tend rationally to pursue their independently defined interests.
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Complementarities - the outcome of coordination between freely contrasting actors
- will prove extremely difficult to build. Illuminating the fact that states are self-
perpetuating the long-term inefficient equilibriums raises a debate of how institutional
incoherence can be overcome. Thus institutional change needed requires significant
renegotiation of the politically invested system of public-political control (Streeck &
Thelen, 2009; Schneider, 2009; Wood & Frynas, 2005) invoked by limited degrees
of freedom and path-dependencies. This is to overcome the issue of institutional
settings becoming permanently settled into their foundations with the preservation of
institutional contradictions and non-complementarity. In short, once you illuminate
the role of complementarities, it is difficult to separate away a narrative on institutional
change and stability.
7.5 Conceptual Framework
The foregoing discussion has argued that national institutional environments exert an
important influence on the cross national aggregate rates of entrepreneurship. The
research findings show that, on the one hand, national political economies are marked
by considerable diversity. The diversity is defined by the composition and calibration
of institutional complementarities. On the other hand, the findings further show that
institutions matter because the coherence of the mode of coordination creates various
incentive structures, opportunities and entrepreneurial capital that facilitate the overall
efficiency of the political economy, as showed in the aggregate rates of entrepreneurship.
Hence, this study argues that the rates of entrepreneurship is not only determined by
‘institutions’ as is commonly suggest in existing comparative international entrepreneur-
ship literature, but the degree to which various institutions interact to underpin the
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overall coherence of the political economy is a driving force of aggregate economic
performance. In doing so, it helps extend the analytical and empirical framework that
typically underpins comparative international entrepreneurship research.
Based on a variety of arguments advanced in this thesis, it is possible to propose
an enhanced conceptual framework for both conceptualising these findings and for
guiding future research on comparative international entrepreneurship and comparative
institutionalism. This is further illustrated by a schematic presentation of Figure 7.4.
The key message of the framework is that while singular institutions are important,
the degree to which they interconnect and underscore a coherent logic, defines the way
in which institutions matter. This reorientates the common logic that public policy for
entrepreneurship should be targeted at particular singular frictions, to consolidating
the overall coherence of the political economy. This parsimonious theoretical framework
can enable future research to move away from an eclectic towards a more focused
investigation of how specific core institutions influence entrepreneurship, answering the
calls of Dilli, Elert & Herrmann (2018). From a public policy perspective, such insights
are highly useful for all those policy-makers who aim to foster entrepreneurship, against
the backdrop of functional equivalence and institutional complementarities.
In terms of guiding principalities of the proposed conceptual framework for further
comparative international entrepreneurship research, the key implication is that institu-
tions should not be studied in isolation. Rather, research into the impact of institutions
should stem from the notion of functional institutional interactions which define to a
greater extent the nature of institutional endogeneity. This has clear implications for
how institutions ‘matter’.
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Fig. 7.4 Conceptual Framework
Institutional Sub-spheres
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7.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter first opened with a discussion differentiated by the three main research
aims. Specifically, it is seen that there remains rich institutional diversity between po-
litical economies, identified by nine clusters of countries across four modes of capitalist,
each defined by complementary variants across institutional sub-spheres. It is also
discussed that institutions effect aggregate levels of entrepreneurship. That is, when
complementary institutions are present across the sub-spheres of the political economy,
rates of Total Entrepreneurial Activity are higher. Institutional diversity identified
by this specification appear to offer unique explanations of cross-national levels of
entrepreneurship. Overall, institutional diversity is a key driver of varied aggregate
entrepreneurial rates. Specifically, the level of entrepreneurial rates is driven by the
degree of institutional coherence of the political economy. This implies that aggregate
economic performance is estimated be higher in nations whose institutionalised practices
correspond more closely to the coherent types of market-based and strategic coordi-
nation models of capitalism. These findings draw attention to arguments concerning
the degree to which countries institutional frameworks need to closely complementary
and institutionally coherent to allow for greater firm and entrepreneurial activity. In
particular, these results show the higher aggregate entrepreneurial performance of a
country is positively linked to the overall coherence of the institutional environment.
This chapter then went on to discuss contributions to theory in specific disciplines
followed by contributions to public policy. It was seen that contradictions in the
institutional complementaries can pose considerable frictions and inefficiencies for
economic actors by undermining the coherence of the political economy. Furthermore,
political economies with particular types of institutions in one sub-sphere tend to have
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particular types of institutions in other sub-spheres. Therefore reforming a particular
institution in a uni-direction should account for the interactions and functionalities
between other institutional sub-spheres commensurate to the mode of capitalism.
As such, it was seen that dynamic stability, institutional evolution and bifurcated
convergence of ‘modes of capitalism’ stems from the economic competitiveness of their
institutional configurations, which can be achieved via the combinations of institutions




This chapter summarises the key contributions from this thesis. It begins by providing
an overview of the thesis and restating the main research gaps, whilst demonstrating
that the research aim and objectives developed to address these gaps have been
answered. Further, it outlines a number of specific contributions, both empirically,
theoretically and methodologically. This is continued by outlining implications and
recommendations for policy, followed by a discussion of the main limitations of the
study. The chapter concludes by suggesting potential avenues for future research.
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8.2 Thesis Summary
This thesis examined the impact of institutions on international entrepreneurship.
Taking an ‘institutional configuration’ approach, this thesis poses several questions in
reference to the nature of institutional diversity and how this can explain the divergent
levels of entrepreneurial activity. The aim of this study was to explore the influence of
national institutional environments on the levels of entrepreneurship
Several literature streams have informed this study. In conceptualising and opera-
tionalising the notion of institutions, it drew upon the Governance works of Amable
(2003) in the area of Comparative Institutionalism. In understanding the structure
and composition of global entrepreneurial activity, the study drew primarily upon the
burgeoning conception from the comparative international entrepreneurship literature.
Other relevant literatures that informed the research include national institutional
system thinking, institutional coherence and comparative innovation performance.
The main justification for conducting this research stemmed from several important
gaps identified in the comparative international entrepreneurship literature. These
concerned: (a) the relative neglect of a ‘comparative institutionalism approach’ and,
more specifically, the lack of theoretical emphasis of national institutional system
thinking via Governance approaches; and (b) overlooking the conception of key com-
parative institutionalism themes such as (i) institutional diversity, (ii) institutional
complementarities and its configurational approach, and (iii) institutional coherence.
At its heart, this thesis illustrates that there is a need to move away from convergent
views of institutions, to applications which sees institutions as divergent creations.
By following a framework derived from Amable’s (2003) comparative institutionalism
perspective and applying it to the gaps identified in the comparative international
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entrepreneurship literature, the study divided national institutional sub-spheres, and
through factor analysis, investigated the separate sub-spheres within a configuration,
accounting for institutional complementarities. This approach offered a framework
which enabled the research to move away from an eclectic list of institutional factors to
offer a parsimonious appreciation of sets of institutions. Subsequently, this provided a
basis for the main research aim to be elaborated and divided into three specific research
objectives. The empirical findings in relation to each research objective were presented
and analysed in Chapters 5 and 6. The discussion of how these findings relate to and
affect existing knowledge within various camps of literature was provided in Chapter 7.
The first objective - which was to ascertain whether capitalist institutional diversity
exists, and if so, whether these diversities could be characterised between political
economies - was addressed using empirical evidence generated from a principal com-
ponents analysis of 42 manifest variables. This evidence concentrated on generating
latent factors in the institutional dimensions of product markets, labour markets, edu-
cation system and financial system. Through the PCA, multiple latent factors were
developed, and through a cluster analysis technique, the study was able to identify
a topography institutional capitalist diversity. Indeed, there exists rich institutional
diversity between political economies, identified by nine clusters of countries across
four modes of capitalism, defined by complementary variants across institutional sub-
spheres. Beyond the original empirical characterisation of economic models, these
results illustrate that the dichotomy between market-based and coordination-based
capitalism is still an important hallmark of institutional diversity. The findings show
some but not complete support for the VoC approach. Also consistent with the VoC
approach, these results show, that this studies institutional configurations pertinent to
those akin to Hall & Soskice’s (2001) LME and CME classifications afford substantial
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comparative advantage, compared with the relative comparative disadvantage of those
configurations not marked by the market/non-market dichotomy.
Furthermore, persistent cross-national differences in institutional practices in the
face of intense convergence pressures suggests that, despite some liberalisation in
coordinated market economies, the distinctions central to comparative capitalism
studies are likely to be of continued value and thus worthy of continued discussion
on institutional change and reform. One therefore obtain support for stability or the
non-convergence hypothesis of VoC.
The second objective - which was to ascertain the effects of institutional diversity
on aggregate entrepreneurship - was addressed through multivariate panel analysis.
Using the institutional factors developed under objective one, the study tests several
model specifications between institutions and levels of international entrepreneurship.
Departing from the narrow definition of institutions, the cluster and factor analysis
underlines the diversity of political economies which are built upon unique configurations
and typologies of institutions. These factors are used to create coordination indices for
each institutional sub-sphere, which illuminates the degree of non-market coordination
present within institutional sub-spheres.
Using panel data analysis, the study finds that the relationship between the degree
of coordination within the institutional complementarity format and the level of
entrepreneurial activity is non-linear. Specifically, the relationship is quadratic and ‘U’
shaped. Where the institutional structure of the political economy allows for higher
levels of market coordination (akin to this studies market based cluster) or higher levels
of strategic coordination (akin to this studies coordination based cluster), estimated
entrepreneurship rates are higher than they are when there is more variation in the
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types of institutional complementarity present in the political economy. The aggregate
performance of entrepreneurship is moderated by the institutional configuration of the
political economy.
These results suggest that the institutional diversity and complementarities per-
spective of the comparative institutionalism literature, built on the distinction between
coherent and incoherent sets of political economies (Hall & Gingerich, 2009; Amable,
2009) has genuine merit. The institutional coherence of the political economy is a
driving explanatory variable in increasing aggregate rates of entrepreneurial activity.
That is, the general performance of aggregate entrepreneurship is suggested to depend
on the degree of institutional coherence. When complementary institutions are present
across spheres of the political economy, aggregate rates of entrepreneurship are higher;
both liberal and strategically coordinated political economies appear to offer general
efficiencies to economic actors, a theme parallel to the arguments of the founding
fathers of comparative institutionalism, Hall & Soskice (2001).
The third objective was to ascertain whether perspectives from comparative insti-
tutionalism can explain the divergent nature of entrepreneurial activity across nations.
This objective allowed for the mapping of institutional diversity as well as an exam-
ination of the causal combinations of institutions that account for higher levels of
entrepreneurial activity across nations. The focus of such approach is on the institu-
tional complementarities within countries that co-evolve with those of other countries to
produce distinct governance configurations. Thus, no single institutional characteristic
is sufficient to explain outcomes; instead, the outcome is related to combinations of
conditions (Fiss, 2007). This research has been able both to identify fine-grained
configurations and to evaluate their impact on national economic outcomes.
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In summary, this study proposes and finds evidence for the argument that national
institutional systems, and thus institutional configurations provide an additional and
significant explanation of aggregate international entrepreneurial activity. The study
observes equifinality and functional equivalence in that some configurations are more
supportive of performance than others. Moreover, the degree to which configurations
impact aggregate activity is a function of the institutional coherence of the politi-
cal economy. The study finds institutional configurations to be important through
the mechanism of institutional complementarities and thus increasing institutional
coherence. How one defines institutions therefore has important implications for how
institutions matter for entrepreneurship.
8.3 Thesis Contributions
Using Baumol’s (1990) work on productive, unproductive and destructive economic
activities as a starting point, the entrepreneurship literature investigating the antecedent
influence of institutions on entrepreneurship gained particular momentum in the early
1990’s. It has often been concluded that ’institutions matter’ for entrepreneurship
because they structure the relative economic pay-offs which influence entrepreneurial
activities (Baumol, 1990). While the literature agrees uniformally that both formal and
informal institutions incentivise individual behaviour (North, 1990), hereby influencing
the extent and composition of an economies activity, it also focussed on individual
and isolated institutional drivers of entrepreneurship. Formal institutions, such as
private property rights, tax policies, Government regulation, capital market regulation
have been empirically found to be beneficial for entrepreneurial activity. Likewise,
informal institutions supporting entrepreneurship include but not exclusive to power
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distance, transactional trust and culture. In short, the current literature suggests that
differences in entrepreneurship between countries can be explained by a broad eclectic
list of institutions as defined by their theoretical basis.
This literature on institutions and entrepreneurship however suffers from several
problems. First, a clear concept of institutions and the institutional system is missing.
Secondly, a parsimonious understanding of whether and how core institutions combine
to facilitate entrepreneurship is missing. Third, scholars often ignore institutional theory
which defines political economies as divergent creations in favour for perspectives which
emphasise their convergence. This leads to the issue that there is a prevailing hegemony
which stresses linearity and thus ‘one-size-fits-all’ configuration of an institution or
institutions. Finally, these misconceptions of institutional influence lead to a narrow
view of how public policy can be conducive for entrepreneurship.
Identification of these literature voids has led this study to contribute by taking a
varied approach to institutional theory, with perspectives from comparative institution-
alism. Applications from the comparative institutionalism literature made it possible
to address these problems. Firstly, comparative institutionalism clearly defined the
institutional architecture, a configuration of institutions. Institutions thus are the
written or verbally agreed rules of the game which lead to a systematic behaviour of
actors (individuals and organisations) i.e. of entrepreneurs and their ventures. This
configurational approach to national institutions is a way of distilling a complex array
of interdependent variables into a unified whole.
Second, this study’s approach stemming from comparative institutionalism offered
a parsimonious theoretical framework to identify a core of inter-related institutions
which influence economic activity (Amable, 2003; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Herrmann,
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2019). To this end, it focussed both on the composition of the institutions and the
functional interdependence of institutions to which defines the overarching taxonomy
of the political economy. Institutions were not be seen in isolation but rather as
non-random creation as defined by the nature of neighbouring institutions. Institutions
channelling the interaction between firms and their activities are therefore contingent
on also the interactions between the structures themselves. This has clear implications
for how ‘institutions matter’, as the findings have illustrated.
This research contributes by showing that the concept of institutional complemen-
tarity is helpful for understanding the internal logic of institutional configurations. It
challenged the focus on effects of single institutions, and redirects our attention to the
functional effects of configurations. It is from this conjecture that aggregate hypothesis
into the effect of institutions on economic performance can be empirically validated.
As argued by Hopner (2005b), complementarity can be a highly abstract concept,
describing one possible functional feature of institutional interaction. Its sources and
consequences, though, have to be specified by empirical research on actual institutions
in a given space and time. As such, this research contributes by supporting in the wave
of empirical validations into the role of institutions, their complementarities and their
pertaining functional interactions.
This thesis yields important empirical contributions. Said research focuses on the
analysis of 29 countries, all members of the OECD, at approximate levels of development.
Based on factor, cluster and panel analyses of institutional indicators, this research
contributes by showing (1) How a core set of institutions differ systematically and
in a parsimonious way between countries; (2) How these institutional constellations
facilitate the development of aggregate levels of entrepreneurship; and (3) The format
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from which institutions effect entrepreneurship: through the mechanism from which
the institutional matrix is coherent.
These findings illustrate how a distinct and highly parsimonious set of institutions
governing the exchange between entrepreneurs and their labour markets, product
markets, education system and financial system lead to different ‘economic models’.
This has shown to translate into different production outcomes across economies
defined by their institutional diversity. The weight of the evidence suggests that the
varieties in economic models captures important difference among political economies.
The concepts of market-orientated and strategic coordination do seem to reflect an
underlying dimension practices across countries. The contention that institutional
complementarities operate across political economies is borne out by the evidence.
Persistent cross-national differences in institutional practices in face of convergence
liberal pressures, suggests that, the distinctions build upon coordination are likely to
be of continuing value.
The institutional configuration perspective recognises that human behaviour is
jointly shaped by the interdependence between institutions, a proposition often dis-
cussed but rarely (given the difficulty) empirically tested. Collectively these findings
support the notion that one important route to advancing institutional theory and com-
parative entrepreneurship research is to integrate the largely separate research streams
on institutional complementarities, coherence and economic activity by considering
configurations of both types and function of institutions.
It is of relative importance to note that the research findings from this study
go beyond a simple assertion that ‘institutions matter’ for entrepreneurship. The
rich empirical evidence presented in Chapters 5 & 6 and subsequent discussions has
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also provided some insights on the questions of how and why institutions matter (i.e.
through the mechanisms of institutional coherence), and also which configurations of
institutions are more or less important. The empirical chapters contain a number of
supporting econometric estimations, coupled with further illustrations with Chapter
7 which shed important lights on the mechanisms through which single institutional
sub-spheres combine to influence aggregate performance. This represents a much
more sophisticated set of findings, and subsequently, a more significant contribution
to comparative international entrepreneurship literature and wider political economy
scholarship.
In studying the effect of institutions on cross national rates of entrepreneurship,
they are often investigated in cross-sectional analysis, typically by isolating a single
institutional factor. As highlighted beforehand, in the econometric analyses, the
endogenous nature of institutions has been recognised as a key limitation to the
validity of estimates. Isolation to singular institutional effect is largely ignorant of
the institutional complementarities which stylise the architecture of the institutional
environment and their subsequent impacts (Aoki, 2001).
This research yields important public policy contributions. Firstly, it can be
illustrated that economic reform in one institution will have impact on other interrelated
institutions, thus reform such take a holistic political economy approach, and not just
removing ‘frictions’ in an identified institution/area. In this way, ‘monocropping’
and supplanting institutions which may be empirically validated to produce returns,
may fail to produce returns in the absence of considering the functional interactions
with other institutions. Reforms in a few institutional sub-spheres cannot lead to a
functionally coherent system because of the interdependence between institutions and
its consequences for agents strategies.
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Secondly, the implementation of some market-based structural reforms, even in
conjunction with one another, may not be enough to transform political economies
based on different principles into liberal market economies. Given the rich diversity
between OECD economies, and the empirical suggestion of functional equivalents,
forwards the rationale that reform can be against the grain of liberalisation towards
market based political economies. Economic returns are increased by institutional
coherence, for which means solidifying the complementarity set between institutions, for
which can be in the direction of strategic (non-market) coordination. The impression
is that such a large set of inconsistencies is suggested to affect performance.
Thirdly, the results contribute in its inference for the wider role that states can take
in their approach to institutional reform. The equifinality of different coordination
mechanisms is contributes to the question of ‘what kinds of reforms’ (and especially
in which areas) may undermine the capacities for coherent coordination. Especially,
couple with discussion of the (in)stabilities of (in)coherent varieties of coordination,
contributes to a wider discussion of how stabilities can be increased in incoherent
models. Differently, any analysis of how institutions change should begin from a
conception of how institutions are sustained during periods when they may remain
stable (Hall & Thelen, 2009). The lack of self-reinforcement in light of incomplete
calibration and complementarities means that states are actively pervasive in the
direct production, regulation and correction of coordination failures (Molina & Rhodes,
2007). Institutional stability in these systems can quickly degenerate into sclerosis
producing durable ‘non-complementarities’ within the production regime and across the
political system. State regulation will tend to reinforce long term inefficiencies because
the collective action (i.e. prisoner dilemma) problems that ensue and subsequent
institutional inertia, and therefore entrepreneurial policy should be taken in such
contextual discussion. In the absence of mechanisms for collective goods provision, or
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a state independent and powerful enough to resist vested interest demands, actors will
tend rationally to pursue their independently defined interests. Complementarities -
the outcome of coordination between freely contrasting actors - will prove extremely
difficult to build.
Illuminating the fact that states are self-perpetuating the long-term inefficient
equilibriums raises a debate of how institutional incoherence can be overcome and how
entrepreneurial policy can be successful. Thus institutional change needed requires
significant renegotiation of the politically invested system of public-political control
(Streeck & Thelen, 2009; Schneider, 2009; Wood & Frynas, 2005) invoked by limited
degrees of freedom and path-dependencies. This is to overcome the issue of institutional
settings becoming permanently settled into their foundations with the preservation of
institutional contradictions and non-complementarity. In short, once you illuminate
the role of complementarities, it is difficult to separate away a narrative on institutional
change and stability. This study contributes to entrepreneurial policy by demonstrating
and empirically validating that governments must take account of the functionalities and
interdependence of institutions. Contradictions in the institutional complementaries
can pose considerable frictions and inefficiencies for economic actors by undermining
the coherence of the political economy. Monocropping policies which work in one model
of capitalist may not work in another. Importantly, this means that policymakers need
to be aware of the implications that regulatory changes in the institutional environment
will have, as suggested by Dilli et al (2018).
Overall, this thesis jointly makes contributions to the extant literature. The
current comparative international entrepreneurship literature suggests that differences
in entrepreneurship between countries can be explained by a broad list of institutions
as defined by their theoretical basis. However, to date, comparative institutionalist
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perspectives have hardly been applied in entrepreneurship research. This thesis provides
a theoretical and empirical contribution by introducing a holistic, configurational
approach to institutions and their influence on entrepreneurship. This echoes calls
by Herrmann (2019) to use certain comparative institutionalist theoretical strands to
"explain how a core group of distinct national institutions facilitate the development of
different types of entrepreneurship between countries".
This study is one of the first to introduce the key tenets of comparative institu-
tionalism, contributing by theoretically blending and empirically validating the role of
institutional complementarities, institutional coherence and equifinality. In particular,
it contributes to extant literature by shifting the extant literature focus away from
converging approaches to institutional to diversity approaches to institutions. This
contributes by empirically justifying, through a robust approach to the estimation of
the institutional environment, that there is not ‘one-best-way’ for an entrepreneurial
society, but rather an emphasis to the functional equivalence of political economies
based on their complementarities and coherence. No single institutional characteristic
is sufficient to explain outcomes, as extant literature suggests. Instead, the outcome is
related to combinations of conditions (Fiss, 2007). This research has been able both to
identify fine-grained configurations and to evaluate their impact on national economic
outcomes, and again adds empirical substance to the calls of Herrmann (2019) for
"entrepreneurship research to investigate the idea of institution-based equifinality".
This yields important public policy implications given reforms in a few institutional sub-
spheres cannot lead to a functionally coherent system because of the interdependence
between institutions and its consequences for agents strategies.
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8.4 Limitations of the Study
Though these empirical findings and methodological design are robust to a large
number of alternative specifications, they may have important limitations which must
be identified in pursuit of further work. This study is one of the first comparative
institutionalism studies in international entrepreneurship and as such, it is not without
limitations.
A simplifying assumption of the study is that institutions are treat as exogenous
and studied a causal link flowing from the respective independent institutional based
variables and aggregate entrepreneurship. Whilst the panel analysis has controlled
for any ‘endogeneity’ in the models, the link between aggregate performance and
the structure of institutions may indeed be partially reciprocal. As argued by Deeg
& Jackson (2007), the issue of endogeneity plagues all comparative institutionalism
research. Institutional change may trigger a change in aggregate efficiencies, but as
comparative performance shifts, institutional measures may change as a result (Hall &
Thelen, 2009; Schneider & Paunescu, 2012; Deeg & Jackson, 2007).
Furthermore, there may be limitations in relation to construct validity. Bryman
(2008, p. 151) argue that validity refers to the issue of whether an indicator (or
set of indicators) that is devised to gauge a concept really measures the concept.
Validity can be assessed in different ways; social scientists have focused their attention
to measurement of construct validity (Carmines & Zeller, 1979). Construct validity
generally refers to the process whereby a researcher deduce hypotheses form a theory
that is relevant to the concept. Though there are no agreed upon measures based on
a uniform agreement of institutions and their ‘crucial dimensions’ of analysis, there
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is general consensus on the analysis of sub-spheres and their pertaining institutional
characteristics.
Nonetheless, there could be issues raised concerning the construct validity of the
coordination measures. Hall & Soskice (2001) discussed the notion of transferable
versus relational assets across their categories of institutional sub-spheres. Likewise,
Amable (2003) forwards a similar logic around the nation of institutional coordination.
However, little consensus exists about which institutional indicators should be used to
best capture ‘coordination’ in each institutional sub-sphere. Whilst this study takes
considerable steps in validating the coordination and complementarity indices, better
measures may, as the literature matures, be considerably agreed upon. Yet comparative
institutionalism is defined by wide plurality in approaches, for which both bring varied
methodologies and classifications of institutional sub-spheres.
Interpretation and functionalism could contribute to a relative limitation. Part
of the issue is the restrictive conceptualisation of complementarities as residing in
institutional coherence, which allows only for two fully complementary configurations
(Morgan, 2005; Witt & Jackson, 2016). Whilst this is not necessary wrong, in particular
given empirical support for the quadratic relationships where coordination indices or
both high and low, concerns maybe raised in relation to the efficacy of the coherence
hypothesis. As put by Crouch & Farrell (2004, p. 8), preoccupation with ‘coherent
logics of ordering’ prevents an understanding of incongruencies, incoherence, and within
system diversities". Despite this, authors are yet to characterise beyond the institutional
coherence classifications, with notion of complementarity and coherence still seen by
many scholars as the key leitmotif of comparative institutionalism (Hancke, 2007;
Hopner, 2007). It is clear from this empirical work that the retention of such themes
8.4 Limitations of the Study 324
that more functional interpretations are more of theoretical worth than open-ended,
unstructured voluntarism.
Forcing countries into one or the other category runs the risk of ignoring fundamental
differences between them, thereby emptying the classification of its meaning. Categories
that are too broad tell us very little about what brings countries together in a specific
group. This research only provides a snapshot of institutions over a limited time
period and therefore hardly illustrates all possible changes occurring in institutional
configurations. Whilst institutions are argued to have been largely stable over time
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2015), as subtly validated by the studies correlation analysis
with Hall & Gingerich (2009) measures, a historical study of the evolution of institutional
diversity, and its impacts on entrepreneurship would constitute a first important avenue
for future research.
Furthermore, variation exists within countries at the level of states, regions and
individuals. To better understand the complex relationships between institutions
and economic behaviour, a multilevel analysis would indeed be desirable, examining
how institutions influence individual entrepreneurial behaviour at both the aggregate
country level, and the level of states or regions. Additionally, there is reason to be
sceptical about the veracity of empirical findings that appear to support linkages
between aggregated concepts such as these and aggregated outcomes such as growth,
employment and inflation. Assessing such claims requires clear specification and testing
of the purported causal mechanisms (Hedstrom & Swedberg, 1996; Goldthorpe, 2001).
Finding associations may or may not tell us something interesting. It is not suggesting
that aggregate analyses are useless, but rather that they should be considered only a
partial step in the investigation of causal linkages and the broader research agenda.
However, the frame of reference for which matches institutions with macroeconomic
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performance is neatly articulated by Amable (2003), who argues that "instituions define
incentives and constraints that will lead agents to invest in certain assets, cooperate, or
be opportunistic. These individual decisions will affect macroeconomic performance".
Institutions therefore are a key frame of reference for synthesising with macroeconomic
performance, albeit the mechanisms of causality should be of a deeper, micro orientated
appraisal. An analytical framework which is orientated around aggregation therefore is
supported and valid, but part of a larger debate of how institutions matter. Nonetheless,
matching institutions with aggregate measures of economic outcomes is a well-defined,
respected yet emergent field of literature (i.e. Judge et al, 2014; Hall & Gingerich,
2009; Schnieder & Pausnesu, 2012; Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Witt & Jackson, 2016).
This research has largely been concerned with the interaction between micro (firms)
and macro (production regime) levels in political economies. However, the macro
‘production regime’ is interlinked with other macro features of the macro-economy,
such as the political systems (Lijphart, 1984), Aggregate Demand management regimes
(Soskice, 2007) and welfare systems (Esping-Anderson, 1990). That is, the production
regime is endogenous with the forces from varied arenas of the political economy.
Whilst these interactions and their theoretical and empirical mapping are beyond the
scope of this study (and one that is rather underdeveloped), it should be acknowledged,
particular in relation to institutional change, that various arenas of the political
economy can have implications for examining ‘the’ role of the production regime.
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8.5 Directions for Further Research
This study has dealt with different literature and in this process identified a range of
interesting and potentially important avenues for future research. The nature of this
thesis and the subsequent conceptual framework (Figure 7.8) provides a good point
of reference to understand and develop further research. The conceptual framework
highlights a link with institutions, complementarities and institutional coherence
for ‘aggregate outcomes’. This study provides an initial aggregate view of causality
from which further studies can extend upon. This has implications for comparative
international entrepreneurship by emphasising a move away from testing singular
institutions to complementarities and coherence; alongside political economy, that is,
better ‘linking’ and testing of institutions and their effect. The following discussion
emphasises specific areas for further research in subsequent camps of literature.
In terms of guiding principalities of the proposed conceptual framework for further
comparative international entrepreneurship research, the key implication is that institu-
tions should not be studied in isolation. Rather, research into the impact of institutions
should stem from the notion of functional institutional interactions which define to a
greater extent the nature of institutional endogeneity. This has clear implications for
how institutions ‘matter’. In view of the empirical evidence supporting the argument
that distinct institutional constellations facilitate and help explain diversities in en-
trepreneurial activity, which implications arise for a well-defined theory of institutional
affects on entrepreneurship? To begin with, entrepreneurship research would benefit
from assuming a more parsimonious approach towards investigating the link between
institutions and entrepreneurship (Herrmann, 2019). Importantly, the parsimonious
comparative institutionalism framework, based on core sets of institutional sub-spheres
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and their complementarities, can enable comparative international entrepreneurship
research to move away from its eclectic ’listing’ towards a more focused and functional
link between institutions and entrepreneurship.
More importantly, and within this parsimonious framework, this study reorientates
the literature to investigate in more detail the idea of institutional equifinality discussed
beforehand. One of the major insights of this studies configurational framework and
empirical results is that economic actors in differently institutional environments need to
behave differently in order to achieve the same outcome. In reciprocal terms, if economic
actors across economies behave alike, this behaviour tends to result into differently
outcomes given the nature of the institutional environment and the functions they
perform. Research into such questions of institutionally induced equifinality can offer
a novel approach to investigating the link between institutions and entrepreneurship,
and this study is the first in the step to shift in such direction.
The findings show important emphasis of institutional complementarities in that the
configuration arrangement of the institutional environment appear to help explain the
diversity of entrepreneurial activity. While it appears that the coherence of institutional
complementarities appear to offer genuine efficiencies for an economy, in line with
the hypothesis of Hall & Gingerich (2009), it is not been the intentions of this study
to analyse this mechanism at a finer-grained level. Undoubtedly there are more
complementarities in the political economy than this study proposed, some emerging
literature specifies some more precise complementarities that can be explored in detail,
and thus can be used to understanding some of the casual mechanisms from which
underpin entrepreneurial activity.
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Furthermore, as outlined in the foregoing limitations, there may well be endogenous
relations between performance and institutional form. Institutional change may trigger
a change in aggregate efficiencies, but as comparative performance shifts, institutional
measures may change as a result. Specifically, the institutional architecture could
be a result of aggregate economic performance, hereby reciprocal and endogenous.
Whilst it maybe unjust to fully propose that certain economic outcomes create certain
institutional forms, due to the sample scale and seminal nature of formalised institutions,
it is possible that institutions are a result of prior equitable economic outcomes.
Similarly, extrapolating results into the future may have its limitations given the
dynamic nature of the global economy. As such, future research should examine
changes in these institutional configurations over longer periods of time. Longitudinal
comparative research could complement this thesis and advance the understanding of
how these institutional configurations are related dynamically. Differently, additional
research should be conducted to analyse the fundamental causes of the movements of
specific countries across different capitalism types.
Another interesting area for further research could be to assess the nature of com-
plementarities and reform with the use of vector autoregression (VAR) modelling.
From this perspective, institutional reform could be analysed across time and margins,
particularly in relation to how this impacts the strength of coefficients of other comple-
mentary institutions. This can be used, where data availability prevails, in relation to
types of entrepreneurship. For example, it would be interesting to account the marginal
change of one institutions on another over time, and thus how this impacts the change
in said outcome measure. This indeed would allow the literature to better understand
how complementarities form, adapt and adjust to external changes, particularly in
relation to how they can thus be used for reform, that is, ‘impulse-response’ modelling.
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Understanding the dynamics across time will help facilitate discussions not just around
the concept of diversity, but rather divergence.
Additionally, this research could be used for further research to benefit from an
adoption of a qualitative, inductive approach to explore the influence of institutional
environments. Unlike quantitative methods, qualitative can be concerned with theory
building from case studies. Considering the significance attached in this study to
understanding institutions that are embedded in specific national contexts, future
research could benefit from a broader "contextualised explanation" of social phenomenon
(Welch et al, 2011, p. 747). This approach, which is essentially a more nuanced method
of theorising from case studies, can be deemed important as it enables the much needed
contextualisation of the case study countries and their institutional environments, and
offers an enhanced potential for developing empirically rich analyses and explanations.
An interesting direction for future research would be to explore the consequences
of the diversity of institutional structures for different types of entrepreneurial ac-
tivity. Baumol (1990) argues that institutions are likely to affect the allocation of
entrepreneurial activity. The literature would benefit from more detailed research on
the types of entrepreneurial activity that flourish under the different forms of institu-
tional structures validated by this thesis. This would lend into supporting Herrmann’s
(2019) plea for ’varieties of entrepreneurship’, and lead in to the work of Dilli et al
(2018).
The results of this thesis may be limited to the specific time frame and country
sample. This study is based on a 6-year window for reasons of data availability, depth
and rigour as explained earlier. Whilst this studies country sample covers only OECD
countries, it is possible that a larger range of countries might lead to more nuanced
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and comprehensive insights. However, the nature of present data availability may be a
precluding factor in such extension to a larger country sample, yet giving the increasing
scope of country level information may help in the pursuit of this future avenue of
research.
The study of comparing different forms of modern capitalism has a central place in
comparative political economy. The discourse of comparing institutional configurations
across countries has led to the emergence of a plurality of typologies that describe the
essential features of different welfare production regimes. Amongst the most prominent
categorizations has been the distinction between coordinated market economies and
liberal market economies, as outlined in Varieties of Capitalism, written by Hall and
Soskice (2001). The corresponding typologies have been used in a wide range of other
empirical work to explain causal relations between political phenomena and economic
achievements/outcome variables.
The nature of the application of institutional theory has assumed that institutions
are largely homogeneous within an economy whilst relatively distinct across economies.
However, some recent work has demonstrated a "multiplexity" of institutions operating
within an economy (Witt & Redding, 2013). They have noted that transnational and
supranational institutions can and do influence national institutions, particularly with
respect to supranational influences of bodies such as the European Union (Allen &
Aldred, 2011). Each model of capitalism is likely, over a relative large time period,
to adapt and evolve according to the relevant features of the global or local economy
shift over time. This evolution may include elements of imitation and mono-cropping
that creates institutional convergence (Judge, Fainshmidt & Brown, 2014). Whilst this
has been discussed in the foregoing results of this thesis, further research could aim to
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understand the degree to which institutions vary within and across various forms of
capitalism so that these assumptions can be validated or overlooked.
With reference to International Business (IB), in recent years, scholars have reaf-
firmed their commitment to the interdisciplinary nature of their research field (e.g.
Chabowski et al., 2017). In particular, they have embraced institutionalism, as a
theoretical perspective embedded in a variety of disciplines and forms of analysis (see
Morgan et al., 2010; Scott, 2013), as a necessary complement to more traditional modes
of economic analysis. Whilst institutions matter for international business, how they
matter is a contested area. It could be argued that how they matter ultimately depends
on how the international business (IB) scholars define institutions. Given the plurality
of institutional approaches, IB has the propensity to adopt a ‘narrow’ definition of
institutions (Allen & Aldred, 2012), tending to favour New Institutional Economics
(NIE) approaches. The neglect for broader definitions and approaches to institutional
research has led the international business literature to concentrate on the standard
‘formal & informal’ convergent framework of institutions. This has led to belief that
there is ‘one best set’ of institutions; all countries should converge and ‘monocrop’
the ‘best’ institutions (Rodrik, 2008). Taking a broader conception of institutions as
underpinned by political economy/comparative capitalist institutionalism literature
provides the contrast to ‘convergent’ based views; institutions are divergent creations
and there is ‘not-one-best-way’. Indeed, what is lacking from the international business
literature is an analytical focus on the ways in which institutional diversity can impact
firms naturally operating within varied political economies (Jackson & Deeg, 2008;
Morgan, 2012; Allen & Aldred, 2012; Jackson & Deeg, 2019). The disciplines of
political economy and comparative capitalist institutionalism provide a fertile ground
for the cross-disciplinary approach to the treatment of institutions within international
business. If the configurations of institutions ‘matter’ for numerous sub-domains
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of international business scholarship, then clearly a quantitative blueprint to assess
institutional diversity remains central to the momentum of such ‘institutional turn’.
This research provides a natural framework to extend institutional approaches in
international business research with the concentration of institutional diversity theorised
to shape the behaviour of companies. The inclusion of a wider set of institutions coupled
with our quantitative capitalist framework that specifies objective diversity of political
economies arguably lends to a richer explanation of how institutional variance can
impact the activities and conduct of firms. Specifically, this research allows international
business scholars to lend closer attention to the particular institutional context within
which firms operate (Allen, 2004; Lange 2009). This can be achieved in several
ways. For example, the proximity matrix (Fig B.5) provides a natural focus on the
‘institutional distance’ between countries and clusters. Much IB work on cross-national
differences and country distance has been influenced by cultural value theory, stressing
underlying differences in cultural values that impact firm behaviour. Specifically it is
argued that the cultural distance between home and host countries is important for
MNE’s entry mode decisions and broader decisions of internationalisation (Brouthers
2002; Meyer, 2001; Brouthers & Hennart, 2007). Beyond the concept of distance as
defined by cultural variance, cross-country differences can be measured in terms of the
institutional diversity between political economies. This study allows international
business scholars to measure ‘institutional distance’ by the single proximity score
between either specific countries or clusters.
Beyond the use of linear-based analysis of institutional dissimilarity, this research
provides a framework to assess the possible importance of particular combinations of
institutions. International business has often discussed cross-national diversity either
by the terms of ‘economic development’ (e.g. developed versus emerging economies),
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or by the relative distance (particularly culture) between sets of countries (Jackson
& Deeg, 2008) rather than institutions as particular configurations and typologies
(Jackson & Deeg, 2019). Therefore, how institutions matter can be determined by
which divergent ‘set’ of institutions rather than the particular effectiveness of a given
institution. This provides substantial scope for future institutional based international
business research, where institutional frameworks provide the natural context to the
country ‘duality’ posed to MNEs (Morgan, 2012). For example, do MNEs from
the neo-liberal capitalist cluster find it relatively easier to adapt in other market
based capitalist modes? Do capitalist regimes characterised by low product market
regulations tend to encourage relatively more market-seeking FDI than non-equity
entry modes? Do countries with high human asset specificity tend to encourage
more strategic led investments relative to low skill asset specificity countries? As
echoed by various authors, the comparative capitalist literature provides a suitable
conceptual framework for international business; we have taken this forward with
the provision of a quantitative assessment of institutional diversity. Accordingly, our
conceptualisation provides amble scope to theorise institutions at different levels and
develop a coherent understanding of how institutional diversity (not just institutional
convergence) influences various aspects of the international business domain.
Thirteen years ago, Redding (2005, p. 124) observed that "there is scanty attention
to context" in much international business research and called for the field to address this
issue. This research has responded to this void by focusing particularly on advancing
the understanding of the institutional context with a greater basis of statistical and
empirical evaluation. Specifically, this work goes beyond the VoC and NBS perspectives
to illustrate a more fruitful and comprehensive framework relevant to political economies
of the OECD. As such we provide an improved platform for scholars examining the
implications of cross-national differences of activity embedded in different and diverse
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types of institutional systems, which has recently been called for in the work of Jackson
& Deeg (2019). This study offers a more comprehensive and systemic way to think
about institutional context. Namely, it transcends geographical boundaries and allows
for a parsimonious conceptual and operational mapping of nation-states that may not
appear similar (or dissimilar) when looking at a single type of institution or variable
(Aguilera et al, 2008). To suitably understand international business context, scholars
need to combine a political economies institutions with a configurational arrangement
as executed here. After all, "within that [International Business] literature, the analysis
focuses on a relatively narrow range of institutions. Even within the comparative
capitalisms perspective, there has been a tendency to overlook the impact that the
absence of key institutions can have on outcomes" (Allen & Aldred, 2012, p. 402)
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Pooled OLS estimation begins with the basis form of Eq (A.1) below:
yi = Xiβpool + ui (A.1)
where...
yi = (yi1, ..., yit)
Xi = (yi,t−1, x1it, ..., xkit)
βpool = (α, β1, ...βk)
366
ui = (ui1, ..., uit)
The coefficient vector βpool can be obtained by assuming orthogonality conditions
E(Xiui) = 0, which yields the following calculation:
E[Xi(yi − Xiβpool)] = 0
E(XiXi)βpool = E(Xiyi)
βpool = [E(XiXi)]−1E(Xiyi)







Here random heterogeneity comes into play. Consider α∗1, ..., α∗N as realisations of N
independent draws from a probability distribution which characterises the population
from which the N individuals, here countries i, are selected. The regression equation
is therefore:
yit = α∗i + xitβ + uit, i = 1, ..., N ; t = 1, ..., T, (A.3)
367
where xit = (x1it, ..., xKit) contains the observations on the K regressors from
individual country i in period t, and β = (β1, ..., βK)′ is its coefficient vector, common
to all countries i. The individual-specific intercepts, α∗i satisfy:
E(α∗i |X) = k, var(α∗i |X) = σ2α, cov(α∗i , α∗j |X) = 0(i ̸= j);
i, j = 1, ..., N
(A.4)
where k and σ2α are unknown constants and X symbolises all values of xit in the data
set. Choosing this formulation instead, it reduces the number of unknown parameters
describing the individual-specific intercepts from N to two: the expectation k and the
variance σ2α. It economises on the number of unknown parameters as compared with
using fixed individual-specific effects, and the reduction is substantial since N will
often be large.
Letting αi = α∗i − E(α∗i ) = α∗i − k, the model with K regressors, stochastic
individual-specific effects, and disturbance homoskedasticity reads:
yit = k + xitβ + αi + uit = k + xitβ + ϵit, ϵit = αi + uit,
(uit|X) ∼ iid(o, σ2), (αi|X) ∼ IID(0, σ2α),
uit ⊥ αi, i = 1, ..., N ; t = 1, ..., T,
(A.5)
where ⊥ denotes ‘orthogonal to’ and ϵit can be interpreted as a composite, gross
disturbance, generated by one simple random draw for country i and one random draw
made repeatedly for country i in each period.
368
OLS Regression Estimator
OLS regression estimates the mean of the dependant variable (Y) conditional on the
independent variable (X). The conditional mean of Y is:
E(yi|xi) = β0 + β1xi (A.6)
The OLS estimator computes the parameter estimates by minimising the sum of
squared residuals:




Table B.1 Overview of Country Samples































Fig. B.1 Manifest Variables: Labour Market
 
Dimension Measure Definition Source 
Labour 
Markets 
Protection of Permanent Workers 
against Individual and Collective 
Dismissal 
Protection of permanent workers with respect to (i) 
procedural inconveniences (ii) notice periods and severance 
pay and (iii) difficulty of dismissal (index points 0-6, least to 
most restrictive) 
OECD 
 Protection of Permanent Workers 
against Individual Dismissal 
Protection of permanent workers with respect to (i) individual 
procedural inconveniences (ii) notice periods and severance 
pay and (iii) difficulty of individual dismissal (index points 0-6, 
least to most restrictive) 
OECD 
 Regulation on Temporary Forms 
of Employment 
Regulation of fixed-term and temporary work agency 
contracts with respect to the type of work for which these 
contracts are allowed and their duration; regulation governing 
the establishment and operation of temporary work agencies; 
requirements for agency workers to receive the same pay 
and/or conditions as equivalent workers in the user firm, 
which can increase the cost of using temporary agency 
workers relative to hiring workers on permanent contracts 
(index points 0-6, least to most restrictive) 
OECD 
 Union Density Ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade union 
members, divided by the total number of wage and salary 
earners 
ICTWSS 
 Wage Coordination Degree of wage coordination from 1 = fragmented wage 
bargaining confined largely to individual firms or plants, 5 = 
centralised wage bargaining  
ICTWSS 
 Flexibility of Wage Determination How are wages generally set in your country? (1 = by a 
centralised bargaining process; 7 = up to each individual 
company) 
WEF 
 Public Expenditure on Public 
Employment Services 
Public expenditure on public employment services including 
an employment fund which is spent on training, wage 
subsidies and work experience, benefit administration and 
placement/related services by both public and private 
providers as a % of GDP 
OECD 
 Public Expenditure on Training Public expenditure on labour market training programmes 
including institutional training, workplace training, integrated 
training and special support for apprenticeships as a % of GDP 
OECD 
 Public Expenditure on Sheltered, 
Rehabilitation & Supported 
Employment 
Public expenditure on sheltered, supported employment and 
rehabilitation as a % of GDP 
OECD 
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Fig. B.2 Manifest Variables: Product Market
 
Dimension Measure Definition Source 
Product 
Markets 
Administration Burden for 
Corporations 
Administrative burdens on creating a public limited company 
(index points 0-6, least to most restrictive) 
OECD 
 Administration Burden for Sole 
Proprietor Firms 
Administration burdens on creative individual enterprise 
(index points 0-6, least to most restrictive) 
OECD 
 Communication and 
Simplification of Rules & 
Regulations 
Governments communication strategy and efforts to reduce 
and simplify the administration burden of interacting with the 
Government (index points 0-6, least to most restrictive) 
OECD 
 Barriers in Network Sector Entry barriers in 8 network sectors and degree of vertical 
separation in the gas, electricity and rail transport sectors 
(index points 0-6, least to most restrictive) 
OECD 
 Legal Barriers to Entry Pervasiveness of barriers to entry in 30 business sectors as a 
share of sectors in which there are explicit legal limitations on 
the number of competitors (index points 0-6, least to most 
restrictive) 
OECD 
 Scope of State Owned 
Enterprises 
Pervasiveness of State ownership across 30 business sectors 
measured as a share of sectors in which the state controls at 
least one firm (index points 0-6, least to most restrictive) 
OECD 
 Government Involvement in 
Network Sector 
Government stakes in the largest firms in 6 network sectors 
(electricity, gas, rail transport, air transport, postal services & 
telecommunications) - (index points 0-6, least to most 
restrictive) 
OECD 
 Government Control over Private 
Enterprises 
Indicators of the licensing & permit system, enterprise 
procedures, administration burdens on start-ups, scope of 
legal barriers, existence of anti-trust exemptions for public 
enterprises (index points 0-6, least to most restrictive) 
OECD 
 Government use of Price Controls  Extent and type of price controls in the economy (index points 
0-6, least to most restrictive) 
OECD 
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Fig. B.3 Manifest Variables: Education System
 
Dimension Measure Definition Source 
Education 
System 
Gross Domestic Expenditure on 
R&D 
Gross domestic expenditure on Research & Development 
(GERD), defined as the total expenditure on R&D carried out 
by all resident companies, research institutes, University and 
Government laboratories as % of GDP 
OECD 
 Publicly Financed R&D Public expenditure on Research & Development (R&D) as a % 
of GDP 
OECD 
 Percentage of Labour Force with 
Tertiary Level as Highest Level of 
Education 
Labour force with tertiary education is the share of the total 
labour force that attained or completed tertiary education as 
the highest level of education. 
World 
Bank 
 Expenditure on Primary 
Education as % of Government 
Expenditure on Education 
Public expenditure on primary education as a share of total 
government expenditure on education. 
OECD 
 Expenditure on Secondary 
Education as % of Government 
Expenditure on Education 
Public expenditure on secondary education as a share of total 
government expenditure on education. 
OECD 
 Share of Population by Education 
Attainment: Upper Secondary & 
Post-Secondary Non-Tertiary – 
General Education 
Population with upper secondary & post-secondary non-
tertiary 'general education' is the share of the population that 
attained or completed such qualification level as their highest 
level of education 
OECD 
 Share of Population by Education 
Attainment: Upper Secondary & 
Post-Secondary Non-Tertiary – 
Vocational Training 
Population with upper secondary & post-secondary non-
tertiary 'vocational education' is the share of the population 
that attained or completed such qualification level as their 
highest level of education 
OECD 
 Percentage of Labour Force with 
Secondary Education as Highest 
Level of Education 
Labour force with secondary education is the share of the total 
labour force that attained or completed secondary education 
as the highest level of education. 
World 
Bank 
 Unemployment Rates by 
Education Attainment – Upper 
Secondary & Post-Secondary 
Non-Tertiary Education 
Unemployment rates of those in the labour force whom their 
highest level of educational attainment is ' Upper Secondary & 
Post-Secondary Non-Tertiary Education' 
OECD 
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Fig. B.4 Manifest Variables: Financial System
 
Dimension Measure Definition Source 
Financial 
System 
Ease of Access to Loans In your country, how easy is it to obtain a bank loan with only 
a good business plan and no collateral? (1 = extremely 
difficult; 7 = extremely easy) 
WEF 
 Availability of Financial Services In your country, to what extent does the financial sector 
provide a wide range of financial products and services to 
businesses?  (1 = not at all; 7 = provides a wide variety) 
WEF 
 Venture Capital Availability  In your country, how easy is it for entrepreneurs with 
innovative but risky projects to find venture capital? (1 = 
extremely difficult; 7 = extremely easy) 
WEF 
 Financing through Local Equity 
Markets 
In your country, how easy is it for companies to raise money 
by issuing shares on the stock market?  (1 = extremely difficult; 
7 = extremely easy) 
WEF 
 Five Bank Asset Concentration Assets of five largest banks as a share of total commercial 
banking assets.  
World 
Bank 
 Bank Concentration (%) Assets of three largest commercial banks as a share of total 
commercial banking assets.  
World 
Bank 
 Pension Fund Assets to GDP Ratio of assets of pension funds to GDP. A pension fund is any 
plan, fund, or scheme that provides retirement income. 
World 
Bank 
 Stock Market Capitalisation Total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a & of GDP World 
Bank 
 Stock Market Total Value Traded 
to GDP 
Total value of all traded shares in a stock market exchange as a 
% of GDP 
World 
Bank 
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